Johan Vikström

Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part-time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.

Social Behaviour in Work Absence

By making use of a large-scale randomized experiment, we test whether social behaviour is important for work absence due to illness. The individuals treated in the experiment were exposed to less monitoring of their eligibility to collect sickness insurance benefits, which sharply increased their non-monitored work absence. This exogenous variation is exploited in two complementary analyses. In both analyses, we find significant social-behaviour effects. Using detailed data, we conclude that the social-behaviour effects most likely stem from fairness concerns.