Johanna Helena Kerstholt

How robust is the language architecture? The case of mood

In neurocognitive research on language, the processing principles of the system at hand are usually assumed to be relatively invariant. However, research on attention, memory, decision-making, and social judgment has shown that mood can substantially modulate how the brain processes information. For example, in a bad mood, people typically have a narrower focus of attention and rely less on heuristics. In the face of such pervasive mood effects elsewhere in the brain, it seems unlikely that language processing would remain untouched. In an EEG experiment, we manipulated the mood of participants just before they read texts that confirmed or disconfirmed verb-based expectations about who would be talked about next (e.g., that “David praised Linda because … ” would continue about Linda, not David), or that respected or violated a syntactic agreement rule (e.g., “The boys turns”). ERPs showed that mood had little effect on syntactic parsing, but did substantially affect referential anticipation: whereas readers anticipated information about a specific person when they were in a good mood, a bad mood completely abolished such anticipation. A behavioral follow-up experiment suggested that a bad mood did not interfere with verb-based expectations per se, but prevented readers from using that information rapidly enough to predict upcoming reference on the fly, as the sentence unfolds. In all, our results reveal that background mood, a rather unobtrusive affective state, selectively changes a crucial aspect of real-time language processing. This observation fits well with other observed interactions between language processing and affect (emotions, preferences, attitudes, mood), and more generally testifies to the importance of studying “cold” cognitive functions in relation to “hot” aspects of the brain.

The effect of a priori probability and complexity on decision making in a supervisory control task

In the present study we investigated how monitoring and fault management in a ship control task are affected by complexity and a priori probability of disturbances. Participants were required to supervise four independent shipping subsystems and to adjust the subsystems whenever deviations occurred. However, in order to apply the correct action, they first had to diagnose the cause of the deviation by requesting further subsystem information. Complexity and a priori probability were manipulated by varying the number of disturbances occurring simultaneously and the disturbance rates over subsystems. In general, the results indicate that the participants ignored the monitoring function when they were diagnosing a disturbance. Results also show evidence for “cognitive lockup”: Despite the possibility of stabilizing additional system faults and, consequently, increasing their time for diagnosis, participants tended not to interrupt an ongoing fault-finding process. Still, large individual differences were found in both the selected strategy and reasoning abilities.

Does suggestive information cause a confirmation bias in bullet comparisons

Several researchers have argued that the confirmation bias, the tendency to selectively gather and process information such that it fits existing beliefs, is a main threat to objective forensic examinations. The goal of the present study was to empirically investigate whether examiners making bullet comparisons are indeed vulnerable to this bias. In the first experiment, six qualified examiners evaluated 6 sets of bullets that were presented to them twice. In the neutral task condition it was mentioned in the case description that there were two perpetrators and two crime scenes, whereas in the potentially biasing task condition it was mentioned that there was only one perpetrator and one crime scene. The results showed no effect of biased information on the decision outcome. An exploratory analysis revealed rather large individual differences in two cases. In a second study we compared the conclusions of first and second examiners of actual cases that were conducted in the period between 1997 and 2006. As the second examiner mostly has no context information it may be expected that the conclusion of the first examiner should be more extreme when he or she would have become prey to a confirmation bias. The results indicate an effect in the opposite direction: the first examiner gave less extreme ratings than the second one. In all, our results indicate that examiners were not affected by biased information the case description.

Disability assessments: effects of response mode and experience

Purpose. To what extent response mode and experience affect the assessment of disability was investigated. Method. An experiment was conducted in which 34 medical doctors (17 inexperienced and 15 experienced) were required to assess disability of a videotaped client. Participants either gave a probability assessment after each piece of information or only after all information had been processed (step-by-step, SBS, or end-of-sequence, EOS). They were furthermore required to indicate how confident they were of their judgement and which information was most important for their judgement. Results. Neither response mode nor experience affected the assessment of disability. Only experienced doctors changed their judgement after seeing the video as compared to their judgement after reading the file. Even though all doctors became more confident after seeing the video, this increase was stronger for experienced than inexperienced doctors. Experienced doctors more often mentioned limitations as the basis for their judgements and, to a lesser degree, clients motivation to return to work than inexperienced doctors. Conclusions. The results suggest that assessments of disability are largely based on the initial representation that is formed after reading the file. The main pitfall is that the final representation is based on general beliefs rather than on actual client information. For training and support this would mean that doctors should be made aware of the extent to which their assessment is anchored in the case at hand.

The effect of information costs on strategy selection in dynamic tasks

Abstract Previous research on dynamic decision behaviour consistently indicated that individuals tend to use a judgment-oriented strategy. When faced with deteriorating system performance people prefer to select information before they apply an action, even when the straightforward application of actions would result in better task performance. In the present experiment we investigated whether subjects specifically base the selection of their strategy on the costs of information and actions. Subjects had to supervise a running athlete whose fitness level could decrease over time, either slowly (low time pressure) or fast (high time pressure). The fitness decline was due to either a real physiological cause, requiring an action of the subject, or a false alarm in which case nothing needed to be done. The task parameters were chosen such that an action-oriented strategy (only apply actions) would lead to the highest financial outcome in all task conditions. The results indicate that the selected strategy does depend, at least in part, on the relative costs of information: when these costs were relatively low subjects selected a judgment-oriented strategy and when the information costs were relatively high they chose an action-oriented strategy. But although they were responsive to the relative costs of information, subjects still selected a judgment-oriented strategy where an action-oriented strategy would have led to better results. Two factors may account for suboptimal strategy choice: difficulties in trading off the costs of information and its diagnostic value and a neglect of the time dimension. In contrast to previous findings the same effort level was maintained across time pressure conditions. It is suggested that the reaction to time pressure depends on the absolute costs of information. When these costs are low subjects start their diagnostic process soon after the onset of a fitness decline and when these costs are high they wait longer and increase their effort in order to meet the time constraints.

Fault management in supervisory control: the effect of false alarms and support

Automation has changed the role of human operators from direct manual control to supervision. Their main task is to monitor whether system performance remains within pre-specified ranges and intervention is only required in unusual situations. One of the consequences is a loss of situation awareness, which significantly affects performance in abnormal, time-critical situation. The present study reports two experiments, both dealing with fault management in a maritime supervisory control task. The first experiment investigated to what extent false alarms would affect performance and diagnosis behaviour when multiple disturbances occurred. Thirty-nine students from maritime curricula diagnosed disturbances that could either be real or turn out to be a false alarm. The presence of false alarms not only affected the rate with which the subsystems under control were sampled, but it also increased problem-solving time. One of the reasons for suboptimal performance in dealing with fault propagation was tunnel vision: participants had a tendency to deal with disturbances sequentially. In the second experiment the effect of support on performance and diagnosis behaviour was investigated. Two types of support were distinguished: interactive support requiring participants to provide the symptom values and automatic support that directly provided the correct action. Thirty students from maritime curricula diagnosed disturbances with the help of either the interactive or the noninteractive support tool. The results indicated that even though both support tools gave the same advice on how to act, more incorrect actions were taken in the non-interactive support condition. Even though no differences in performance were found after the tool had been removed, it was shown that participants who were used to interactive support used a more structured problem-solving strategy than participants used to the non-interactive support. Consequences for system design are discussed.

Eyewitnesses: A comparison of live, video, and photo line-ups

An experiment was conducted in which the effectiveness of three line-up methods (live, video, and photographs) was compared. Participants witnessed a staged event and were subsequently required, by one of the three methods, to identify the target. Both target-present and target-absent line-ups were used. The results showed that all methods led to an equal number of correct identifications (hits). In the target-absent line-ups, participants more often incorrectly identified a person in the video and photographs condition than in the live condition. Presenting photographs simultaneously or sequentially did not affect the number of correct judgments. Dynamic video images, showing locomotion and facial expression, had a marginal significant effect on the number of correct judgments as compared with the static video images. Practical implications are discussed.

Does playing the serious game B-SaFe! make citizens more aware of man-made and natural risks in their environment?

The goal of the present study was to investigate whether playing a serious game concerning natural and man-made risks leads to increased risk awareness and additional information search. As an experimental task, we developed a serious board game. Fifty-six students participated in the experiment; half of them played the serious game whereas the other half only filled in a questionnaire at pretest and posttest (after two weeks). Participants who had played the game were more aware of risks in their own environment. Furthermore, playing the serious game counterbalanced the decline in self-efficacy as seen in the control condition. In both conditions, participants gathered more information on natural risks. This positive effect in the control condition is probably a side effect of the method used: a reasonably elaborate questionnaire in combination with a delay of two weeks. In all, the results provide a positive basis for further development of the game and to use it on a larger scale to empower citizens to take more responsibility for their own safety.

Helping behavior in a virtual crisis situation: effects of safety awareness and crisis communication

Incident evaluations show that bystanders tend to help: they do not wait for professionals to arrive, but act as required by the situation at hand. In the present study, we investigated how safety awareness (induced before an accident happened) and providing a course of action by emergency services affect helping behavior after witnessing a virtual accident with two victims. The main task of the participants was to arrive at a job interview in time. Safety awareness was manipulated by the specific organization they went to: either promoting safe traffic or healthy living. The results show that all participants were inclined to help. Participants who were primed towards safe traffic more often called the emergency number, but talked to the victim less often. Participants who had received specific courses of action moved the victim less often. In all, the results clearly indicate the value of effective risk communication (before an event occurs) and crisis communication (after an event has occurred), as both types of information improve the quality of actual helping behavior at the scene.

Deciding to help: effects of risk and crisis communication

This study aimed to gain insight into the (combined) effects of risk and crisis communication on adequate behaviour during a crisis situation. In addition, it adds to the existing literature by examining the effects of risk and crisis communication on psychological factors that are involved in decision-making during a crisis. This study, utilizing a virtual environment, was a 3 (risk communication: risk information vs. risk information with course of action vs. control) × 2 (crisis communication: with recommended behaviours vs. without recommended behaviours) between subjects design. Both risk and crisis communication supported adequate behaviour in a crisis situation. In addition, through risk communication, participants had less affective reactions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.