Johanna Seibt

Forms of emergent interaction in General Process Theory

General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a general process. General processes are not individuated in terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of their dynamic relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional mereology, albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a brief sketch of basic notions and strategies of the GPT-framework I show how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, functional, self-maintaining, and recursively self-maintaining interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses of the term.

Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives

Ontology: The Categorial Stance.- Particulars.- The Ontology of Mereological Systems: A Logical Approach.- Causation.- Actualism Versus Possibilism in Formal Ontology.- Dispositions and Response-Dependence Theories.- Properties.- Boundary Questions Between Ontology and Biology.- The Ontology of Perception.- Interactive Knowing: The Metaphysics of Intentionality.- The Role of Logic and Ontology in Language and Reasoning.- Ontologies in the Legal Domain.- Ontology in Economics.- Ontology and Phenomenology.- Phenomenology and Ontology in Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden.- Ontology and Methodology in Analytic Philosophy.- Hermeneutic Ontology.

Existence in Time: From Substance to Process

Most topics of present-day ontological debate are discussed within a specific ontological research paradigm that has dominated ontological inquiry throughout its history. Since this paradigm has its starting point in Aristotle and contains many elements of Aristotle’s substance metaphysics, one might justifiedly speak of a historical hegemony of the paradigm of substance ontology’. It is important to note, however, that the paradigm reaches beyond the commitment to the dualist categorial framework of ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ — in fact, being committed to substances and attributes is not even essential to it. Rather, the paradigm of substance ontology consists primarily of a set of principles which governs the construction of ontological theories.

Attitudinal Change in Elderly Citizens Toward Social Robots: The Role of Personality Traits and Beliefs About Robot Functionality.

Attitudes toward robots influence the tendency to accept or reject robotic devices. Thus it is important to investigate whether and how attitudes toward robots can change. In this pilot study we investigate attitudinal changes in elderly citizens toward a tele-operated robot in relation to three parameters: (i) the information provided about robot functionality, (ii) the number of encounters, (iii) personality type. Fourteen elderly residents at a rehabilitation center participated. Pre-encounter attitudes toward robots, anthropomorphic thinking, and personality were assessed. Thereafter the participants interacted with a tele-operated robot (Telenoid) during their lunch (c. 30 min.) for up to 3 days. Half of the participants were informed that the robot was tele-operated (IC) whilst the other half were naïve to its functioning (UC). Post-encounter assessments of attitudes toward robots and anthropomorphic thinking were undertaken to assess change. Attitudes toward robots were assessed with a new generic 35-items questionnaire (attitudes toward social robots scale: ASOR-5), offering a differentiated conceptualization of the conditions for social interaction. There was no significant difference between the IC and UC groups in attitude change toward robots though trends were observed. Personality was correlated with some tendencies for attitude changes; Extraversion correlated with positive attitude changes to intimate-personal relatedness with the robot (r = 0.619) and to psychological relatedness (r = 0.581) whilst Neuroticism correlated negatively (r = -0.582) with mental relatedness with the robot. The results tentatively suggest that neither information about functionality nor direct repeated encounters are pivotal in changing attitudes toward robots in elderly citizens. This may reflect a cognitive congruence bias where the robot is experienced in congruence with initial attitudes, or it may support action-based explanations of cognitive dissonance reductions, given that robots, unlike computers, are not yet perceived as action targets. Specific personality traits may be indicators of attitude change relating to specific domains of social interaction. Implications and future directions are discussed.

Towards an Ontology of Simulated Social Interaction: Varieties of the “As If” for Robots and Humans

The paper develops a general conceptual framework for the ontological classification of human-robot interaction. After arguing against fictionalist interpretations of human-robot interactions, I present five notions of simulation or partial realization, formally defined in terms of relationships between process systems (approximating, displaying, mimicking, imitating, and replicating). Since each of the n criterial processes for a type of two-agent interaction \(\mathfrak{I}\) can be realized in at least six modes (full realization plus five modes of simulation), we receive a (6 n × n) × (6 n × n) matrix of symmetric and asymmetric modes of realizing \(\mathfrak{I}\), called the “simulatory expansion” of interaction type \(\mathfrak{I}\). Simulatory expansions of social interactions can be used to map out different kinds and degrees of sociality in human-human and human-robot interaction, relative to current notions of sociality in philosophy, anthropology, and linguistics. The classificatory framework developed (SISI) thus represents the field of possible simulated social interactions. SISI can be used to clarify which conceptual and empirical grounds we can draw on in order to evaluate capacities and affordances of robots for social interaction, and it provides the conceptual means to build up a taxonomy of human-robot interaction.

“Sociality and Normativity for Robots”: An Introduction

This anthology is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The book presents eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with “social” robots – robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. It features cutting edge research in philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics that examines in which sense such robots can be said to be “social” and how human social relations will change when we interact with robots at work and at home. Connecting research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology, the authors address all topics that are currently at the forefront of discussion. They offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions; investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine; discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality; clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms and share commitments; whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions; and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans.

The Master/iSlave Dialectic: Post (Hegelian) Phenomenology and the Ethics of Technology

In part one of this paper I turn to Don Ihde to show how a technological object can occupy the role that “the other” plays for Hegel in his phenomenology as the structural features of Hegels analyses of self-other relations can be found in Ihdes analyses of human-technology relations. I then turn to Singers Wired for War and Gertzs Philosophy of War and Exile. Using these texts I show how the way soldiers treat robots by naming them, protecting them, and by even risking their lives to save them, illustrates Hegels central claim: ethical life develops based on the process of discovering that to recognize others (whether human or technological) is to recognize ourselves and that to misrecognize others is to misrecognize ourselves. I conclude by offering suggestions as to how this understanding of ethical life as based on recognition and misrecognition can be applied to design ethics.