Johannes Voget

Effects of Territorial and Worldwide Corporation Tax Systems on Outbound M&As

Repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of multinational firms from tax credit countries when bidding for targets in low tax countries. This comparative disadvantage with respect to bidders from exemption countries violates ownership neutrality, which results in production inefficiencies due to second-best ownership structures. This paper empirically estimates the magnitude of these effects. The abolishment of repatriation taxes in Japan and in the U.K. in 2009 has increased the number of acquisitions abroad by Japanese and British firms by 31.9% and 3.9 %, respectively. A similar policy switch in the U.S. is simulated to increase the number of U.S. cross-border acquisition by 17.1 %. We estimate the yearly gain in efficiency to be around 525 million dollar due to the Japanese reform and 13.5 million dollar due to the U.K. reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S. results in a yearly efficiency gain of 1134 million dollar.

International Taxation and Takeover Premiums in Cross-Border M&As

Cross-border M&As can trigger a higher international taxation of the target’s income. Non-resident dividend withholding taxes may be imposed by the target country, while additional corporate income taxation can be imposed by the acquiring country. Our evidence suggests that takeover premiums fully reflect non-resident dividend withholding taxes, while there is some evidence that they reflect corporate income taxation by the acquiring country as well. In contrast, acquiring firm stock market returns around the bid announcement do not appear to reflect either type of taxation. These results are consistent with previous findings that the gains of M&As primarily accrue to target shareholders.

Capital Gains Taxation and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Unanticipated Cross-Border Transfers of Tax Bases

In a cross-border takeover, the tax base associated with future capital gains is transferred from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Cross-country differences in capital gains tax rates enable us to estimate the discount in target valuation on account of future capital gains. A one percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the value of equity by 0.225%. The implied average effective tax rate on capital gains is 7% and it raises the cost of capital by 5.3% of its no-tax level. This indicates that capital gains taxation is a significant cost to firms when issuing new equity.

Taxing Away M&A: The Effect of Corporate Capital Gains Taxes on Acquisition Activity

Using a comprehensive sample of M&A deals around the world, we analyze the effect of corporate capital gains taxation on M&As involving corporate sellers (e.g. subsidiary sales). Capital gains taxation distorts the market for corporate control by imposing a cost on corporate sellers which leads to a lock-in effect that inhibits the completion of deals. We find that an increase in the corporate capital gains tax rate affects the location choice and reduces acquisition activity significantly. For the United States, this implies forgone acquisitions from corporate sellers at a volume of around

Tax Complexity and Foreign Direct Investment

34.4 billion annually due to capital gains taxes.

International taxation and productivity effects of M&As

We empirically investigate the impact of tax complexity on FDI at �?rm level, employing a large database of German multinational enterprises that is administrated by Deutsche Bundesbank. More precisely, we analyze the location choice of 4474 new German FDI projects in OECD countries from 2005 to 2009. The results suggest that tax complexity has a repressive effect on FDI. Moreover, we �?nd that the magnitude of this effect substantially depends on the level of the statutory corporate income tax rate.

Corporate Taxation and Location of Intangible Assets: Patents vs. Trademarks

We investigate the effect of international differences in corporate taxation on the realization of productivity gains in M&A deals. We argue that tax differentials distort the efficient allocation of productive factors following an M&A and thus mitigate the resulting productivity improvement. Using firm-level data on inputs and outputs of production as well as on corporate M&As, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the absolute tax differential between the locations of two merging firms reduces the subsequent total factor productivity gain by 4.5%. This effect is less pronounced when firms can use international profit shifting to attenuate effective differences in taxation. In a complementary analysis, we use an event study design and a fixed effects model to explore the timing of the response of productivity, as well as, labor and capital input to the tax rate differential after the merger separately for the acquirer and the target. We show that our findings are mainly driven by deals with targets residing in locations with a tax advantage with respect to the acquirer. In these transactions, tax differentials reduce the post-merger adjustment in the target firm and inhibit the full realization of productivity gains.

The impact of taxes on bilateral royalty flows

Numerous empirical studies have analysed the influence of corporate taxation on the location of intangible assets within a company group. However, the previous literature has rather focused on studying the impact of taxation on patent location choices assuming that these assets represent the rest of intangibles as well. This paper complements previous studies by estimating and comparing the tax elasticities of two different types of intangibles - patents and trademarks. We employ data on European and US patent and trademark applications in the period of 1996-2012 and estimate a multinomial logit model that incorporates various observed and unobserved factors of the intangibles location choice. According to our main findings, trademarks are more sensitive to changes in taxation as compared to patents. This implies that firms use trademarks more eagerly for tax planning purposes than patents.

International Taxation and the Direction and Volume of Cross-border M&As

In 2013 the OECD introduced its Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). One of the major concerns of this Plan is a strategic use of intangible assets as an instrument for profit shifting. The main purpose of this paper is to test whether multinational enterprises use intangibles as an important BEPS channel by empirically analysing the relationship between taxation and bilateral royalty flows. We employ the OECD data on 3,660 country-pairs for the time period of 1990-2012 and apply the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator in a fixed-effects framework. The main results point to a negative impact of taxation on bilateral royalty flows. Moreover, we find that tax differentials, which represent a relative level of taxation in a recipient state compared to other potential royalty recipients, have a significant influence on royalty payments as well. For tax policy considerations, the paper provides various insights to the ongoing work on BEPS by the G20, the OECD, and the European Commission. For example, we find that such reform suggestions of the OECD Action Plan as an enforcement of the Nexus Approach, as well as an introduction of strict Controlled Foreign Company rules and transfer pricing regulations are likely to reduce international royalty flows.