John A. Barker

Towards closure on closure

Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories of knowledge.

The Fallacy of Begging the Question

Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy. 1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves saying, but they are fallacious despite their validity, owing to their inability to establish the truth of a conclusion which is not already known. But are not question-begging arguments sometimes effective in bringing an audience to an awareness of the truth of the conclusion ? How can a dialectical maneuver which is capable of effecting epistemic progress be a fallacy , an illegitimate maneuver? In such cases of success, we can reply, the audience was simply in need of some logical coaching — a question-begging argument is of its very nature ill-suited for producing new knowledge in someone who is being fully rational. But then are not all valid arguments question-begging, since the conclusions are at least implicitly contained in the premises in such a way that a fully rational individual can never augment his knowledge through such arguments? No, we may answer, only those valid arguments in which the proposition constituting the conclusion appears, whether distinguised or not, as a distinct premise are question-begging; if several premises go together to imply a conclusion, the argument does not beg the question, But why is it legitimate to posit premises which more-or-less implicitly contain the conclusion, while it is illegitimate to posit premises which more-or-less explicitly contain the conclusion ? Because, we are tempted to say, a question-begging argument is one in which what is to be proved in the conclusion is posited in the premises, and this positing must be more-or-less explicit in order for a fallacy to be committed!

Computer Modeling and the Fate of Folk Psychology

Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory - the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior - they disagree strongly about FPs fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be largely preserved and vindicated by scientific investigations of behavior. Recent findings by developmental psychologists, I argue, will push both Churchlandians and Fodorians toward the pessimistic view that FP is a misguided theory that will never be displaced, because it is, so to speak, built into our cognitive systems. I explore the possibility of preserving optimism by rejecting the theory-theory and adopting the simulation theory, a competing view developed by Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, and Jane Heal. According to simulationists, common-sense interpretation of behavior is accomplished by means of pretense-like operations that deploy the cognitive systems own reasoning capabilities in a disengaged manner. Since on this view no theory-like set of principles would be needed, the simulation theory seems to enjoy a simplicity advantage over the theory-theory. Steven Stich and Shawn Nichols, however, contend that as the cognitive system would require special mechanisms for disengaged operation, the simplicity question cannot be resolved until suitable computational models are developed. I describe a set of models I have constructed to meet this need, and I discuss the contribution such models can make to determining FPs fate.

Scriven on The Logic of Cause

In a recent article entitled, ‘The Logic of Cause’ Scriven has presented a series of formidable arguments against the possibility of explicating the concept of cause in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Some of his main arguments center on the difficulties of capturing the asymmetry of cause and effect and of handling a certain kind of over-determination he calls linked overdetermination. Scrivens contention that there is no way to capture the asymmetry of cause and effect will be countered by constructing a definition of the concept of causal priority in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Scrivens contention that the existence of linked overdetermination undermines the necessary condidition feature of the definition will be countered by distinguishing two senses of necessary conditionship. My rebuttal of Scrivens arguments, if successful, indicates that the ‘common sense’ view of the cause as a necessary and sufficient condition of its effects may yet prove to be at least roughly accurate.

Pragmatics and Definite Descriptions

One philosophical logician will take the current system of formal logic itself as the firm base from which to direct all his ordering operations against the unruly tribes of language, all his explanatory manoeuvres among the diverse phenomena of speech. Another will start — as far away as possible from this base — by examining those phenomena themselves in all their particularity and detail. Will the true order be achieved when the adherents of both approaches are folded in a single party, when we have a theory of meaning firm enough and rich enough to accommodate in a single, unified account both the simplicity of logical laws and the diversity of linguistic phenomena? Perhaps it will — if there is such a thing as the true order.1