John A. Hamman

Interest group PAC contributions and the 1992 regulation of cable television

Abstract The literature concerning political action committee (PAC) influence over congressional roll-call decisions offers mixed findings. Some studies find strong effects, others weak effects, while some detect no PAC impact on congressional roll-call voting. These mixed results imply that PAC influence might vary across contexts and perhaps interact with other variables. In this paper, we suggest that PAC influence might vary with two contexts. First, we hypothesize that PAC influence will vary with chamber, and in particular, PAC effects will be stronger in the House than in the Senate. Second, we hypothesize that PAC effects will be stronger in policy subsystems than at the macropolitical level. We test these hypotheses with the votes on the 1992 Cable Television Reregulation Act. The fact that both chambers twice voted upon identically worded bills, once for passage, once to override President Bush’s veto, allows us to construct a quasi-experimental design. Results of the analysis generally support our hypotheses. We conclude with some suggestions for future research on the linkage between interest groups, PAC contributions, and congressional policy making.

Bureaucratic Accommodation of Congress and the President: Elections and the Distribution of Federal Assistance

This article investigates whether elections provide bureaucrats with a means for accommodating political pressure from Congress and the White House. Specifically the article tests: (1) whether bureaucrats shorten the time they take to process applications from districts important to the agency and the White House in election years, and (2) whether such preferences are reflected in the resulting geographical distribution of assistance. An analysis of the administration and distribution of federal mass transportation discretionary capital assistance grants from 1966 through 1984 finds that agency officials adapted to White House but not subcommittee pressures in this way. The article concludes that the marginal influence of the presidency in the bureaucratic allocation of federal assistance needs further theoretical consideration.

Career Experience and Performing Effectively as Governor

Although studies analyze the career paths of governors, virtually none investigates whether careers matter for how they perform once in office. This analysis merges attitudinal data from two 48-state ABC News/Washington Post national surveys with measures of career experience and state characteristics to assess the relationship between career experience and gubernatorial job performance. Controlling for contextual, attitudinal, and demographic factors, the results show that career experience in administrative and statewide executive branch offices relates positively to job performance. The analysis concludes by noting which careers matter for subsequent performance as governor and the implications this has for contemporary trends in the career experience of governors.

Reelection and Congressional Support Presidential Motives in Distributive Politics

We discuss circumstances whereby presidents dispense distributive benefits to enhance their reelection chances and cultivate congressional support. Presidents do this by influencing bureaucratic decision making within those subsystems to strategically time federal project announcements to coincide with presidential and congressional elections. We test these conten tions and find support for them. We conclude that the traditional theory of distributive politics is not so much invalid as incomplete. Our findings show that presidents can play more strategic roles within the distributive policy arena than existing theory suggests.

Incumbent vulnerability and entry in gubernatorial elections: The case of former governors

Abstract The vulnerability hypothesis predicts strategic, quality candidates only challenge weak incumbents. House election studies support this hypothesis. State level analyses produce mixed results. We test whether incumbent vulnerability affects the entry of one kind of strategic actor – former governors. Former governors are an ideal test case. Having already served in the states highest office, they represent the highest quality and perhaps most strategic candidates who run for state office. Our results show that performance in the previous election, one measure of incumbent vulnerability, does not affect former governor entry. However, incumbent vulnerability measured as recent economic performance and number of other quality candidates appearing in a former governors party primary does affect entry in general elections.