John Arquilla

Cyberwar is coming

Abstract The information revolution and related organizational innovations are altering the nature of conflict and the kinds of military structures, doctrines, and strategies that will be needed. This study introduces two concepts for thinking about these issues: cyberwar and netwar. Industrialization led to attritional warfare by massive armies (e.g., World War I). Mechanization led to maneuver predominated by tanks (e.g., World War II). The information revolution implies the rise of cyberwar, in which neither mass nor mobility will decide outcomes; instead, the side that knows more, that can disperse the fog of war yet enshroud an adversary in it, will enjoy decisive advantages. Communications and intelligence have always been important. At a minimum, cyberwar implies that they will grow more so and will develop as adjuncts to overall military strategy. In this sense, it resembles existing notions of “information war” that emphasize C3I. However, the information revolution may imply overarching effects ...

The Origins of the South Atlantic War

The most widely-accepted views of the origins of the South Atlantic War contend that it arose either out of the Argentine juntas need to divert attention away from a worsening economy or from misperceptions in both London and Buenos Aires. This article argues that the ‘demobilisation’ of Argentine civil society removed the need for a diversionary war; and that the lengthy crisis bargaining that followed in the wake of the ‘grab’ of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands substantially mitigated the impact of any misperceptions. This article advances an alternative to existing theories that explains the outbreak of this war by reference to both structural and organisational factors. A fast decreasing gap in relative power between Argentina and Britain may have encouraged the junta more seriously to consider the possibility of initiating a war between the two. Thereafter, however, the organisational pathologies of the Argentine military led to a suboptimally timed preemptive invasion, intransigent diplomacy and a ‘hedged’ approach to deployments that severely undermined Argentinas military effectiveness, allowing Britain to undertake reconquest of the islands with a very reasonable chance of success.

The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers

ew forces at work in the post+zold war world are changing the strategic N environment in which American foreign policy operates. Chief among these is the emergence or return of states that are creating new configurations of regional power. ‘These states, by definition, possess the will, means, and ambition to conduct foreign policy in their own neighborhood without close regard to the preferences of the United States or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations. These are “new” powers in that they have recently acquired unprecedented opportunities for autonomous action, facilitated by current widespread confusion in the West over strategic valueswhat really matters and what does not. This confusion makes it unlikely that the United States, absent clear and present danger, would move decisively to prevent the emergence of new centers of strategic power. Maintenance of a global American primacy, although still advocated by some, thus no longer seems a realistic policy goal. As regional politics grow, “renationalization” of strategic policies by other major world states-not an issue during the cold war-cannot be held off for much longer, despite U.S. preferences to the contrary. As regional centers of power emerge, the United States faces important choices about the kinds of broad strategies to pursue in relation to them: acquiescence, encouragement, or resistance. But in order to choose wisely American policymakers must first understand how international politics are increasingly shaped, not by a single, globalized process, but rather by several regional ones. Next, they must appreciate how new elements of powerespecially psychological and behavioral ones-liberated by the end of the cold war are invalidating traditional views of foreign relations. Lastly, they must assess the challenges posed by the combination of new “regionalized” politics and new kids of power. This article takes up these tasks in turn, applies its findings to the various emerging systems, and discusses their implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?

Netwar, an emerging mode of conflict engaged in by networked, mostly nonstate actors is associated most with social activism (e.g., the Zapatistas), terror (e.g., bin Ladens Al Qaeda) and crime (e.g., the Asian triads). However, netwar can also manifest itself in highly militarized settings, particularly in the context of ethnonationalist conflict. The recent war in Chechnya provides a good example of how netwar can be used in extremely violent ways to confront and overcome the much larger conventional forces of nationstates. In this conflict, a network of clan-based Chechen fighters, organized in closely internetted small fighting cells, was able to defeat a valorous, but still-hierarchical, balky Russian army in the field. This case is also analytically important because the Chechens employed a wide range of netwaroriented activities, from social activism to terror and strategic crime in order to complement their military netwar.

Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues

This work continues to develop the ‘netwar’ concept that the authors introduced in 1993 and have expanded upon in their various RAND and other writings ever since. Deeper understanding of the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of networks will prove useful in combating terrorism and transnational crime, but also in understanding militant social activism, both of the violently disruptive sort and that which aims at fostering the rise of a global civil society. This essay also assesses recent US performance in the terror war, and concludes by raising concerns over the possible rise of a new form of network-based fascism.

Preparing for information‐age conflict: Part 1 conceptual and organizational dimensions

Abstract Prevailing hopes for the peace‐enhancing tendencies of interconnectivity must be tempered by a realization that the information revolution augurs a new epoch of conflict, in which new modes of armed combat and social upheaval will emerge. We propose a four‐part vision to prepare for this new epoch. This article spells out the first two parts — the conceptual and organizational (a second article will convey the doctrinal and strategic parts). In our vision, preparing for information‐age conflict involves rethinking the very concept of ‘information’. This is achieved by adding to the dominant view, that information is largely about ‘information processing’, a less‐developed view that emphasizes the ‘structuring’ roles of information. In this latter view, embedded information is what enables a structure to hold its form; and this helps account for the successful functioning of all sorts of actors and systems, in peace as well as in war. The organizational dimension of our analysis holds that the inf...

Can information warfare ever be just

The information revolution has fostered the rise of new ways of waging war, generally by means of cyberspace-based attacks on the infrastructures upon which modern societies increasingly depend. This new way of war is primarily disruptive, rather than destructive; and its low “barriers to entry” make it possible for individuals and groups (not just nation-states) easily to acquire very serious war-making capabilities. The “less lethal” appearance of information warfare and the possibility of “cloaking” the attackers true identity put serious pressure on traditional just war doctrines that call for adherence to the principles of “right purpose”, “duly constituted authority”, and “last resort”. Age-old strictures about noncombatant immunity are also attenuated by the varied means of attack enabled by advanced information technologies. Therefore, the nations and societies leading the information revolution have a primary ethical obligation to constrain the circumstances under which information warfare may be used -- principally by means of a pledge of “no first use” of such means against noncombatants.

The end of war as we knew it? Insurgency, counterinsurgency and lessons from the forgotten history of early terror networks

Abstract The growing potency of networked organisations has manifested itself over the past decade in the fresh energy evident among terrorists and insurgents—most notably al-Qaida and Hezbollah. Networks have even shown a capacity to wage war toe-to-toe against nation-states—with some success, as can be seen in the outcome of the First Russo-Chechen War (1994 – 96). The range of choices available to networks thus covers an entire spectrum of conflict, posing the prospect of a significant blurring of the lines between insurgency, terror and war. While history provides some useful examples to stimulate strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight in so many different ways—sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going to require some innovative thinking to go along with more traditional introspection about the relevant lessons of history.

Nuclear weapons in South Asia: More may be manageable

The character of the burgeoning nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan suggests that, in the post‐cold war world, the spread of weapons of mass destruction may increase the likelihood of lower intensity conventional conflict rather than that of total war. In South Asia, where ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes persist, the mutual fear of big weapons may help to form a set of “rules of the game,” adherence to which will allow limited but not excessive use of force in pursuit of national aims. However, insufficiently formed military command, control, and strategic nuclear doctrine in India and Pakistan, along with ill‐focused, tardy Western pressure to stem the tide of proliferation in South Asia, may create serious problems for the careful management of a fractious relationship between two democracies that have much to quarrel about.

Louder than words: Tacit communication in international crises

Abstract Clear communication is generally viewed as requisite to the peaceful resolution of international crises. The success of bargaining, deterrent, and compellent strategies hinges on the credibility afforded by unambiguous signals exchanged between opponents. Despite the acknowledged importance of this ‘communication factor,’ little effort has been made to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the various modes of communication that may be employed in crisis. By means of theoretical and comparative case analysis, this study finds a substantial difference between the efficacy of traditional diplomatic negotiation and tacit measures, such as the deployment and/or exercise of military forces near the scene of crisis. Where negotiation alone often fails, backing, preceding, or, at times, replacing diplomacy with tacit measures affords the greatest chances for success. The policy implications of this finding are explored, particularly as they apply to U.S. regional ‘extended deterrent’ strategies for pro...