John Charles Bradbury

Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence

Abstract The “Law of 1/ n ” posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending. Despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact, the Law of 1/ n has received only limited empirical scrutiny, and the existing evidence for the American States provides mixed support for the thesis. This paper examines the Law of 1/ n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross-section of democratic countries. The results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures, but bicameralism dampens the 1/ n effect relative to unicameralism.

Local government structure and public expenditures

The ``Law of 1/n postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending. Strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theUnited States (at both the state andnational level) and across countries. Fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures. Using a sample of Georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures,indicating support for the Law of 1/nat the local level.

Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy

Early and modern scholars both presume that bicameral chambers limit the exploitation of minorities by the ruling majority similar to supermajority voting rules. We explain theoretically why bicameralism is a unique and desirable institution for protecting minority interests. The empirical analysis examines the structure of bicameralism in the American States. Using detailed data to proxy voter preferences, we find the degree of constituent homogeneity across chambers to be an important determinant of government expenditures for several budget components. Decreased constituent homogeneity tends to reduce redistributive spending and increase spending on public goods.

The designated hitter, moral hazard, and hit batters - new evidence from game-level data.

The rate of hit batters in the American League (AL) has exceeded the National League (NL) by an average rate of 15% per season since the introduction of the designated hitter (DH) to the AL. This difference may be the result of moral hazard by AL pitchers; however, past studies have been unable to differentiate between competing explanations. Using game-level statistics from the entire 31-year history of the DH, we find the DH to be positively correlated with hit batsmen while controlling for many factors. Results indicate that the difference in hit batsmen between leagues is real and that moral hazard explains about one half of the difference. Observations from interleague play further support the notion that the results are not an artifact of unidentified league-specific factors.The rate of hit batters in the American League (AL) has exceeded the National League (NL) by an average rate of 15% per season since the introduction of the designated hitter (DH) to the AL. This difference may be the result of moral hazard by AL pitchers; however, past studies have been unable to differentiate between competing explanations. Using game-level statistics from the entire 31-year history of the DH, we find the DH to be positively correlated with hit batsmen while controlling for many factors. Results indicate that the difference in hit batsmen between leagues is real and that moral hazard explains about one half of the difference. Observations from interleague play further support the notion that the results are not an artifact of unidentified league-specific factors.

Pigou at the Plate Externalities in Major League Baseball

Past studies estimating the marginal revenue products of baseball players have assumed individual players hitting performances to be independent of teammate spillovers. However, the baseball communitys widely held belief in “protection”—that a good (bad) player can improve (diminish) the hit probability of the batter who precedes him in the batting order—violates the assumption of the independence of batting outcomes. In this paper, the authors identify two possible hitting externalities in baseball. Using play-by-play data the authors find evidence contrary to the protection hypothesis—the quality of the on-deck hitter negatively impacts the preceding hitter—though the magnitude of the effect is very small.