John Divers

The Analysis of Possibility and the Extent of Possibility

In section 1 I motivate and execute the presentation of a well-defined Lewisian conception of analysis and of what it would be to analyse modality successfully. That conception is then put to two applications. In section 2 various inadequacies are exposed in a (recently popular) separatist approach to the understanding and/or evaluation of Lewiss analysis of modality. Section 3 provides a defence against a resilient argument for the claim that Lewiss analysis of modality cannot be fully reductive while also dealing adequately with alien possibility.

Kant’s Criteria of the A Priori

Kant states that necessity and strict universality are criteria of a priori knowledge. Interpreting this dictum standardly and straightforwardly in respect of necessity, it is inconsistent with there being necessary a posteriori truths or contingent a priori truths (cf Kripke). This straightforward interpretation may convict Kant of understandable error (at worst) in the case of necessity, but it is so uncharitable in the case of strict universality that we ought to seek an alternative. I offer a charitable interpretation of the doctrine that necessity and strict universality are sufficient conditions of a priority, commenting briefly on comparable necessary conditions.

Supervenience for operators

The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator ‘◊’ as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifled notion. Therefore, Lewis is unjustified in claiming that a genuine modal realist approach to the analysis of the concept of supervenience is superior to a modal primitivist approach.

Realism and Truth.

Preface to the Second Edition Preface to the First Edition Part I Introduction 1 Introduction Part II Proposals 2 What is Realism? 3 What is Truth? 4 What has Truth to do with Realism? 5 Why be a Common-Sense Realist? 6 Why do we Need Truth? 7 Why be a Scientific Realist? Part III Polemics 8 Van Fraassen against Scientific Realism 9 Kuhn, Feyerabend, and the Radical Philosophers of Science 10 Davidsonians against Reference 11 Rortys Mirrorless World 12 The Renegade Putnam 13 Worldmaking 14 Dummetts Anti-Realism Part IV Conclusions 15 Conclusions Afterword List of Major Named Maxims and Doctrines Bibliography Index