John E. Chubb

The Political Economy of Federalism

This article introduces a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology for analyzing the increasingly important effects of the national government on the federal system. The framework is a synthesis of the dominant political and economic approaches to this issue: it attempts to capture key elements of the complex political and administrative processes that implementation research has identified in contemporary federalism, and to exploit formal models of local fiscal choice used to analyze the impact of federal grants on state and local spending and taxing. The vehicle for the synthesis is a principal-agent model which represents the federal system as a formal hierarchy extending from Congress and the president to subnational bureaucrats. An econometric analysis of two major federal grant programs in each state for the years, 1965-1979, demonstrates that 1) economic models alone cannot explain the effects of federal grants on subnational fiscal behavior; politics must be included, and 2) the political effects can be disaggregated into ideological and constituency-oriented demands made by Congress and the White House on federal grant agencies.

Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics of state elections

As the U.S. states develop their political institutions and take greater responsibility for their economic well-being, two concerns that have long driven research on national elections—electoral insulation and economic accountability—should become central in research on state elections. I investigate institutionalizations effects on the vulnerability of state elections to major periodic forces—coattails, turnout, and economic conditions—and how political responsibility for economic growth is apportioned between presidents and governors in state elections. The investigation relies upon dynamic models of state legislative and gubernatorial outcomes estimated with a pooled data set comprised of most states and elections in the years 1940–82. The results, which have important implications for state government more broadly, indicate that institutionalization has substantially insulated legislative elections against major threats and that state legislators and governors have less to fear from their state economies than is often thought, but also that state elections are becoming more susceptible to swings in the national economy.

America's Public Schools: Choice Is a Panacea

The signs of poor performance were there for all to see during the 197Os. Test scores headed downward year after year. Large numbers of teenagers continued to drop out of school. Drugs and violence poisoned the learning environment. In math and science, two areas crucial to the nations success in the world economy, American students fell far behind their counterparts in virtually every other industrialized country. Something was clearly wrong.

Should Market Forces Control Educational Decision Making

In the December 1988 issue of this Review , John Chubb and Terry Moe presented data comparing public and private schools, and made an argument concerning “politics, markets, and the organization of schools.” Chubb and Moe argue that private schools outperform public schools because they are more autonomous, advantaged by market forces rather than democratic political control. Jack Tweedie takes vigorous exception to this conclusion, arguing that the evidence does not support Chubb and Moes conclusions about the efficacy of market forces. Dennis Riley directly attacks the virtues of market control of institutional choices in educational policy making. Chubb and Moe find their critics unconvincing.

Politics, Markets, and Equality in Schools

American education can be said to have two basic problems. The first is that students generally achieve too little. According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the typical American high school student possesses only middle school knowledge and skills. According to the International Assessment of Educational Progress, the typical middle school student does not rank in the top ten in mathematics or science when compared with thirteen year olds around the world. This problem—call it a problem of efficiency—is compounded by a second problem, a problem of equality. Students differ too much in what they achieve, with poor, black and Hispanic students too often at the bottom. The United States sends a higher percentage of its students to college than most nations, and the best American students are as accomplished as any in the world. Yet, a fifth of all big city students fail to finish high school, roughly twice the national average. And despite considerable progress, black students trail white students by nearly 200 points on the SAT.