John E. Owens

Qualified exceptionalism: The US Congress in comparative perspective

The framers of the American Constitution devised a singular bicameral legislative body, which invested substantial power in both a broadly representative lower chamber and a second ‘deliberative’ chamber that was both insulated from the voters and unrepresentative of the population as a whole. Until the early twentieth century the singular US Congress changed little, but with growing national responsibilities it sought to develop organisational forms that could address a consistently stronger executive. Since the 1980s, the Congress has relied increasingly on stronger parties to organise its activities. This development, embraced in turn by Democrats and Republicans, has led to changes that have edged the Congress in the direction of parliamentary democracies. We conclude that this analysis has real but limited utility, as congressional party leaders continue to barter for votes and, in the context of narrow chamber majorities, often rely heavily on presidential assistance on divisive issues that are important to their party brand. Yet the traditional features of the American separated system – bicameralism, the committee systems, and the centrifugal forces emanating from diverse congressional districts, increasingly complex policy issues, and the fear of electoral retribution – also remain strong, and effectively constrain the influence of leaders. ‘Qualified exceptionalism’ thus most aptly describes the contemporary American Congress, which remains ‘exceptional’, but less than unique, as it responds to many of the same forces, in some of the same ways (for example, strong parties), as do many other representative assemblies around the world.

Congressional Acquiescence to Presidentialism in the US ‘War on Terror’

Congressional dominance theory holds that not only can the US Congress control the executive, it does. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration’s ensuing global ‘war on terror’ suggest a different result. Bush’s response to 9/11 signalled not only new directions in US foreign and domestic policy but a new stage in the aggrandisement of presidential power in the United States and a further step in the marginalisation of the Congress. Informed by a constitutional doctrine unknown to the framers of the US Constitution, the Bush administration pursued a presidentialist or ‘ultra-separationist’ governing strategy that was disrespectful to the legislature’s intended role in the separated system. Using its unilateral powers, in public and in secret, claiming ‘inherent’ authority from the Constitution, and exploiting the public’s fear of a further terrorist attack and of endangering the lives of US troops abroad, the administration skilfully drove its legislation through the Congress. Occasionally, the Congress was able to extract concessions – notably in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when partisan control of the government was split – but more typically, for most of the period, the Congress acquiesced to administration demands, albeit with the consolation of minor concessions. The administration not only dominated the lawmaking process, it also cowed legislators into legitimating often highly controversial (and sometimes illegal) administration-determined definitions of counter-terrorism and national security policy. Certainly, the Congress undertook a considerable amount of oversight during the period of the ‘war on terror’; lawmakers also complained. But the effects on policy were marginal. This finding held true for periods of Democratic as well as Republican majorities.

The resilience of democratic institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under conditions of total war

To what extent are democratic institutions resilient when nation states mobilise for war? Normative and empirical political theorists have long argued that wars strengthen the executive and threaten constitutional politics. In modern democracies, national assemblies are supposed to hold the executive to account by demanding explanations for events and policies; and by scrutinising, reviewing and, if necessary, revising legislative proposals intended to be binding on the host society or policies that have been implemented already. This article examines the extent to which the British and Australian parliaments and the United States Congress held their wartime executives to account during World War II. The research finds that under conditions approaching those of total war, these democratic institutions not only continued to exist, but also proved to be resilient in representing public concerns and holding their executives to account, however imperfectly and notwithstanding delegating huge powers. In consequence, executives—more so British and Australian ministers than President Roosevelt—were required to be placatory as institutional and political tensions within national assemblies and between assemblies and executives continued, and assemblies often asserted themselves. In short, even under the most onerous wartime conditions, democratic politics mattered and democratic institutions were resilient.