John E. Peters

Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army

Abstract : Post-Cold War political pressures are likely to increase the demand for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular to conduct operations other than war (OOTW). This report analyzes how changing demographics worldwide will affect the operational requirements of future OOTW missions. Two key factors that have influenced U.S. success or failure in the past are 1) political-military communication, and 2) mission creep and mission swing. Without effective political-military communication, military planning may be derived from political rhetoric or, alternatively, political decisions may be based on faulty understandings of military capabilities or considerations. Equally critical is sufficient recognition of, and planning for, mission creep (in which political goals shift, requiring military operations different from those planned at the interventions outset) and mission swing (in which the operational environment undergoes quick deterioration or improvement unrelated to the presence or efforts of intervening forces). The report concludes with specific recommendations regarding Army doctrine, training, equipment, and force structure.

Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons

The United States can significantly reduce the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack if it pursues a vigorous, multilayered approach. Such an approach involves controlling nuclear technology and materials, manipulating the black market, and monitoring the behavior of aspiring nuclear actors. After analyzing each of these components, this article outlines the broad contours of a national preventative strategy that should give the nonproliferation community some cause for optimism.

Recasting European security

This article considers the interaction of NATO and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as two principal tools for providing post‐Cold War European security. The article suggests that the conventional wisdom, which typically envisions CFE adaptation as a bill‐payer to placate the Russians over NATO enlargement is wrong because CFE has very little flexibility to perform this role. Rather, it is NATO modernization which must account for the larger share of change in European security. Finally, the article suggests a symbiotic relationship between NATO and CFE in which CFE shapes the environment and limits the size of likely conflicts to dimensions that NATO can handle, and NATO provides the military response necessary to deal with the trouble.