John Forge

A Note on the Definition of “Dual Use”

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and willingness to make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks.

Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding ‘interpretation problem’: what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a ‘measurement problem’: how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.

History and Philosophy of Science

The Program in History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) teaches students to examine the sciences, medicine and technology from a number of perspectives, conceptual, historical and social. The community of scholars includes core faculty and students in History and Philosophy and affiliated members in Classics, Anthropology, English, Political Science, Communication, and other disciplines. Together, they draw upon the multiple methods of their disciplines to study the development, functioning, applications, and social and cultural engagements of the sciences.

How to Make the Case Against Weapons Research

What is the best way to proceed to make the case against weapons research, now that we have in place a moral system in which to make judgements about actions, about actions that have to do with harming? It seems the case will need to be indirect, in that engaging in WR is not in itself to undertake an activity that harms. Weapons researchers are not soldiers: what they do in their day-to-day activities, whether they work in advanced research institutes or simple workshops, is not to actually harm anyone (assuming that they are not using any experimental subjects). However, we have seen how actions can be described in different ways, by taking account of the consequences of those actions. For individual episodes of WR, it is therefore possible to describe the actions of those undertaking the research with reference to various instances of the use of the products of that research – such as “using a product of the Manhattan Project to bomb on Hiroshima” – although those descriptions might not apply, owing to restrictions imposed by the Limits Principle. But this does suggest a general way of describing WR, one that takes account of a property of all weapons, namely, that they are the means to cause harm. We shall need to see how this suggestion works out: how it brings WR within the ambit of moral judgement and why we are then able to demand justification from weapons researchers, now that we have shown what they do is morally wrong. To this end it will be necessary to introduce and assess what I call ‘the means principle’, which asserts that it is wrong to provide the means to harm, and also to look at alternative ways a person who provides the means to harm might represent what she does. This will eventually allow us to conclude that WR is prohibited. Much of the chapter will be taken up with these tasks. I will also look at some recent debates about artefacts that are taking place in the philosophy of technology – touched on in Chap. 2 – as these have some relevance to the present discussion. Finally, I will state the case against WR, taking account of the method of justifying violations of moral rules introduced in the previous chapter.

Commercial Weapons Research and Peacetime Weapons Research

We have dated the beginnings of WR to the fourth century BCE; and at that time there was also an armaments industry, the organised systematic production of weapons as an element of economic activity. In fact, once we know when WR emerged we can infer that the arms industry must also have been in existence at that time, because there could be no point in there being research into the design of weapons technology without there being workshops, factories, merchants, customers, etc., for realising the output of the design process. In the fourth century BCE there were many sieges involving catapults and others engines of war, cities accumulated arsenals of weapons, and there were centres, such as the island of Rhodes, where it was possible to buy catapults and learn how to make them. All this is clear from Rihill (2007) and from other sources. The production of weapons as a commercial activity has thus been in existence for nearly two and half millennia, and ranks with agriculture and building as one of the oldest industries in continuous existence. Arms production became ‘industrialised’ in the nineteenth century, when modern methods of production informed by scientific understanding of the composition of metals and explosives were introduced. The production of weapons has been one of the most profitable enterprises of all time, and WR has been integral to this process. There is no doubt that the main reason the vast majority of people involved in weapons research and weapons production undertook these activities was economic: as a source of work, as a means to make money, etc. In the modern era, at least, it is states who have been the biggest customers for CWR, notwithstanding the large domestic market for small arms in some countries – I shall in any case only consider WR done at the behest of national interests.

The Development of Nuclear Weapons

The weapons to be discussed in this chapter differ in several important respects from those of the previous two chapters. First of all, and most obviously, nuclear weapons are far more destructive than small arms or catapults – any comparison with the latter in particular seems ridiculous. Nuclear weapons are by far the most destructive weapons ever devised, so much so that, as we will see, those that possess them have struggled (unsuccessfully in my view) to say what role they are supposed to play in warfare, what advantage they convey on those that have them and what utility they have. In the second place, not only are nuclear weapons hugely destructive, but when delivered in the form of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), there is no defence against them. The atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 could have been defended against if Japan had any interceptor aircraft left, but they had none, and the US air force was so confident of this that the planes sent to bomb the cities had no escorts. But there is no plausible defence, either in existence nor even really in theory, that can resist a sustained offensive with ICBMs. Nuclear weapons also differ from small arms and catapults in regard to their genesis. The development of nuclear weapons is unique in that it was the first large WR project driven initially entirely by scientists – some of the most eminent scientists of the last century – who were aware of the possible implications of a relatively new kind of science (nuclear physics).

The Moral Dimension of Weapons Research

The last three chapters have provided examples of WR and its products, and as such have drawn on historical sources. This was not, of course, an end in itself and my intention was to show how circumstances surrounding and giving rise to those episodes of WR, what I have loosely called the ‘context of discovery’, was almost always very different from the contexts of their use and hence the context of their justification. I will proceed to use these examples to undermine, weaken or deny that certain justifications of WR are acceptable. Before that task can begin, it is necessary to show that weapons researchers do indeed need to justify what they do, for that it is not obvious. So I now turn away from the history of technology and the history of weapons research and development to matters that are more strictly philosophical in nature. There are in fact three issues that need to be addressed before we can begin to look at the most convincing justifications of WR, and I will explain what these are in Sect. 6.1 of what follows. Most of the balance of the chapter will be devoted to one of these issues, namely to the choice of a code or system of morality, which will be used to support the claim that WR is morally wrong – the first step in the case against WR – and deny that it is (readily or easily) justifiable which is the second step. This first step will be taken in the next chapter, and the second in the chapters which follow.

The Development of Projectile Weapons: Ancient Catapults

One of the first projectile weapons was the sling; there is evidence of slings dating from about 10,000 BCE. The sling is a very basic weapon, consisting of a piece of cloth or hide to which two unequal strings are attached. A small shot is placed in the sling, which is then whirled about the head and one of the strings released in the direction of the target. An important innovation occurred at about 6,000 BCE, when it was found that conical shot was more accurate than round shot, and the first manufactured ammunition was made from baked clay from 5,000 BCE. The sling was a dangerous weapon; Alexander himself was only saved from death by his helmet when hit on the head by a slingshot during the siege of Kyropolis in 329 BCE. The bow and arrow is even older than the sling, with cave paintings of bows dating back to the Palaeolithic (Rihill 2007: 13). Composite bows, made of wood, sinew and horn, smaller and more powerful than the ‘self-bow’ constructed from a single piece of wood, appeared in the fourth millennium BCE. I resist the temptation to date the beginnings of weapons research with reference to any of these innovations regarding the bow or the sling – I expect some case could be made if only the evidence was available, but the precise date at which weapons research began is not something that needs to be established here. However, when the sling and bow evolved into the catapult, and especially with the advent of torsion artillery, it is clear that weapons research had arrived. In this chapter I will say something about catapult technology in order to show that weapons research has been around for a long time. The development of this technology will also help us understand just what weapons research is. Moreover, there are four remarkable treatises on the catapult written between the third century BCE and the first century CE by Philon, Biton, Heron and Vitruvius which amount to the first weapons design manuals. To conclude, I will outline the evolution view of technology, and illustrate it with reference to the catapult. To set the scene I recount one of the best-known episodes in the ancient world of military technology skilfully deployed to thwart a powerful enemy.

The Development of Projectile Weapons 2: Firearms

It is a truism that the side with the better weapons will win a battle and a war, all other things being equal. And it is probably true that the side whose ordinary soldiers, the infantry, have better weapons will win, though heavy weapons can be decisive (as they were at Syracuse and at Sedan 2,000 years later). In this chapter I will consider three episodes from the history of the firearm, the weapon that has been the standard equipment of the ordinary soldier and his platoon of comrades. The first firearms were wildly inaccurate and did not replace other infantry weapons for several hundred years after their introduction. The situation is completely different now, with the infantryman usually being equipped with a deadly assault rifle, an accurate, sturdy weapon that can be set to fire in single-shot, semi-automatic or automatic mode, and so simple to use that a child can (and children do) operate it. I will discuss three weapons designers in this chapter, men who were responsible for one of the first really effective rifles, the machine gun and the assault rifle respectively. We have much more information about these people, and about who used their weapons, than we do for the catapult, as is to be expected. It is also important to remember that these were innovations that were part of the long evolution of the infantry weapon, innovations that were spawned by earlier work, one building upon another – we see the evolution view of technology at work again. I will also say something about the infantry weapons which proceeded those that appeared in the nineteenth century.

Just War Theory and Wartime Weapons Research

In the previous chapter principle P1 was formulated : “Whenever C is fighting a just war, then it is morally permissible for S to engage in WWR to support C”. This principle can be used to construct justifications of S’s participation in WWR on behalf of C, who (we assume) is fighting a just war. However, the idea of a just war needs clarification – we at least need to know what a just war is – and also P1 itself requires support: why is it that fighting a just war is such as to make WWR morally permissible, if indeed it does? We said that it will be necessary to turn to Just War Theory (JWT) to answer these questions, and it is now time to do so. To begin with we should note that there has a been a good deal said about the idea of a just war and there is not just one single just war theory. There is in fact a just war tradition that has grown up over many centuries, with some even dating its beginnings to ancient Greece. It is not surprising that there has been a long-standing tradition of thinking about how war can be just, given that war has been such a perennial feature of human history. Surely all wars cannot be bad, for, if they are, then does this not condemn all the societies and states that have fought wars, comprising virtually all of human civilisation? This was a pressing problem for the early Christian fathers, like St Augustine, who were anxious to show that the teaching of Christ was compatible with the killing and destruction wrought by war, though clearly not all war could be just. JWT has in fact been informed by different perspectives and viewpoints, ranging from Catholic theology to international law to moral and political philosophy. While this need not result in radically different versions of modern JWT, it will best to use a version of the theory that is most congenial for present purposes, and for this reason I will make use of what I will call the ‘Walzer-Orend’ formulation. Finally, we should be aware that JWT is by no means a secure and uncontroversial theory that commands universal assent: there are problems associated with it, especially as regards the interpretation of certain of the conditions for just war and about verifying that these are satisfied. There is, however, no other viable normative theory about war and it will not be necessary, for our purposes, to accept all its principles and conditions.