John Gearson

Deterring Conventional Terrorism: From Punishment to Denial and Resilience

This article considers the developing role of deterrence in countering conventional terrorist threats, tracing the post-9/11 rejection and later rediscovery of deterrence as a tool of counter-terrorism. Why do so many policymakers assume that the ‘new’ terrorism represented such a break with the past? Why was deterrence neglected as a consequence, under the belief that few terrorists do not aspire to be strategic in their campaigns? To the contrary, this analysis shows that most terrorists are open to attempts at coercion and in particular can be influenced by denial-based strategies. In the case of the United Kingdom, denial-based strategies successfully diverted a potentially crippling campaign of economic dislocation in the 1990s, with lessons for todays challenges. A reinvigorated focus on resilience – physical and societal – as part of a denial-based approach to deterring terrorist attacks, particularly those involving home-grown activists, is recommended. This offers the prospect of time and space for broader counter-terrorism programmes of counterradicalization and de-legitimization to run their course and should be part of future counter-terrorism strategies.

The Voyage of Discovery

The inconclusive alliance discussions of the winter of 1958/9 left Macmillan determined to pursue an independent course of action. US contingency planning and the apparent eagerness of sections of the US military to test Soviet resolve to the brink of war had concerned the prime minister greatly. Convinced that in a real test the West would eventually compromise, he believed a way had to be found to persuade his allies that a negotiated settlement (if it preserved the Western military presence in Berlin) was preferable to brinkmanship. Macmillan was aware that British public opinion favoured negotiations and was mindful that a general election was pending. Astounding his advisers, aUies and pubUc, he decided in early 1959 to visit Moscow on a ‘voyage of discovery’ to avert a disaster1. Merely by undertaking the visit, Macmillan plunged the Western alUance into another crisis of confidence about British resolution, but the dangers were seemingly unappreciated by the prime minister once he had set his mind on an independent initiative.

CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's Counterterrorism Approach

The appropriateness of the United Kingdoms counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, divides opinion. This article reassesses CONTEST as strategy rather than simply examining its effectiveness as policy, or critiquing its individual parts. Reviewing the development of CONTEST in the context of wider analytical discussions on what makes for good strategy, the authors argue that several important strands of CONTEST are either underdeveloped or not yet as “strategic” as some analysts and the U.K. government itself have professed them to be. Fresh thinking on aspects of counterterrorism is urgently needed to counter the challenge of contemporary and future terrorism.

Homes for Heroes? Assessing the Impact of the UK’s Military Covenant

Abstract The British Military Covenant can be located in and from many sources and from 2011 onwards in primary legislation. This article argues that the provision of military housing amounts to an early test of how the military covenant is understood and used by those involved in defence policy, and those in the armed forces affected by it. It finds that housing was a prominent feature of how service personnel understood how they were valued, but was not explicitly understood as a covenant issue by those personnel or the officials in charge of the Defence Estates. We locate three reasons for this: (1) the covenant has been poorly translated from aspiration into policy practice, (2) the covenant is unevenly understood across its stakeholders which has the effect of generating disappointment through misaligned expectations, (3) those engaged in the reform process surrounding the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) saw the covenant as a means to energise reform. Ultimately housing was seen as a dry and technocratic business area and thus an issue ripe for being refracted through the covenant was ultimately left outside of its remit.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

The problem of Berlin during the late 1950s and early 1960s offers a unique insight into the crisis management approach of British foreign policy makers in the post-Suez environment, revealing the extent to which Britain’s world role still was not clear at a time of profound change. Inasmuch as Britain still harbours an ambiguous approach towards its European partners, still conceiving a unique role for herself in transatlantic relations, the events of the Berlin crisis have important implications for understanding how Britain’s future role remains unclear to many even today. Indeed the Berlin crisis was the background to the decision to seek membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and as such, the event perhaps as profoundly as Suez, shaped Britain’s later placement in the world. Pointedly, it was during the Berlin Wall crisis that Dean Acheson, the former secretary of state and Berlin adviser to President John F. Kennedy, famously commented that Britain had lost an Empire but had yet to find a role.

Disaster in Paris

The successful outcome of the Rambouillet meeting of December 1959 and the decision to meet Khrushchev in 1960 was the culmination of Macmillan’s attempts to arrange a summit meeting. With the date settled, the UK aimed to prevent the alliance from adopting a hardline policy for the coming talks, whilst urging commitment to an interim agreement on Berlin. The breathing space afforded by the withdrawal of Khrushchev’s deadline also allowed the British another period of soul-searching on whether the UK was an Atlantic or a continental power. Macmillan’s strategy of the preceding two years finally appeared about to be realised, but was frustrated by the realities of the Berlin problem. Face-to-face contact could not alter the fact that Khrushchev claimed to be committed to ending the occupation regime in Berlin and the Western powers were not prepared to abandon their position in the city. These realities had begun to sour US-USSR relations in advance of the summit and the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane two weeks before the meeting, may well have been used by Khrushchev as an excuse to avoid substantive discussions which were unlikely to give the Soviet leader what he wanted. The collapse of the summit was a personal tragedy for Macmillan, whose entire policy was in tatters.

Britain and the Problem of Berlin

The Berlin crisis was a continuation of a long-standing dispute between the former allies of World War II. In section I of this chapter, the antecedents of the crisis will be traced back to their wartime origins. The Berlin problem’s historical context as part of the development of the Cold War and the division of Europe lay at the heart of the subsequent crisis. In section II, the importance of Berlin to British foreign policy-makers is assessed. Harold Macmillan’s background and pre-eminence in British foreign policy-making as prime minister, along with Britain’s self-image and ambivalence towards Germany and the Germans, critically shaped Britain’s policy towards Berlin. The search for German reunification and the desire for agreement with the USSR on European security developed as two conflicting strands in British thinking. From the early attempts to secure agreement with the Soviet Union on ending the wartime division of Germany, to the tacit acceptance of the status quo, British leaders conceived of a leading role for themselves for much of the post-war period - an inheritance that coloured Macmillan’s approach. Tracing the course of British policy on Germany, it emerges that Macmillan was logically and emotionally predisposed to an accommodation with the USSR at the expense of West German security interests, and this shaped his whole policy towards Berlin.

The Limits of British Influence

MacmiUan’s visit to Moscow left him in a difficult position with his main alUes. None had supported his decision to go and all were suspicious about what had transpired. He beUeved that Khrushchev’s withdrawal of his deadUne and the Soviets’ wiUingness to attend a foreign ministers’ conference, in advance of a fuU summit, provided an opportunity that should not be missed. The problem was to convince his sceptical allies that nothing sinister had happened in Moscow and that the time was right for negotiations to begin. The goal was to secure a summit meeting, where Macmillan hoped a deal could be struck. The foreign ministers’ conference was merely a stage to this end and his strategy was to convince the Americans and French of the need for direct contact with the Russians, whilst retaining a leading role for Britain and himself ahead of the British election. But his attempts to reassure his allies failed: de GauUe was ambivalent but determined broadly to support Adenauer; the chancellor was incensed by a reference to what he believed was disengagement in the final communique from Moscow; and Eisenhower, preoccupied with Dulles’s worsening illness, proved immune to Macmillan’s blandishments. More to the point, the president had begun to consider his own, individual initiative, which was to have profound implications for MacmiUan’s whole foreign policy and election strategy.

The Deadline Crisis

Khrushchev’s attack on the West’s presence in Berlin in the autumn of 1958 caught the Western alliance by surprise, despite an on-going series of disputes. Anglo-German relations were in a delicate state over the EEC-EFTA question, with the British government unsure how to support Adenauer against an external Soviet threat at a time when it was unhappy with him on trade matters. Khrushchev’s initial threat to turn over the control functions in Berlin to the DDR caused confusion in Western capitals. The British, predisposed towards compromise, quickly settled on the possibility of recognising the East German regime as a price worth paying for a Berlin settlement, to the dismay of their main allies. The debate over how to respond to Khrushchev saw little agreement, either militarily or politically, among the three allied occupying powers and the FRG, but Britain was singled out as the weakest link and accused of defeatism. This resulted from an ill-conceived decision by the Foreign Office to present the problem as a stark choice between compromising on dealing with the East German regime, or preparing for war. Although this reflected concerns shared by a number of Western countries, Britain’s policy of emphasising the extent to which the West was powerless to stop Khrushchev damaged Anglo-German relations and set the tone for the entire Berlin crisis.

Winning the Election

In the summer of 1959 Macmillan was faced with the problem of saving face following the collapse of the Geneva talks and Eisenhower’s invitation to Khrushchev; winning the election; and of ensuring that if any deal on Berlin was agreed, Britain was part of it. His strategy of moving his allies towards acceptance of a grand summit to agree on the future of European security had begun to disintegrate. The Americans appeared to be moving towards a bilateral solution to the Berlin crisis, whilst in Europe, Britain seemed irrelevant to the emerging Franco-Grerman entente. The danger of Britain finding herself without a role or ally in the international arena had become a real one. Macmillan attempted to ensure that his part in the relaxation of tension between East and West, demonstrated by Khrushchev’s visit to the US, was fully appreciated by the public in the weeks running up to the British general election. When he won the contest convincingly, Macmillan appeared politically the strongest Western leader, but was riven with indecision.