John Haugeland

The nature and plausibility of Cognitivism

Cognitivism in psychology and philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal “cognitive processes,” that is, rational thought in a very broad sense. Sections 1 to 5 attempt to explicate in detail the nature of the scientific enterprise that this intuition has inspired. That enterprise is distinctive in at least three ways: It relies on a style of explanation which is different from that of mathematical physics, in such a way that it is not basically concerned with quantitative equational laws; the states and processes with which it deals are “interpreted,” in the sense that they are regarded as meaningful or representational; and it is not committed to reductionism, but is open to reduction in a form different from that encountered in other sciences. Spelling these points out makes it clear that the Cognitivist study of the mind can be rigorous and empirical, despite its unprecedented theoretical form. The philosophical explication has another advantage as well: It provides a much needed framework for articulating questions about whether the Cognitivist approach is right or wrong. The last three sections take that advantage of the account, and address several such questions, pro and con.

Closing the last loophole: joining forces with Vincent Descombes

I will focus on the topic announced in the subtitle of Professor Descombes’ profound and provocative work: The Mind’s Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism. In the end, I will agree with practically everything in his incisive ‘critique’ except its conclusion: that cognitivism is incoherent. What he shows instead, I think, is that cognitivism, as an account of human thought and understanding, is deeply false. The difference matters because incoherence is harder to prove and, prima facie, less plausible. But, if the same argument, slightly recast, shows falsehood with even more conviction, then the essential point is saved after all. So, following a quick characterization of cognitivism, I will attempt to distill what I take to be the main grounds and themes of Descombes’ critique, explain why I don’t think they expose an incoherence, and then show how they might be recast in a way that is devastating all the same.

The Computer as a Mistaken Model of the Mind

The most dramatic and potentially revolutionary development in recent psychology is the suggestion that psychological explanations may be formulable as computer programmes. Such a suggestion has immense prima facie appeal to the scientific and philosophical community, for it seems to approach some kind of ideal of scientific explanation and intellectual understanding. But this very attractiveness should make us cautious. Before accepting such a programme of research unreflectively, we should try to make explicit the assumptions behind its approach. Baring these presuppositions might expose difficulties and equivocations not otherwise readily apparent.