John Ioannidis
Columbia University
Publication
Featured researches published by John Ioannidis.
acm special interest group on data communication | 1991
John Ioannidis; Daniel J. Duchamp; Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
We consider the problem of providing network access to hosts whose physical location changes with time. Such hosts cannot depend on traditional forms of network connectivity and routing because their location, and hence the route to reach them, cannot be deduced from their IP address. We present protocols that seamlessly integrate mobile hosts into the current IP networking infrastructure. They are primarily targeted at supporting a campus environment with mobile computers, but also extend gracefully to accomodate hosts moving between different networks. The key feature is the dependence on ancillary machines to track the location of the mobile hosts. Our protocols are designed to react quickly to changing topologies, to scale well, and not to place an overwhelming burden on the network.
the cryptographers track at the rsa conference | 2005
Debra L. Cook; John Ioannidis; Angelos D. Keromytis; Jake Luck
We study the feasibility of using Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) for cryptographic processing, by exploiting the ability for GPUs to simultaneously process large quantities of pixels, to offload symmetric key encryption from the main processor. We demonstrate the use of GPUs for applying the key stream when using stream ciphers. We also investigate the use of GPUs for block ciphers, discuss operations that make certain ciphers unsuitable for use with a GPU, and compare the performance of an OpenGL-based implementation of AES with implementations utilizing general CPUs. While we conclude that existing symmetric key ciphers are not suitable for implementation within a GPU given present APIs, we discuss the applicability of moving encryption and decryption into the GPU to image processing, including the handling of displays in thin-client applications and streaming video, in scenarios in which it is desired to limit exposure of the plaintext to within the GPU on untrusted clients.
network operations and management symposium | 2002
Kostas G. Anagnostakis; Sotiris Ioannidis; Stefan Miltchev; Michael B. Greenwald; Jonathan M. Smith; John Ioannidis
Network monitoring is a vital part of modern network infrastructure management. Existing techniques either present a restricted view of network behavior and state, or do not efficiently scale to higher network speeds and heavier monitoring workloads. We present a novel architecture for programmable packet-level network monitoring that addresses these shortcomings. Our approach allows users to customize the monitoring function at the lowest possible level of abstraction to suit a wide range of monitoring needs: we use operating system mechanisms that result in a programming environment providing a high degree of flexibility, retaining fine-grained control over security, and minimizing the associated performance overheads. We present an implementation of this architecture as well as a set of experimental applications.
information security practice and experience | 2005
Stelios Sidiroglou; John Ioannidis; Angelos D. Keromytis; Salvatore J. Stolfo
We present an architecture for detecting “zero-day” worms and viruses in incoming email. Our main idea is to intercept every incoming message, pre-scan it for potentially dangerous attachments, and only deliver messages that are deemed safe. Unlike traditional scanning techniques that rely on some form of pattern matching (signatures), we use behavior-based anomaly detection. Under our approach, we “open” all suspicious attachments inside an instrumented virtual machine looking for dangerous actions, such as writing to the Windows registry, and flag suspicious messages. The attachment processing can be offloaded to a cluster of ancillary machines (as many as are needed to keep up with a sites email load), thus not imposing any computational load on the mail server. Messages flagged are put in a “quarantine” area for further, more labor-intensive processing. Our implementation shows that we can use a large number of malware-checking VMs operating in parallel to cope with high loads. Finally, we show that we are able to detect the actions of all malicious software we tested, while keeping the false positive rate to under 5%.
Computer Networks | 2006
Patrick D. McDaniel; William Aiello; Kevin R. B. Butler; John Ioannidis
Attacks against Internet routing are increasing in number and severity. Contributing greatly to these attacks is the absence of origin authentication; there is no way to validate claims of address ownership or location. The lack of such services not only enables attacks by malicious entities, but also indirectly allows seemingly inconsequential misconfigurations to disrupt large portions of the Internet. This paper considers the semantics, design, and costs of origin authentication in interdomain routing. We formalize the semantics of address delegation and use on the Internet, and develop and characterize original, broad classes of origin authentication proof systems. We estimate the address delegation graph representing the current use of IPv4 address space using available routing data. This effort reveals that current address delegation is dense and relatively static: as few as 16 entities perform 80% of the delegation on the Internet. We conclude by evaluating the proposed services via trace-based simulation, which demonstrates that the enhanced proof systems can significantly reduce resource costs associated with origin authentication.
symposium on small systems | 1991
John Ioannidis; Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.; Israel Ben-Shaul; Marios Levedopoulos; Micky Liu
We describe the Student Electronic Notebook and the process of porting IBMs AIX 1.1 to run on it. We believe that portable workstation-class machines connected by wireless networks and dependent on a computational and informational infrastructure raise a number of important issues in operating systems and distributed computation (e.g., the partitioning of tasks between workstations and infrastructure), and therefore the development of such machines and their software is important. We conclude by summarizing our activites, itemizing the lessons we learned and identifying the key criteria for the design of the successor machines.
Archive | 1988
Jonathan M. Smith; John Ioannidis
We describe a method for implementing a remote fork , a primitive with the semantics of a UNIX fork() call which begins the execution of the child process on a remote machine. We begin by examining the subject of process migration, and conclude that most of the relevant process state can be captured and transferred to a remote system without operating system support. We then show how our implementation is easily optimized to achieve a performance improvement of greater than 10 times when measuring execution time. We conclude with some comments on limitations and applications of the remote fork mechanism.
Archive | 1990
John Ioannidis; Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
We discuss our ideas for the Personal Information Portal its hardware and software platform our visions for its use and its impact on the student and the professional community.
international conference on information security | 2005
Stephen Chou; Angelos Stavrou; John Ioannidis; Angelos D. Keromytis
We present gore, a routing-assisted defense architecture against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that provides guaranteed levels of access to a network under attack. Our approach uses routing to redirect all traffic destined to a customer under attack to strategically-located gore proxies, where servers filter out attack traffic and forward authorized traffic toward its intended destination. n nOur architecture can be deployed incrementally by individual ISPs, does not require any collaboration between ISPs, and requires no modifications to either server- or client- software. Clients can be authorized through a web interface that screens legitimate users from outsiders or automated zombies. Authenticated clients are granted limited-time access to the network under attack. The gore architecture allows ISPs to offer DDoS defenses as a value-added service, providing necessary incentives for the deployment of such defenses. We constructed a PC-based testbed to evaluate the performance and scalability of gore. Our preliminary results show that gore is a viable approach, as its impact on the filtered traffic is minimal, in terms of both end-to-end latency and effective throughput. Furthermore, gore can easily be scaled up as needed to support larger numbers of clients and customers using inexpensive commodity PCs.
ACM Sigsmall\/pc Notes | 1991
John Ioannidis; Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.; Israel Ben-Shaul; Marios Levedopoulos; Micky Liu
We describe the Student Electronic Notebook and the process of porting IBMs AIX 1.1 to run on it. We believe that portable workstation-class machines connected by wireless networks and dependent on a computational and informational infrastructure raise a number of important issues in operating systems and distributed computation (e.g., the partitioning of tasks between workstations and infrastructure), and therefore the development of such machines and their software is important. We conclude by summarizing our activites, itemizing the lessons we learned and identifying the key criteria for the design of the successor machines.