John Kincaid

From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism

Cooperative federalism, the reigning conception of American federalism from about 1954 to 1978, was a political response to the policy challenges of market failure, postwar affluence, racism, urban poverty, environmentalism, and individual rights. Having social equity as its primary objective, cooperative federalism significantly transformed American society, but when the conditions underlying cooperation changed during the 1970s, the pressure to expand national power inherent in cooperative federalism gave rise to coercive federalism, in which the federal government reduced its reliance on fiscal tools to stimulate intergovernmental policy cooperation and increased its reliance on regulatory tools to ensure the supremacy of federal policy. The erosion of federal fiscal power and of constitutional and political limits on federal regulatory power in the 1970s and 1980s has produced a more coercive system of federal preemptions of state and local authority and unfunded mandates on state and local governments. This system undermines governmental responsibility and public accountability; yet state and local governments may not possess sufficient constitutional or political leverage to alter the system. Thus cooperative federalism has not been replaced by a new consensus on federalism. In light of contemporary conditions, a new consensus may have to be forged from elements of cooperative equity, competitive efficiency, and dual accountability.

De Facto Devolution and Urban Defunding: The Priority of Persons Over Places

Much attention has been focused on devolution of federal functions to states and localities; yet, little devolution is evident. Many forces are generating interest in devolution, but opposition remains potent. Meanwhile, a bipartisan process of de facto devolution involving a defunding of urban programs has been under way for two decades. De facto devolution has been driven predominantly by a shift in federal policy making from places to persons whereby the political incentives for federal officials now lie more in responding to the rights and interests of individuals than to the prerogatives and interests of state and local governments. This article, therefore, examines forces for and against devolution; the devolution records of Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court; de facto devolution in the context of federal emphases on persons; and implications for cities.

Economic policy‐making: advantages and disadvantages of the federal model

In principle, key advantages of a democratic federation include (1) more efficient provision and production of public services tailored to the diversity of citizen and communal preferences; (2) better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry and thus more equity, insofar as citizens get what they pay for and pay for what they get; (3) better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics, especially the variable economies of scale of different public goods; (4) increased competition, experimentation, and innovation in government; (5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences, especially insofar as regional and local governments have the authority and ability to respond to those preferences; (6) more transparent and close-to-the-citizen accountability in policy-making; and (7) more sensitivity to subnational regional concerns, including the power of constituent governments to provide for primarily by considerations relating to liberty, the promotion of active citizenship, and democracy. In multination states, federal arrangements will also be necessitated by considerations of equity and the right to self-determination. Federal constitutions nevertheless tend to make it mation; there are significant differences between liberal individualist and multi-communal federations; and many factors other than federalism affect economic policy-making. Consequently, federations include both the worlds richest and the worlds poorest nations.

Federal democracy and liberty

Federalism figures prominently in Alexis de Tocquevilles Democracy in America (1969) because federalism is a fundamental constitutive principle of the American polity and because federalism aims to achieve conditions that Tocqueville regarded as essential for liberty in a democratic age. These conditions lie principally, though not entirely, in the preservation of local liberty. Local liberty allows and encourages individuals in small civil communities to participate together in defining and addressing their common needs and aspirations and, thereby, to learn how to express their self-interest-as rightly, rather than wrongly or selfishly, understood-in ways that defend individual liberty and republican citizenship against the atomizing, enervating effects of a mass democracy driven toward centralization and uniform legislation by popular clamoring for equality. Yet, federalism has an uncertain future, even in the United States, according to Tocqueville, as well as limited applicability to democratic polities forged in the ashes of an ancien regime.

State Constitutions in the Federal System

State constitutionalism has undergone a certain revitalization in recent decades due to the efforts of state electorates and officials to reform and modernize state government, the willingness of many state high courts to redevelop state constitutional law as an independent body of law, and the expansion of federal constitutional law requiring adjustments in state constitutional law. State constitutions remain important as instruments of local self-government even though the field of state constitutional choice has been circumscribed by federal constitutional law. A basic distinguishing characteristic of state constitutions is their reliance on direct popular consent and control. This characteristic is a matter of conflict in state constitutional change because it produces long and detailed constitutions subject to easy popular amendment. Despite reform efforts to streamline state constitutions and limit majoritarian influences, most state electorates continue to prefer more consent and control of government under state constitutions than are available under the U.S. Constitution.

Courts in Federal Countries : Federalists or Unitarists?

Courts are key players in the dynamics of federal countries since their rulings have a direct impact on the ability of governments to centralize and decentralize power. Courts in Federal Countries examines the role high courts play in thirteen countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States. The volumes contributors analyse the centralizing or decentralizing forces at play following a courts ruling on issues such as individual rights, economic affairs, social issues, and other matters. The thirteen substantive chapters have been written to facilitate comparability between the countries. Each chapter outlines a countrys federal system, explains the constitutional and institutional status of the court system, and discusses the high courts jurisprudence in light of these features. Courts in Federal Countries offers insightful explanations of judicial behaviour in the worlds leading federations.

Is the Teaching of Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations Dead or Alive in U.S. Public Administration

Abstract Despite widespread perceptions of a decline in teaching about federalism and/or intergovernmental relations in U. S. public administration and public affairs programs, this study finds that more than half of all such programs offer courses on these subjects. Such courses are more prevalent in public administration than in political science; interest in teaching such courses is higher in public administration than in political science; and such courses are viewed as valuable by department colleagues in both disciplines. The top four topics covered in such courses are intergovernmental administration, federal-state-local relations, policy issues, and fiscal matters. Moreover, the rise of popular terms such as collaborative, networked, and multilevel governance has not displaced federal, federalism, and intergovernmental relations in course titles.

Federalism: A Normative Theory and its Practical Relevance

regard—misguided. This seems to be particularly true since the US encountered constitutional conflicts very similar to those the EU is faced with today. After an extensive analysis of the constitutional and the comparative dimensions, the third and final part of this book deals with the institutional dimension. For that purpose, Chapter 5 surveys the historical development and importance of the artificial term ‘Treaty Architecture’, deriving from the ‘Spinelli Treaty’ and referring to the innovative way in which the EU’s various treaties are arranged and related to each other. In the course of his analysis, de Witte demonstrates in a convincing manner that the EU has undergone a curious change during its short but eventful treaty history; unfortunately without ever realizing the primary objective of a federally integrated Europe. The author puts it aptly when stating that, today, the EU finds itself stuck in some kind of unresolved treaty paradox: with two separate treaties (the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), establishing and regulating one organization (the EU), the ideas of simplification and closer integration seem to have been deferred to the unforeseeable future. Finally, Chapter 6 provides an indepth discussion of the EEC’s former President François Mitterrand and his role in the negotiations following the 1984 ‘Spinelli Treaty’. In this connection, Palayret calls into question Mitterrand’s sudden change of mind regarding the French’s attitude towards Europe, then being the most supportive during France’s entire history. Moreover, he makes absolutely evident that, once again, Spinelli’s ideas and provisions for a federally organized Europe were more prominent than ever before. This truly inspiring book brings together a very useful set of contributions and numerous topical references, thereby, on the one hand, piquing the readers’ interest with many new theses and propositions and, on the other hand, providing persuasive explanations. Albeit every chapter highlights different dimensions of federalism and constitutionalism from different perspectives, all of them point to one outstanding fact: no matter whether it be federalism or federalization, constitutionalism or constitutionalization, or maybe even both, Spinelli’s pre-eminent ideas for the creation of a European Federation will influence the European system throughout the next decades. Not least due to this apparently timeless significance as well as the wide range of potential readers covered—politicians, economists and lawyers, practitioners and academics alike—this book will merit a place on many reading lists.