John Langan

The American Hierarchy and Nuclear Weapons

THE MORAL problem to be considered here has roused considerable public interest in the past year, during which numerous American Catholic bishops have addressed the problem of nuclear weapons. Many of them have spoken out against what they perceived to be the attitudes and policies of the Reagan administration on the development of new weapons systems and the possible use of nuclear weapons. Public interest has also been heightened by the decision of the U.S. Catholic Conference to prepare a statement on peace and war with special reference to nuclear weapons. This statement was to be issued at the annual meeting of the bishops in November. Both political commentators and government officials have been struck by the readiness of members of the Catholic hierarchy to raise difficult questions and to take controversial stands on a complex and divisive issue of crucial importance to both the future security of the United States and the peace of the world. The way in which the moral issues raised by nuclear weapons are formulated in the current debate in the Catholic community reflects both the general public debate in American society over defense policy and the special concerns of Christian faith and Catholic tradition. The central questions about the moral justifiability of producing, possessing, deploying, and using nuclear weapons are thus considered both within the context of the special responsibilities of the United States as nuclear superpower with its own distinctive history, interests, treaty obligations, resources, and vulnerabilities and within the context of the Catholic tradition with its special forms of church teaching and its preferred patterns of moral argument and reflection. The complex task of reflecting on these questions in the American Catholic context is in a special way the responsibility of the ad hoc committee chaired by Archbishop Joseph Bernardin of Cincinnati, which has drawn on numerous consultants from different disciplines and viewpoints. But many other bishops have also chosen to address the problem on their own initiative. It is not my intention here to review in a

Moral Disagreements in Catholicism: A Commentary on Wallace, Schüller, and Thomasma

Catholic approaches to ethical issues in general and to the problems of medical issues in particular have been both admired and criticized for their extensive use of philosophical categories and methods. The reasons for the Catholic reliance on philosophy in articulating ethical theory and in resolving ethical disputes come from different sources. First, from the long history of Catholic theologians from Augustine and Aquinas to Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan in our own time, who have been deeply engaged with philosophy. Second, from Catholicism’s sense of itself as a universal church, as the carrier of a religious message that speaks to the hearts and the needs of all persons; this is a sense that was powerfully renewed at the Second Vatican Council and that underlies the recent pastoral letters of the U.S. Catholic Bishops. Third, from the Catholic understanding of the human person created as a free and rational being in the image of God, an image that is obscured, but not obliterated, by human sinfulness.

Violence and Injustice in Society: Recent Catholic Teaching:

VIOLENCE CAN OCCUR on different scales and in different contexts, from the terrifying forced intimacy of rape to the stunning desolation of nuclear bombardment. It has been one of the great constants in our literature and our history—from Cain and Achilles on. It enters into our understanding of such virtues as courage and patience. It is seen as both the instrument of justice and the enactment of malice. It is linked with the time of founding of the nation and of political order, and it brings about the destruction of empires. It enters into our conception of God Himself and into our account of His judgements on the peoples of the earth. Accordingly, it is and must remain a central topic for theological inquiry and reflection. But constant though violence is in human history, theological reflection on it always takes place within a cultural, social, and political context which is itself both complex and variable. This context is particularly diverse and rich in the case of Roman Catholicism, which is a transnational church with a long, checkered history and which has strong elements of the political both in its internal structure and in its stance to the larger world. In ministering to the various parts of its vast flock, Catholicism has had in the recent past to deal with the problems created by such different forms of violence as urban terrorism (Northern Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Argentina), civil war (Lebanon and El Salvador), tribal warfare (Africa), conventional naval warfare (the Falklands), the threat of violence implicit in mass political movements (Poland), military coups both actual and threatened (Latin America and Spain), rural terrorism carried on by both revolutionary groups and governments (Central America), the deployment of nuclear armaments (United States, United Kingdom, France), rioting by minority groups (United States, United Kingdom), arbitrary arrests, torture, executions, and disappearances carried on by governments directly or through paramilitary groups (Uganda, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil). There are also continuing forms of violence which are linked with long-standing social conditions, such as rising levels of violent crime in urban societies, or with cultural developments, such as the effects of the representation of violence in the various media. This listing is not intended to be exhaustive, but it does indicate the scale and the complexity of the problem of violence in

Book Review: Death and Eternal LifeDeath and Eternal Life. By HickJohn. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. Pp. 495.

on quality-of-life criteria. Here R. stresses that no treatment is indicated where none exists that can do more than prolong dying. But he sharply distinguishes this from the situation of those who die because no treatment is given, even though some treatment is indicated. Thus R. argues against quality-of-life criteria on two grounds. First, philosophically, justice demands that the standard of letting die must be the same, for example, for normal children and children with defects; otherwise we are adding injustice to injury. Second, theologically, R. recalls that God is no respecter of persons and that God rains on the just and the unjust. The inference is that quality-of-life perspectives should not influence medical judgment or decisions. Third, R. argues that the practice of medicine should be based on neither the attempt to rid life of the tragedies that are present nor on criteria of personhood. The criteria of medicine are physiological, and to go beyond these is substantively to change the practice of medicine. Many will be offended by R.s polemics and bluntness. However, he does indicate inadequacies in arguments and demands serious attention. Though the style is a bit thick at times, the material is worth while. A major problem with the book is that one almost needs to have the copy of either the case or article on which R. is commenting next to one as the arguments are read. Although one can read the book in itself, one is better off for doing such cross-referencing. Nonetheless, the volume is a most helpful contribution to the literature in that it points out many problems with respect to public policy that have not received the full attention R. gives to them. The book is a fitting conclusion to R.s work in medical ethics.

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tions from social psychologists. He acknowledges Freuds impact on the theology/sociology dialogue, but he would further profit from an acquaintance with the thought of the likes of G. H. Mead and Karen Horney. Of special note is B.s conclusion that many of the classical sociological critiques of religion observe only one side of religions complexity. Some theorists choose to cite only the alienating forces of religion, while failing to consider the liberating side which all major religions possess. B. also adds that some churches have made similar reductions. B. directs his study to major areas of theology. Ultimately, he is calling for a wholesale revision of theology. But within that general demand he focuses on specific areas where the theology/sociology dialogue is most useful. He treats the issue of secularization, theories of evolution and revolution, the role of symbol in understanding, and the role of the imagination in theology. He spices his study with critical comments on how psychoanalysis and a privatized eschatology have established alienating tendencies in contemporary religion. B. will forcefully criticize sociologists when he judges that they have overstepped their methodological competencies, but he is equally critical of theologians and churches when they failed to sense the societal ramifications of their teachings.

Book Review: Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740. By JohnsonJames Turner. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975. Pp. 292. 12.50.

the role of religious studies within the university. The weaknesses of the book are not so much P.s as those of much of the metacritical literature he relies upon: namely, to what extent can metacritical theories indeed speak for those sciences they purport to represent? Radnitzky (Contemporary Schools of Metascience [Göteborg, 1968]) gives a searching critique of this question that would have enriched P.s own presentation. Also, P.s research interest needs further exploration. He seems to locate the question as one of theologys position within the university and does not adequately discuss theology in reference to its own praxis situation, which leads one to wonder to what extent academic respectability rather than the organization of theological knowledge is the overriding concern. Nevertheless, P.s book remains an important contribution to the discussion of method and theology.