John M. Connor

Market-Structure Determinants of National Brand-Private Label Price Differences of Manufactured Food Products

This paper estimates the relationships between market structure and the Lerner index of monopoly constructed from price data on processed food products sold through grocery stores. A theoretical model of a differentiated oligopoly specifies two determinants of price-cost margins: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of seller concentration adjusted for the elasticity of demand and the industry advertising-to-sales ratio. The results indicate that the three principal determinants of price-cost margin variation, in order of their impacts, are: advertising intensity, elasticity of demand, and concentration. Previous structure-performance studies that did not incorporate the elasticity of demand were probably misspecified.

Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis

The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

Global price fixing

The Economics of Price Fixing.- Anticartel Laws and Enforcement.- The Citric Acid Industry.- The Citric Acid Conspiracy.- Economic Impacts of the Citric Acid Cartel.- The World Lysine Industry.- The Lysine Conspiracy.- Economic Effects of the Lysine Cartel.- The Global Vitamins Industries.- The Vitamins Conspiracies.- Effects of the Vitamins Cartels.- U.S. Government Prosecutions.- Antitrust Prosecutions Outside the United States.- The Civil Suits.- The Business of Fighting Cartels.- Global Price Fixing: Summing Up.

Grocery market pricing and the new competitive environment

Abstract This article seeks to examine the effect of changes in retail-grocery market conditions upon consumer prices and the response of food retailers to these conditions. We explore these issues for two different product groups. One is composed primarily of branded, dry and frozen groceries (P1) while the second largely represents produce, meat, and perishable products (P2). Our statistical model finds that the effect of these new market conditions is often markedly sensitive to product type. Competitive conditions affect both price measures, but entry by warehouse and similar grocery formats surprisingly lower perishable prices more than those for staple goods. We also observe that frequent price changes in a market serves to reduce food prices, suggesting that promotional activities in response to new format competition are beneficial for consumers. There is strong evidence of a fast food-supermarket rivalry, but we are unable to identify its specific nature. Operating costs significantly effect prices for staple itmes, but have virtually no evident influence on perishable.

“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995

Prosecution of the lysine cartel signaled aresurgence in global price-fixingconspiracies in dozens of markets. It was the first to enter thevideo age and set new precedents for large criminal fines. Thispaper examines the sensitivity of overcharges generated by thecartel to several factors: time period, seasonality of demand,and the price absent collusion. Civil settlements in the federalclass action (including the interrelated citric acid conspiracy)were the fourth highest in legal history. Yet, overcharges of

Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels

65 to

Determinants of new product introductions in the US food industry: a panel-model approach

134 million mean that buyers in the federal class receivedat most single damages. The opt-out firms got double damages.

Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1991-2009

This paper assesses the antitrust fines and private penalties imposed on the participants of 260 international cartels discovered during 1990–2005, using four indicators of enforcement effectiveness. First, the United States is almost always the first to investigate and sanction international cartels, and its investigations are about seven times faster than EU probes. Second, US investigations were more likely to be kept confidential than those in Europe, but the gap nearly disappeared since 2000. Third, median government antitrust fines average less than 10% of affected commerce, but rises to about 35% in the case of multi-continental conspiracies. Civil settlements in jurisdictions where they are permitted are typically 6 to 12% of sales. Canadian and US fines and settlements imposed higher penalties than other jurisdictions. Fourth, fines on cartels that operated in Europe averaged a bit more than half of their estimated overcharges; those prosecuted only in North America paid civil and criminal sanctions of roughly single damages; and global cartels prosecuted in both jurisdictions typically paid less than single damages. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Collusion and Price Dispersion

Economic theory suggests that market structure variables influence technical change, growth and new product introductions. Based on a broad data set for new product introductions in various food industries, it is elaborated in this article how market structure variables affect innovative activities in the US food sector. It is different from earlier studies in the way that cross-sectional and time-series data are combined and panel data models are used in the econometric analysis. A major result is that new product introductions are driven by market structure variables and industry-specific characteristics, i.e. fixed effects. A significant determinant of new food product introductions is the concentration ratio which affects the number of innovations in a nonlinear form. The fixed-effects estimates reveal a U-type effect of concentration on innovations. Furthermore, the number of firms, the degree of existing product differentiation and the size of a market show a positive influence on the number of innovations. From a methodological point of view, plain OLS models yield biased results on the concentration-innovation linkage and on the relationship between the size of a market and innovations. Therefore, it is very important to include sector-specific characteristics as is done in the fixed-effects models.

Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays

High rates of or rising trends in recidivism is evidence that enforcement of a criminal law is failing. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)