John M. Griffith

CEO ownership and firm value

This paper examines the hypothesis that the amount of CEO ownership has a dominating effect on the value of the firm. Using a diverse sample of firms, firm value as measured by Tobins q is found to be a nonmonotonic function of CEO ownership. Specifically, Tobins q rises when the CEO owns between 0 and 15% and declines as CEO ownership increases to 50%. Beyond 50%, the value starts to rise. Firm value also is found not to be a function of management ownership when CEO ownership is separated out, indicating that CEO ownership does have a dominating effect on firm value. Copyright

CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance

This study examines the relation between CEO ownership and bank performance. In contrast to Pi and Timme (1993), we find that, when economic measures of performance are used, the relation between ownership and the performance of commerical banks is nonlinear. Additionally, in contrast to previous studies, we find the question of whether or not the CEO also holds the title of chairman of the board has an insignificant impact on bank performance. We conclude that, in commercial banks, management entrenchment may offset the effects predicted by Jensen and Mecklings (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis.

The Performance of White-Knight Management

This paper finds that, on average, white-knight managers have previously made bad investment decisions and their value-decreasing bids are thus part of a pattern of bad investment decisions, but that there is almost no tendency for shareholders to replace these inefficient managers.

EVA® and Stock Performance

Investors make investment decisions based on various performance measures. This study assesses whether investors should base their investment decisions on market value added (MVA), economic value added (EVA), or future growth reliance (FGR). Griffith finds that investors basing their investment decisions on MVA, EVA, or FGR would have suffered significant losses.

Reit Executive Compensation, Performance, and Management Power: Evidence from Panel Data

This study focuses on REIT CEO compensation. We utilize five different definitions for CEO compensation: salary, bonus, cash compensation, total compensation, and option awards. To capture the determinants of CEO compensation, we use the following performance measures: three-year stock returns, MVA (market value added), and Tobins q. We also examine the impact of managerial power on compensation. We utilize a panel data set to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Our panel data set captures both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Previous work on REIT executive compensation has chiefly looked at compensation data on cross-sectional basis. We find performance and size do not influence the CEOs salary while, risk, term, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Contrary to previous findings and our expectations, bonuses are not influenced by risk, CEO power, or size.