John M. Meyer

Political nature : environmentalism and the interpretation of Western thought

Concern over environmental problems is prompting us to reexamine established thinking about society and politics. The challenge is to find a way for the publics concern for the environment to become more integral to social, economic, and political decision making. Two interpretations have dominated Western portrayals of the nature-politics relationship, what John Meyer calls the dualist and the derivative. The dualist account holds that politics -- and human culture in general -- is completely separate from nature. The derivative account views Western political thought as derived from conceptions of nature, whether Aristotelian teleology, the clocklike mechanism of early modern science, or Darwinian selection. Meyer examines the nature-politics relationship in the writings of two of its most pivotal theorists, Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes, and of contemporary environmentalist thinkers. He concludes that we must overcome the limitations of both the dualist and the derivative interpretations if we are to understand the relationship between nature and politics. Human thought and action, says Meyer, should be considered neither superior nor subservient to the nonhuman natural world, but interdependent with it. In the final chapter, he shows how struggles over toxic waste dumps in poor neighborhoods, land use in the American West, and rainforest protection in the Amazon illustrate this relationship and point toward an environmental politics that recognizes the experience of place as central.

Interpreting nature and politics in the history of Western thought: The environmentalist challenge

A number of environmentalists have argued that a gulf between nature, on the one hand, and culture or politics, on the other hand, is deeply rooted in Western thought. By contrast, other environmentalists have read the history of Western thought as replete with social and political understandings derived from particular (albeit incorrect) conceptions of nature. In this paper, I distil the essence of these two dominant ‐ and mutually exclusive ‐interpretations of the relationship between nature and politics. I label these ‘dualism’ and ‘derivation’ and highlight the allure of each. By doing so, I both identify their insights, and critique their inadequacies. While Western thinkers have often devalued nature, neither dualism nor derivation has been a consistent reason for this devaluation. If we recognise this, then we can begin to see that there are multiple ways in which nature and politics can be related. The result is to problematise the theoretical project needed to address the very real concerns raise...

The Concept of Private Property and the Limits of the Environmental Imagination

An absolutist concept of property has the power to shape and constrain the public imagination. Libertarian theorists normatively embrace this concept. Yet its influence extends far beyond these proponents, shaping the views of an otherwise diverse array of theorists and activists. This limits the ability of environmentalists, among others, to respond coherently to challenges from property rights advocates in the U.S. I sketch an alternative concept—rooted in practice—that understands private property as necessarily embedded in social and ecological relations, rather than constrained by these relations. I argue that this concept can prefigure a more robust environmentalism.

Populism, paternalism and the state of environmentalism in the US

This article examines the challenges and opportunities faced by US environmental movements, in light of contemporary efforts to address climate change. The author identifies and describes two discourses, which he terms paternalism and populism. These need not describe distinct movements, but reflect differing impulses and ways of engaging the public that are available to environmentalists of various stripes. Discourses are explored through their divergent notions of both environmentalist identity and the relation of environmental concern to the experiences of everyday life.

Hypocrisy, NIMBY, and the Politics of Everybody's Backyard

Feldman and Turner defend the making of so-called ‘NIMBY’ claims as ethically justifiable. They do so while confronting a case—Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s opposition to the Cape Wind Project in Nantucket Sound—that makes them ‘deeply uncomfortable’ (p.6). I concur with both of these views. Nonetheless, I argue that the authors take the wrong route to arrive at them, leaving us with a confused understanding of NIMBY and so a defense that concedes too much to critics. As the authors note, NIMBY is an acronym often used derisively. Few explicitly represent their own claims as such (p.9). As a consequence, the question of how NIMBY is defined becomes crucial. For Feldman and Turner, Kennedy’s opposition to Cape Wind, although ‘egregious’, (p.1) is ‘characteristic’ (p.4) of what they term ‘genuine’ NIMBY claims (pp. 8–9). However, the Kennedy case is only one sort that has been described as NIMBY. Recognising its distinguishing characteristic, and the ways in which others differ from it, can generate a more pluralistic account of NIMBY and a more compelling defense of political struggles against locally undesirable projects. I think the discomfort with Kennedy’s position is best understood as rooted in the suspicion that he is being hypocritical. Presenting himself as a principled environmentalist and supporter of renewable energy, Kennedy’s opposition to siting wind turbines in his ‘backyard’ seemingly exposes him as an unprincipled pretender—a hypocrite. It is the tension between his general position and his stance in this case that elicits Feldman and Turner’s censure, and the NIMBY label. By contrast, if Kennedy were consistently opposed to wind energy, his anti-Cape Wind activism would not be hypocritical. A different illustration might make this point more clearly: imagine two neighbors, Harry and Sally. Harry is an outspoken proponent of nuclear power, while Sally is an unswerving critic. If Harry nonetheless opposes locating a power plant (or, say, spent fuel repository) near their homes, we would likely charge him with hypocrisy and NIMBYism. By contrast, we would expect Sally to be opposed to the plant, since this would be consistent with her general convictions. Even if we disagreed with her view, we would be unlikely to accuse her of either hypocrisy or NIMBYism in this pejorative sense. The problem with