John Nolt

How Harmful Are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions?

It has sometimes been claimed (usually without evidence) that the harm caused by an individuals participation in a greenhouse-gas-intensive economy is negligible. Using data from several contemporary sources, this paper attempts to estimate the harm done by an average American. This estimate is crude, and further refinements are surely needed. But the upshot is that the average American is responsible, through his/her greenhouse gas emissions, for the suffering and/or deaths of one or two future people.

Casualties as a moral measure of climate change

Climate change will cause large numbers of casualties, perhaps extending over thousands of years. Casualties have a clear moral significance that economic and other technical measures of harm tend to mask. They are, moreover, universally understood, whereas other measures of harm are not. Therefore, the harms of climate change should regularly be expressed in terms of casualties by such agencies such as IPCC’s Working Group III, in addition to whatever other measures are used. Casualty estimates should, furthermore, be used to derive estimates of casualties per emission source up to a given date. Such estimates would have wide margins of error, but they would add substantially to humanity’s grasp of the moral costs of particular greenhouse gas emissions.

Replies to Critics of ‘How Harmful are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions?’

I am grateful to all the respondents to ‘How harmful are the average American’s greenhouse gas emissions?’ (Nolt, 2011b). Their comments were individually and collectively very rich. Since there is not, I regret, enough space here to address them all, I will reply only to those that I regard as most telling against my view. My replies are arranged (in no special order) under headings that express particular objections.

Hope, Self-Transcendence and Environmental Ethics

Abstract Environmental ethicists often hold that organisms, species, ecosystems, and the like have goods of their own. But, even given that such goods exist, whether we ought to value them is controversial. Hence an environmental philosophy needs, in addition to an account of what sorts of values there are, an explanation what, how and why we morally ought to value—that is, an account of moral valuing. This paper presents one such an account. Specifically, I aim to show that unless there are eternal goods (and maybe even if there are), we have a duty of self-transcendence toward nature—that is, a duty to value natures goods as ends. This duty is owed, however, not to nature, but to ourselves. It is grounded in what I call an imperative of hope. The argument, in a nutshell, is that we have a duty to ourselves to (in a certain sense) optimize hope. This optimization requires self-transcendence toward entities whose goods are more diverse and enduring than any human goods. But unless there are eternal goods, such goods occur only in nature.

TRUTH AS AN EPISTEMIC IDEAL

Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth” defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also upon one’s standards of warrant.

Why Nietzsche Embraced Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsches embrace of the idea of eternal recurrence has long puzzled readers, both because the idea is inherently implausible and because it seems inconsistent with other aspects of his philosophy. This paper offers a novel account of Nietzsches motives for that embrace—namely that Nietzsche found in eternal recurrence the only possible way to reconcile three potent and apparently conflicting convictions: (1) there are no Hinterwelten (“worlds-beyond”), (2) the great love (take joy in) all things just as they are (amor fati), and (3) all joy wills eternity. The case for this account has two parts. I show first that Nietzsche was deeply committed to each of these principles at or before the time the idea of eternal recurrence “came to” him in 1881 and second that these principles, though in apparent conflict, can, as Nietzsche understood them, be reconciled by, and only by, the idea of eternal recurrence. It follows, I argue, that the idea of eternal recurrence was originally independent of Nietzsches conceptions of the will to power and the Übermensch.

Are There Infinite Welfare Differences among Living Things

Suppose, as biocentrists do, that even microorganisms have a good of their own - that is, some objective form of welfare. Still, human welfare is vastly greater and more valuable. If it were infinitely greater, individualistic biocentrism would be pointless. But consideration of the facts of evolutionary history and of the conceptual relations between infinity and incommensurability reveals that there are no infinite welfare differences among living things. It follows, in particular, that there is some very large number of bacteria whose aggregate overall welfare is not less than the welfare of a human being.

Reference and perspective in intuitionistic logics

What an intuitionist may refer to with respect to a given epistemic state depends not only on that epistemic state itself but on whether it is viewed concurrently from within, in the hindsight of some later state, or ideally from a standpoint “beyond” all epistemic states (though the latter perspective is no longer strictly intuitionistic). Each of these three perspectives has a different—and, in the last two cases, a novel—logic and semantics. This paper explains these logics and their semantics and provides soundness and completeness proofs. It provides, moreover, a critique of some common versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and suggests ways of modifying them to take account of the perspective-relativity of reference.

Toward a Formal Semantics for Control-Flow Process Models

A number of information systems have been developed to automate business processes. For process modeling, verification, and automation in information systems, a formal semantics of control-flow process models is needed. Usually process modeling languages e.g., BPMN, EPC, IDEF3, UML, and WfMC standards are used to represent control-flow process models. When these process modeling languages are developed, their informal semantics are typically described using examples, but their formal semantics are not defined. Although many different semantics for control-flow process models have been proposed, the existing semantics specifications have limitations because they do not support certain desirable features. In this paper, we propose a new formal semantics for control-flow process models. We show that it is more accurate, complete, and applicable than the existing semantics specifications.

A fully logical inductive logic.

Carnap and his successors have explored various a priori probability assignments to possible worlds (state descriptions) in an effort to generate plausible inductive probabilities. Such assignments typically incorporate an a priori bias in favor of more orderly worlds. This paper presents an alternative approach that abjures such a priori favoritism. Instead, inductive probabilities are derived from explicit assumptions about the structure of the actual world. It is shown that even very simple empirical assumptions can yield plausible inductive probabilities for a wide range of inferences