John P. Heinz

The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making

Preface Acknowledgments PART I: Introduction The Lawyer and the Heavyweight The Policy Domains Representatives and Their Clients PART II:The Washington Representatives The Organization of Work The Careers of Representatives Ideology, Colleague Networks, and Professional Autonomy PART III: Targets of Representation Contact with Government Institutions The Government officials PART IV: Consensus and Conflict Allies and Adversaries Elite Networks in National Policy Making Participation and Success in Policy Decisions Conclusion Structure and Uncertainty in Private Interest Representation Notes References Index

Who You Know versus What You Know: The Uses of Government Experience for Washington Lobbyists

Private interest representatives in Washington are often said to exploit prior experience with the federal government, especially their contacts with officials, to gain advantage for their client groups. Data on 776 interest representatives are examined to estimate the frequency and institutional location of prior governmental experience. Just over half of the respondents had had some such service; twice as many in the executive branch as in the milieu of Capitol Hill. For those with experience, the extent and character of its advantages for their work as lobbyists are assessed. In general, representatives assign greater value to the knowledge gained of both substantive policy and decision-making processes than to contacts with officials or other lobbyists.

Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington

Despite the widespread perception that lawyers exercise considerable influence over national policy making in the United States, their participation in the process has previously received little systematic empirical analysis. Based on a variety of evidence gathered in interviews with more than eight hundred Washington representatives, including data on their work, careers, contacts with government agencies, networks of acquaintance, and relationships with clients, we argue that lawyers are not as prevalent, active, or influential in national policy making as the popular image suggests. Rather, the findings indicate that lawyers occupy a relatively specialized niche in the system of interest representation, one that allows them to command substantial economic rewards and to maintain a measure of independence and autonomy in their work, but that limits their influence in policy formation.

The Changing Value of Social Capital in an Expanding Social System: Lawyers in the Chicago Bar, 1975 and 1995

Social capital is’ some aspect of a social structure’ (Coleman 1990: 302) that acts as a resource that individuals may appropriate and use for their own purposes. In this paper, we examine the economic value of ties to local professional elites: specifically, the income returns to Chicago lawyers of contacts among the elite of the Chicago bar. Contact with the elite of the bar represents a channel through which rank and file lawyers may ‘tap in’ to the social structure of the bar and acquire valuable resources. The information and influence lawyers access through contacts with notables are properties of the corporate organization of the bar, and, as such, are benefits of corporate social capital. We briefly outline a theory of social capital and suggest ways in which elite ties may act as social capital. We then discuss changes in the social organization of the bar and suggest how these changes may affect the value of the social capital represented in elite contacts. We reason that acquaintance with elites will become more valuable because of the relative scarcity of such contacts in larger social systems. In analyses of factors affecting lawyers’ incomes, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that ties to elite system members are more valuable in a larger system.