John R. Oneal

Triangulating peace : democracy, interdependence, and international organizations

Triangulating Peace tackles todays most provocative hypothesis in the field of international relations: the democratic peace proposition. Drawing on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant, the authors argue that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war.

The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985

The liberals believed that economic interdependence, as well as democracy, would reduce the incidence of interstate conflict. In this article, we test both their economic and their political prescriptions for peace, using pooled-regression analyses of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era. We find that the pacific benefits of trade, both total and dyadic, have not been sufficiently appreciated. We also offer clear evidence that democracies are relatively unlikely to become involved in militarized disputes with other democracies, while autocracies and democracies are prone to conflict with each other. Since democratic dyads are more peaceful than autocratic dyads, it follows that democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states generally, ceteris paribus. Previous research at the national level of analysis, which led most to conclude that democracies have been no more peaceful than other states, did not consider that the incidence of conflict depends importantly upon the number of contiguous states, the character of their political regimes, and other factors. In addition, we find no evidence that states that have recently undergone regime changes, whether in the democratic or autocratic direction, are particularly conflict prone. Our results suggest the basis for a broader formulation of expected–utility theories of interstate conflict.

The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992

The authors test Kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century, treating those theories as complementary rather than competing. As the classical liberals believed, democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations have strong and statistically significant effects on reducing the probability that states will be involved in militarized disputes. Moreover, the benefits are not limited to the cold war era. Some realist influences, notably distance and power predominance, also reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict. The character of the international system, too, affects the probability of dyadic disputes. The consequences of having a strong hegemonic power vary, but high levels of democracy and interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads, not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade.

The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85

Immanuel Kant believed that democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations could establish the foundations for “perpetual peace.” Our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the Kantian peace makes a statistically significant, independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations. These benefits are evident even when the influence of other theoretically interesting factors—such as relative power, alliances, geographic contiguity, and economic growth—is held constant. Increasing the number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized disputes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states. If both members of a dyad are democratic, conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline; increasing both the dyadic trade–GDP ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduces the chance of conflict by 38 percent. Together, all the Kantian variables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent. We check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work, with IGOs reducing conflict and low-conflict dyads joining IGOs. Democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join IGOs with one another, bringing together the three elements of a system for Kantian peace.

Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence

We assess the degree to which propositions from Samuel Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order can account for the incidence of militarized interstate disputes between countries during the period 1950-92. We find that such traditional realist influences as contiguity, alliances, and relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy and interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict. Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states ceteris paribus. Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups. Among Huntingtons eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West; dyads in other civilizations were as likely to fight as were states split across civilizations, when realist and liberal influences are held constant. The dominance of a civilization by a core state, democratic or not, does little to inhibit violence within the civilization. Contrary to the thesis that the clash of civilizations will replace Cold War rivalries as the greatest source of conflict, militarized interstate disputes across civilizational boundaries became less common, not more so, as the Cold War waned. Nor do civilizations appear to have an important indirect influence on interstate conflict through the realist or liberal variables. They help to predict alliance patterns but make little contribution to explaining political institutions or commercial interactions. We can be grateful that Huntington challenged us to consider the role that civilizations might play in international relations, but there is little evidence that they define the fault lines along which international conflict is apt to occur.

Patriotism or Opinion Leadership

In this study, the “rally effect”—the propensity for the American public to put aside political differences and support the president during international crises—is measured by considering the changes in presidential popularity following all 193 Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1933 and 1992 as identified by the Correlates of War project. Summary analyses find minor, statistically insignificant rallies associated with uses of force, although sizable rallies are associated with particular subcategories of military crises. However, larger rallies are associated with the United States as both revisionist and originator of the dispute, with the initiation of a full interstate war, and with prominent headline placement in the New York Times. Regression analyses indicate that rallies are more likely when they are associated with White House statements and bipartisan support for the administrations policies. Findings suggest that the size and appearance of a rally depends primarily on how the crisis is presented to the public in terms of media coverage, bipartisan support, and White House spin.

Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict:

Two studies question whether economic interdependence promotes peace, arguing that previous research has not adequately considered the endogeneity of trade. Using simultaneous equations to capture the reciprocal effects, they report that trade does not reduce conflict, though conflict reduces trade. These results are puzzling on logical grounds. Trade should make conflict less likely, ceteris paribus, if interstate violence adversely affects commerce; otherwise, national leaders are acting irrationally. In re-analyzing the authors’ data, this article shows that trade does promote peace once the gravity model is incorporated into the analysis of conflict. Both trade and conflict are influenced by nations’ sizes and the distance separating them, so these fundamental exogenous factors must be included in models of conflict as well as trade. One study errs in omitting distance when explaining militarized disputes. The other does not adequately control for the effect of size (or power). When these theoretically informed changes are made, the pacific benefit of trade again appears. In new simultaneous analyses, the article confirms that trade promotes peace and conflict contemporaneously reduces commerce, even with extensive controls for traders’ rational expectations of violence. Previous studies that address the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace — as virtually all have done since 1999 — have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Commerce promotes peace because violence has substantial costs, whether these are paid prospectively or contemporaneously.

Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace

In their article in this issue, Donald P. Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon claim, contrary to liberal theory and extensive evidence, that neither joint democracy nor economic interdependence significantly reduces the frequency of militarized interstate disputes in pooled time-series analyses when dyadic fixed effects are taken into account. Similarly, their fixed-effects analyses contradict theory and previous evidence that democracies have higher levels of trade with one another than do other types of states. Our reexamination, however, refutes both claims and reinforces previous findings. Their fixed-effects analyses of disputes produces distorted results because they consider a relatively short time period, 1951–92, in which variation in the binary dependent variable and the key independent variables, democracy and trade, is limited. When we analyze a longer period (1886–1992), the results confirm liberal theory. The differences between our analyses of bilateral trade and those of Green, Kim, and Yoon primarily arise from a seemingly minor methodological decision. A more reasonable method confirms that democracies do have higher levels of trade than expected on purely economic grounds. Though we do not advocate a fixed-effects model for analyzing these data and have serious reservations about its general usefulness, our findings provide additional confirmation of liberal theories of international relations.

Boon or bane? Reassessing the productivity of foreign direct investment

We assess the effects of foreign and domestic capital on economic growth using the latest data and better models of economic growth than those previously used. We explicitly consider the role of human capital in the process of economic development. We find no evidence that foreign direct investment harms the economic prospects of developing countries. The flow of foreign capital from 1980 to 1991 spurred growth in gross domestic product per capita, while the level of foreign stock, or foreign penetration, had no discernible effect. Indeed, new foreign investment was more productive dollar for dollar than was capital from domestic sources. Previous suggestions that foreign investment flows are less beneficial than domestic ones were based on a misinterpretation. Moreover, foreign direct investment stimulates investment from domestic sources. Consequently, developing countries have no reason to eschew foreign capital, as dependency theorists urge

Rule of Three, Let It Be? When More Really Is Better

Jim Ray and others in this issue question customary procedures for the quantitative analysis of theoretically complex questions in the social sciences. In this article we address Rays use of research on the Kantian peace to illustrate his points. We discuss his five guidelines for research, indicating how we agree and disagree, and take up five substantive issues he has raised about our research. With new analyses to supplement our previous work, we show that none of his reservations is well founded. We discuss the costs as well as the benefits of rigid insistence on reducing the number of independent variables in a regression equation.