John R. Wallach

Constitutive Paradoxes of Human Rights: An Interpretation in History and Political Theory

Two paradoxes constitute the discourse of human rights. One concerns the relationship between “the human” and “the political”; the other invokes the opposition between the universalist moral character of human rights and the practical, particular context in which they become manifest. This chapter argues how and why these paradoxes will not go away – a good thing, too – over and against classical and contemporary writers who have argued for the priority of one or the other. After elucidating the powerful and enduring character of these paradoxes in history and political theory, I argue that human rights discourse only makes sense in terms of the arguably more primary discourses of democracy, political virtue, and justice if it is to avoid being a deceptive, rhetorical cover for dubious political practices.

THE PLATONIC ACADEMY AND DEMOCRACY

From the days of Plato’s Academy, academic life and discourse have operated in tension with political life, and often the political life of democracy. Since World War II, this tension has been read as essentially antagonistic. In this survey of the relationship of the original and subsequent incarnations of the Academy to ancient Athens, republican Rome, and the Florentine city-state, it becomes clear that the tension was, in fact, potentially as much of an asset to democracy as an assault upon it—even as the tension forever remained real. Readings of Plato and versions of the Academy become antagonistic to civic life only when their intellectual posture takes refuge in metaphysical doctrines or political ideologies that bear only marginal connections to the effective argument of Plato’s dialogues or the initial political postures of Academic life.

After Virtue: An Essay in Moral Theory

Throughout his career, MacIntyre has argued “against the self-images of the age,” understood as Marxism, psychoanalysis, Christianity, positivist social science, and ahistorical moral philosophy. In his recent book, After Virtue, MacIntryres iconoclasm has found new targets, such as “emotivism” and its “social content” of “bureaucratic individualism.” For MacIntyre, these complementary forms of moral discourse and social life represent the moral bankruptcy of the West today. They inhibit civility and prevent practical agreement on a conception of justice, making this a time of ethical disarray, an age that is “after virtue.” But unlike MacIntyres previous works, After Virtue aspires to be more than criticism.

Deconstructing the Ancients/Moderns Trope in Historical Reception

Notably since Thomas Hobbes, canonically with Benjamin Constant, and conventionally amid Nietzschean, Popperian, Straussian, Arendtian, liberal (sc. Madison, Mill, Berlin, Rawls, Vlastos, Hansen), republican (sc. Skinner), political (sc. Finley), and sociological (sc. Ober) readings of ancient texts, contemporary scholarship on the ancients often has employed some version of the dichotomous ancient/modern or ancient/contemporary contrast as a template for explaining, understanding, and interpretively appropriating ancient texts and political practices – particularly those of ancient Greek philosophy and democracy (although Roman ideas and practices also have been invoked). In particular, this has been done to argue for some conception of political ethics and democracy. I argue that this rhetorical trope, often using Athens and Europe/America as synecdoches for antiquity and modernity, has generated narrow and distorted views of ancient texts and political practices, on the one hand, and their contemporary relevance, on the other – views that misinterpret the theoretical significance of historical phenomena and misread the potential lessons of ancient authorities. Instead, texts and practices should be read either with more qualifications or more fully against a historical dynamic of critical philosophy and political power – including its ethical, cultural, institutional, and governing elements – that is not framed by this dichotomy.

Platonic Power and Political Realism

AbstractDespite often being condemned for having a paradigmatically unrealistic or dangerous conception of power, Plato expends much effort in constructing his distinctive conception of power. In the wake of Socrates’ trial and execution, Plato writes (in Gorgias and Republic I) about conventional (Polus’, Polemarchus’), elitist (Callicles’), and radically unethical (Thrasymachus’) conceptions of power only to ‘refute’ them on behalf of a favoured conception of power allied with justice. Are his arguments as pathetic or wrong-headed as many theorists make them out to be – from Machiavelli to contemporary political realists, from ‘political’ critics of Plato ranging from Popper to Arendt? And if not, has our understanding of power been impoverished? This question has been surprisingly unasked, and it is one I address by asking Plato and his critics: What are the dialectical moves Plato makes in refuting Socrates’s opponents and constructing his own conception of legitimate (i.e., just) power? Exactly how does he interweave his conception of power with a kind of ethics? How does it compare to recent conceptions of political realism and the power-politics/ethics relationship – e.g., after Marx and Foucault? While addressing these questions I also attend to the issue of Plato’s historicity: to what extent do the limits of his language and world affect our reading of Plato and his political critics? Ultimately, I argue that and how Plato’s conception of power and its political dimensions realistically have much to teach us that we have not learned.

Demokratia and Arete in Ancient Greek Political Thought

This article interprets demokratia and arete as dynamically related terms of political thought in ancient Greek culture, from Homeric times to the end of the classical era. It does so selectively, identifying three stages in which this relationship is developed: (1) from the Homeric to archaic eras; (2) fifth-century Athenian democracy, in which demokratia and arete are posed as complementary terms; and (3) the fourth century era in which philosophers used virtue to critique democracy. Relying mostly on evidence from writers who have become benchmarks in the history of Western political thought, the argument emphasizes the inherently political dimension of arete during this period of ancient Greek culture. Noting different ways in which arete is related to political power in general and democracy in particular, it also illustrates the manner in which arete is neither philosophically pristine nor merely an instrument of practical power. The effect of the research contradicts traditional and recent readings of democracy and virtue as inherently antagonistic. The aim of the article is to identify ancient Greek contributions to understanding the potential, contingencies and dangers of the relationship between democracy (as a form of power) and virtue (as a form of ethics) — one which may benefit both democracy and virtue.

Democracy in Ancient Greek Political Theory: 1906–2006

The notion of ‘democracy’ as found in ancient Athens and the work of ancient Greek political theorists has crucially functioned as a critical, distant mirror for major authors of twentieth-century political thought — starting importantly with Ernest Barker but continuing along diverse paths in the works of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt in the wake ofWorld War II, as well as for recent theorists of democracy who have read Athenian practices and critical discourses against the grain of contemporary philosophy, politics, and culture. In all of them, images of ‘democracy’ in ancient Greek political theory operate simultaneously as historical discoveries, theoretical constructions, and rhetorical supplements for critical renditions of the political realm. As such, they evidence the slippery centrality of ideas of democracy in ancient Greek political thought for the necessary, problematic, and divergent efforts of recent political theorists to justify their ideas as historically rooted, philosophically true, and politically relevant.

American constitutionalism and democratic virtue

Neither the historical tradition of American constitutionalism nor those who have theorized about it have promoted political or theoretical designs hospitable to the valorization or promotion of democratic virtue. This article demonstrated this point by canvassing practical interpretations of the American constitution, from the document of 1787-1791 to Bush v. Gore, and theoretical interpretations from Madison to Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Elster, Holmes, and other contemporary theorists of liberal constitutionalism and natural law. Exposing these roadblocks to the theory and practice of democratic virtue in America, it argues, provides a critical corrective to current debates about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.