John R. Welch

Vagueness and Inductive Molding

Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This paper deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a predicate that applies in some contexts can be reasonably extended to other contexts where it is initially vague. This process of development approximates the cognitive remedy for vagueness that the epistemic view prescribes. The process is piecemeal and inductive, akin to what von Wright described as the molding of concepts.Vagueness cannot be understood apart from the backdrop of classification, for vagueness is classification gone awry. Hence these pages explore the classification of particulars, both its clear successes and vague failures. How we classify unique particulars is the theme of Sections 2 and 3, which are primarily descriptive. Section 2 identifies a way of classifying particulars that pervades discourse of all sorts, and Section 3 illustrates its use in a field notorious for vagueness: ethics. Why a certain particular should (or should not) be classified in a certain way is a normative question, however, and it occupies Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 proposes a norm for strong arguments by analogy, and Section 5 illustrates how the norm might resolve vagueness in one kind of ethical dispute. This norm, which has a strong probabilistic component, is one way of affirming that probability is a guide to life.

Science and ethics: toward a theory of ethical value

SummaryWhat is the difference between the just and the unjust, the courageous and the cowardly, the ethically valuable and the ethically not valuable? To answer these and similar questions, a critical theory of ethical value is advanced. Using sample sentences that include ethical value terms, normative and descriptive components of the theory are identified, and the normative component is developed in some detail. Three levels of normative ethical discourse, adapted from Laudans levels of scientific discourse, are then distinguished: descriptive, methodological, and axiological. Each sample sentence is assigned to a level, and the subsequent discussion illustrates how to proceed rationally at that level. The rational techniques appropriate to each level include inductive inference, falsification, and causal inference. These techniques are likewise appropriate to the corresponding level of the sciences.

Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule

Some arguments are good; others are not. How can we tell the difference? This article advances three proposals as a partial answer to this question. The proposals are keyed to arguments conditioned by different degrees of uncertainty: mild, where the argument’s premises are hedged with point-valued probabilities; moderate, where the premises are hedged with interval probabilities; and severe, where the premises are hedged with non-numeric plausibilities such as ‘very likely’ or ‘unconfirmed’. For mild uncertainty, the article proposes to apply a principle referred to as ‘Jeffrey’s rule’, for the principle is a generalization of Jeffrey conditionalization. For moderate uncertainty, the proposal is to extend Jeffrey’s rule for use with probability intervals. For severe uncertainty, the article proposes that even when lack of probabilistic information prevents the application of Jeffrey’s rule, the rule can be adapted to these conditions with the aid of a suitable plausibility measure. Together, the three proposals introduce an approach to argument evaluation that complements established frameworks for evaluating arguments: deductive soundness, informal logic, argumentation schemes, pragma-dialectics, and Bayesian inference. Nevertheless, this approach can be looked at as a generalization of the truth and validity conditions of the classical criterion for sound argumentation

Comparative Decision Theory

To prepare this work’s subsequent discussions of morally instrumental and morally teleological discourse, Chap. 3 addresses the issue of theory choice. It surveys four views of how to choose a theory: probabilism, falsificationism, decision theory, and virtue epistemology. The chapter argues that each of these approaches has serious debilities, but those of decision theory are less debilitating than the rest. It therefore proposes a decision-theoretic approach to theory choice of any kind—moral and non-moral alike. However, attempts to apply decision theory to real-world problems confront a well-known difficulty: the exceptionally heavy information load the theory imposes on users. Bayesian decision theorists take the probability and utility functions that underlie expected utilities to determine sharp numeric values. Real-life decisions, however, must usually be made without nearly as much information. To ameliorate this difficulty, the chapter introduces a version of comparative decision theory. Because this form of decision theory requires no more than a bare minimum of comparative values for plausibilities and utilities, it can be widely applied. The chapter concludes with a consideration of three decision-theoretically foundational issues: transitivity, independence, and suspension of judgment.

Remedies for Reflective Disequilibrium

Chapter 6 proposes remedies for a common affliction: reflective disequilibrium. This affliction can result from inconsistencies within moral strata or between moral and nonmoral discourse. The chapter claims that reflective disequilibrium within the phenomenal stratum can be reduced by appeal to the standard of inductive cogency. Reflective disequilibrium within the instrumental stratum, which is illustrated by the classic case of United States v. Holmes, can be intra-theoretic or inter-theoretic. Intra-theoretic instrumental disequilibrium can sometimes be resolved by judicious use of moral theory, while the inter-theoretic variety typically requires teleological ascent. Like instrumental disequilibrium, teleological disequilibrium can be intra-theoretic or inter-theoretic. Inter-theoretic cases can be managed with the resources of comparative decision theory. While intra-theoretic cases can be more recalcitrant, they may nonetheless become tractable over time through increased understanding of consequences of alternative moral ends. Finally, reflective disequilibrium can also arise through conflict between moral and nonmoral discourse. Citing the conflict between Gauguin’s commitments to his family and his art, the chapter maintains that extra-moral disequilibrium can sometimes be ameliorated by adhering to an overridingness thesis stated in terms of supererogation and moral obligation.

Securing Our Moral Ends

Chapter 5 concentrates on the teleological stratum of moral discourse. The ends of Kantian, Benthamite, and Frankenian moral theories are the good will, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and beneficence with justice respectively. Since each of these ends can generate moral advice that differs from that of the others, the relative merits of these ends is a fundamental moral issue. Is there any rational way to choose among them? This chapter argues for an affirmative answer. When ends are expressed in teleological descriptions such as ‘The highest good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, the descriptions can be viewed as hypotheses and thereby confirmed or disconfirmed through hypothetico-deductive reasoning analogous to that employed in the sciences. But when ends are expressed in teleological directives such as ‘Act with a good will’, choice among directives can be reasonably guided by the comparative decision theory of Chap. 3. Finally, the chapter addresses the higher-order end of morality itself: Can the aim of acting morally be rationally justified? The chapter urges that coherence requires the adoption of ‘I ought to be moral’ and that coherence in turn can be justified.

Working with Moral Means

Chapter 4 treats the instrumental stratum of moral discourse. Since this stratum is composed of substrata that can be delimited in different ways, the chapter works up through progressively larger discursive chunks: individual sentences, inferences, and theories. The justifiability of individual sentences, whether instrumental descriptions such as ‘That shows the value of courage’ or instrumental directives such as ‘Be honest so that people will respect you’, is an initial theme. The chapter emphasizes the role of observation and inductive inference in evaluating such sentences. Inference is then treated by investigating the possibility of justifying practical inferences (including so-called practical syllogisms). The chapter maintains that practical inferences can be evaluated by appeal to the standard of inductive cogency. Finally, how to choose a moral theory on instrumental grounds is illustrated by an extended analysis of Kantian, Benthamite, and Frankenian theory as applied to Sophie’s choice. The analysis leans heavily on the comparative decision theory launched in Chap. 3.

Saving the Moral Phenomena

Chapter 2 focuses on morally phenomenal statements such as ‘That was generous’ and ‘He is unfair’. Disagreements over such statements are rooted in the vagueness of terms like ‘generous’ and ‘unfair’, which makes the use of these terms to classify actions and people problematic. This chapter introduces core classification as the fundamental form of classification, linguistic or not. To develop the concept of core classification, the chapter proposes the analogy thesis: positive core classification is by analogy; negative core classification is by disanalogy. This is a descriptive claim, but there is an attendant normative thesis: good core classifications result from good analogies. When is an analogy good? The chapter proposes that arguments by analogy can be evaluated by appeal to a standard of inductive cogency. Like the standard of deductive soundness, inductive cogency imposes a condition on the argument’s content and a condition on its form. The formal condition is that the form be inductively strong, where inductive strength can be defined by quantitative inductive logics in the tradition of Carnap, Hintikka, Kuipers, and Niiniluoto. The chapter claims that recourse to inductive cogency affords an in-principle solution to morally phenomenal disagreements. To illustrate this claim, the chapter addresses the moral dilemma faced by Cicero’s grain merchant.