John Thibaut

Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control.

Abstract Research on procedural justice has suggested that the distribution of control among participants can be used to classify dispute-resolution procedures and may be an important determinant of preference for such procedures. This experiment demonstrates that control can be meaningfully divided into two components: control over the presentation of evidence and control over the final decision. The experiment placed subjects (law students and undergraduates) in a situation of conflict and varied two between-subjects factors: (1) Role, whether subjects expected to role-play third parties (law students) or litigants (undergraduates), and (2) Orientation, whether individuals focused on equity claims (appeals to a norm of fairness) or legal claims (appeals to a strict, legal interpretation of events). As a control, a third-party neutral-orientation condition was included. In addition, subjects were presented with four dispute-resolution procedures which varied in third-party control over the presentation of evidence (Process Control) and third-party control over the final decision (Decision Control) as within-subjects factors. Results revealed that both litigants and third parties preferred high rather than low third-party decision control. Litigants with an equity orientation preferred low third-party control over the presentation of evidence, particularly when third parties had high rather than low decision control. Third parties and litigants with a legal orientation preferred low rather than high third-party process control only when there was high third-party decision control. Litigant preferences were more affected by variation in process control than variation in decision control while third-party preferences were more affected by variation in decision control than in process control. As a check on external validity, military judges given a neutral orientation were asked to evaluate and express preferences for the four dispute-resolution procedures. Their results were not detectably different from those of the law students who role-played third parties in the main portion of the study.

Individual versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact

Abstract Following earlier demonstrations of more competitiveness between groups than between individuals in the context of a PDG matrix, two additional conditions were studied. These were a group-all condition in which the intergroup contact involved all the members in both groups (rather than just representatives as in the previously studied group-representative condition), and an interdependence condition in which physically separated individuals shared their winnings with the other subjects on the same side of the suite of rooms (rather than neither giving winnings to nor receiving winnings from other such subjects as in the previously studied individuals condition). The results indicated that there was a large overall tendency for the group-representative and group-all conditions to be more competitive than the individuals and interdependence conditions, that the group-representative condition was more competitive than the group-all condition, and that the interdependence condition and individuals condition did not differ. The difference between the group-representative and group-all condition was interpreted as consistent with a prediction that intergroup contact can reduce competitiveness even when there is conflict and the absence of norms requiring cooperative behavior. The lack of difference between the interdependence condition and the individuals condition was interpreted as inconsistent with an altruisticrationalization hypothesis according to which group members rationalize their competitiveness toward the other group as being enacted for the sake of fellow group members.

Competition and cooperation between groups and between individuals

Abstract Groups and individuals were compared in two experiments. In the first, two same-sex individuals or two same-sex dyads played 10 trials of a Prisoners Dilemma matrix game (PDG) for money. Play between individuals was more cooperative and less competitive than play between groups. In the second experiment subjects played 10 trials of either PDG or mutual-fate-control (MFC) matrices. For the MFC matrix the competitive choice, which reduces the opponents outcomes, but has no effect on own outcomes, reflects a desire to increase ones relative advantage over the opponent. Although cooperation was greater for MFC, for both PDG and MFC matrices groups were more competitive and less cooperative than individuals. A large component of the groups-individuals effect is attributed to the greater desire of groups to “win” or avoid “losing” to the opponent, regardless of their absolute outcomes.

The development of contractual norms in bargaining: replication and variation

Although a great deal of research has been done during the past decade and a half on the processes associated with conforming to norms (e.g., Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Hollander, 1960; and Jones, Jones, and Gergen, 1963), very little work has been done on the prior processes through which the norms come into existence. In understanding these processes and conditions which produce norms it may be useful to begin by inquiring into the ways in which norms provide adaptive solutions or functional advantages that are superior to other forms of social control. Such a functional approach has been suggested by Thibaut and Kelley (1959, pp. 130-42) in discussing the consequences of substituting normative control for control by interpersonal power. For example, in the A-B (dyadic) relationship, suppose A is in the act of exercising power over B. The substitution of normative control for the use of raw power may be advantageous to A as it enables him to regularize and stabilize his control over B. At the same time, the substitution reduces As costs of surveillance and eliminates the ostentation of his power usage. The advantages to B of this substitution are less apparent but

Some Determinants of Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution

This experimental study manipulated presence or absence of temporal urgency, presence or absence of a judgmental standard, and the correspondence or noncorrespondence of outcomes among disputants in a factorial design to assess their effects on preferences for five dispute-resolution procedures arranged along a continuum of decreasing third-party intervention: autocratic decision-making, arbitration, a moot, mediation, and bargaining. Arbitration was the most generally preferred means of settlement, followed in order by the moot, mediation, autocratic, and bargaining procedures. The independent variables modified these preferences, however, such that procedures with a high degree of third-party intervention were preferred more when there was temporal urgency, outcome noncorrespondence, and a standard. Interactions revealed that correspondence affected preferences only when there was no temporal urgency, and presence-absence of a standard affected preferences only when there was temporal urgency and outcome correspondence.

Seniority in the generational transition of laboratory groups: The effects of social familiarity and task experience

Abstract The determinants of leadership seniority in laboratory groups were investigated in two experiments. In both experiments a procedure was used in which individual group members were periodically replaced throughout 7 generations. The individuals within the groups folded origami products and traded with other groups so as to earn quarters. In the first experiment the effect of social familiarity on seniority was investigated by comparing a set of standard groups with a set of rotational groups in which the group members moved from group to group between generations and thus always interacted with strangers. There was less seniority in the rotational groups. In the second experiment the effect of experience on seniority was investigated by comparing a set of standard groups with a set of experienced groups in which the new group members were recruited from the standard groups. There was less seniority in the experienced groups. It was found in both experiments, in agreement with previous research, that over generations the subjects earned increasing amounts of money and worked with increasing speed and efficiency.

The effects of control on perceived fairness of procedures and outcomes

Abstract On the basis of Thibaut and Walkers theory of procedural justice, it was predicted that subjects who experienced control through choosing a trial decision rule would be more satisfied with the outcome of a dispute and the conflict resolution procedure than would yoked subjects who were not given control. Two additional conditions were added to the design in order to investigate the extent to which control had an influence on trial evaluations independent of being allowed to discuss the rules and obtaining a preferred rule in the absence of actual choice. Regardless of role in the dispute (accuser, accused, or no knowledge) and the nature of the rule adopted, those subjects who exercised control through rule choice evaluated all aspects of the trial experience more positively than subjects who did not exercise control through rule choice. The results also revealed that discussion of the rules and obtaining the preferred rule without choice contributed positively to evaluations of the trial procedure and verdict.

Motivational bases in mixed-motive interactions: The effects of comparison levels ☆

Abstract The relationship between reward level and the basic motives which underlie strategic choices (competitive and noncompetitive) in a mixed-motive game was examined from two theoretical perspectives. The “regret” interpretation proposed by McClintock and McNeel was compared to an approach based upon Thibout and Kelleys concept of comparison level (CL). Two independent variables, CL and Reward, were manipulated by varying the payoff rates in two playing series of the MDG. Initially, 50 iterations were played for high (4¢ per point) or low ( 1 5¢ per point) incentive to provide subjects with outcomes upon which to base their CLs. The Reward manipulation was introduced in 150 subsequent trials of the game with subjects playing for 8¢ or 1¢ per point. The results show that the absolute magnitude of reward did not influence the extent of cooperative or competitive behavior. On the other hand, the magnitude of reward relative to CL was significantly associated with the degree of cooperative behavior—supra-CL outcomes yielding a higher frequency of cooperative behavior than infra-CL outcomes.

The Social Psychology of Groups.

This landmark theory of interpersonal relations and group functioning argues that the starting point for understanding social behavior is the analysis of dyadic interdependence. Such an analysis portrays the ways in which the separate and joint actions of two persons affect the quality of their lives and the survival of their relationship. The authors focus on patterns of interdependence, and on the assumption that these patterns play an important causal role in the processes, roles, and norms of relationships. This powerful theory has many applications in all the social sciences, including the study of social and moral norms; close-pair relationships; conflicts of interest and cognitive disputes; social orientations; the social evolution of economic prosperity and leadership in groups; and personal relationships.