John W. Carroll

The Humean Tradition

David Humes discussions of causation have placed constraints on most subsequent accounts of scientific laws. After motivating and describing these Humean constraints, I will argue that they are unsatisfiable. There are two reasons for this conclusion. The first is that extant attempts to give such an account of laws face serious objections. This will be argued by reviewing familiar problems with a Naive Regularity Account and by considering two accounts representative of attempts to avoid these problems. The two accounts are David Lewiss account and an account discernible in Brian Skyrmss Causal Necessity. The second reason for my antiHumean conclusion is of a more general nature. I shall present an argument challenging a presupposition of any philosopher working within the Humean tradition.

Indefinite terminating points and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

ConclusionIn conclusion, I shall indicate one consequence of (3.4). The major resultof work on infinitely iterated Prisoners Dilemma games is that there existcooperative equilibria in such games. I have suggested above that myaccount of finitely, but indefinitely, iterated Prisoners Dilemma gamesreflects the nature of genuine iterated Prisoners Dilemmas more accu-rately than accounts involving infinite iterations. If my suggestion iscorrect, then one consequence of (3.4) - of there being only uncooperativeequilibria in finitely, but indefinitely, iterated games - is to call intoquestion the significance of the existence of cooperative equilibria ininfinitely iterated Prisoners Dilemma games.

Laws of Nature.

Acknowledgements 1. Centrality 2. Humean analyses 3. Humean supervenience 4. A realist perspective 5. Causation 6. The limits of inquiry Appendix A: nomic platonism Appendix B: defending (SC) References Index.

John T. RobertsThe Law-Governed Universe

There is no dodge: These governing laws are not all logically necessary truths. Nor is a skepticism or eliminativism lurking; a further epistemological part of the law-governed world-picture is that what the laws are is discoverable by our science. Furthermore, this starting point is not being presented so as to be refuted. Instead, it is the centerpiece of an argument in favor of a certain meta-theoretic conception of laws, the measurability account of laws (MAL, for short), an account that is in fact metaphysically spartan. Chapter 1 develops the law-governed world-picture. Chapter 2 states and defends some standard, but not uncontroversial, assumptions about laws (e.g. that some laws are contingent). Chapter 3 spells out what the metatheoretic conception is and some preliminary reasons to think that it is true. Chapter 4 argues that this conception is built into three aspects of the law-governed world-picture: (a) that there are laws, (b) that science is capable of discovering which propositions are laws, and (c) that laws govern. Chapters 5–9 argue that MAL must be true given a different portion

The Backward Induction Argument

The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoners dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoners dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, I go on to consider the consequences of adopting a stronger set of assumptions. Focusing my attention on stronger sets that, like the original, obey the informedness condition, I show that any supplementation of the original set that preserves informedness does so at the expense of forcing rational participants in prisoners dilemma situations to have unexpected beliefs, ones that threaten the usefulness of backward induction.

Humean Justified Belief

Orthodoxy has it that Hume was a sceptic with respect to justified beliefs about matters of fact. Tom Beauchamp, Alexander Rosenberg and Michael Costa have argued in the face of this traditional interpretation by proposing that Hume held something like an account of justification according to which we do sometimes justifiedly believe matters of fact. I consider the arguments raised by these authors, and argue that though they are correct in suggesting that Hume sketched considerations distinguishing beliefs as more or less justified, they have misunderstood Hume in certain critical respects.

The Unanimity Theory and Probabilistic Sufficiency

The unanimity theory is an account of property-level causation requiring that causes raise the probability of their effects in specified test situations. Richard Otte (1981) and others have presented counterexamples in which one property is probabilistically sufficient for at least one other property. Given the continuing discussion (e.g., Cartwright 1989; Cartwright and Dupre 1988; Eells 1988a,b), many apparently think that these problems are minor. By considering the impact of Ottes cases on recent versions of the theory, by raising several new examples, and by criticizing natural replies, I argue that the problems for the unanimity theory are severe.

A Puzzle About Persistence

Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrine is that identity-over-time has causal commitments. Another is that identity-over-time is just identity (simpliciter) as it relates one object that exists at two times. We believe that a tension exists between these two apparently sensible positions: very roughly, if identity is the primary conceptual component of identity-over-time and as is plausible identity is noncausal, then the conceptual origins of the causal commitments of identity-over-time become a mystery. We will begin by formulating the two widely held doctrines and our puzzle more fully and more carefully. Then, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to analyzing views one might adopt that could minimize the tension.

The indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd

It is argued that, without a controversial and arguably mistaken assumption, Becker and Cudds (1990) objections do not undermine the challenge raised by my (1987) model of iterated prisoners dilemmas for the arguments of Taylor (1976, 1987) and others. Furthermore, it is argued that, even granting this assumption, there is an alternative model that avoids their objections.