John Young

Along Ethiopia's western frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in transition

The lowland Ethiopian regions of Gambella and Benishangul, bordering Sudan, form a classic frontier zone. ‘Modern’ politics dates from the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, and has been shaped by developments on either side of the frontier, as well as by the complex relations among indigenous peoples, and between them and immigrants and officials from highland areas of Ethiopia. The implementation of the post-1991 Ethiopian governments programme of ethnic regionalism has intensified local rivalries, and regional governments remain weak, being highly dependent on professionals from highland Ethiopia. Education, transport links, and other indicators of development remain poor. None the less, local political power, in sharp contrast to earlier periods, has to an appreciable extent passed into the hands of indigenous leaders.

Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is implementing a radical programme of decentralising state power to ethnic‐based regional units, which could be of interest to other countries in Africa faced with demands of ethnic communities for a greater role in the state. This apparent empowerment of ethnicity represents a complete reversal of this countrys past practices, and is the joint product of the ethnocratic character of the state until recently and the policies adopted by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in its long struggle against the military regime that ruled Ethiopia during 1974–1991. This article examines the processes that brought forth this novel, and for Africa unprecedented, constitutional arrangement.

TPLF: Reform or Decline?

Founded and led by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, after a sixteen-year armed struggle against the military regime that had ruled Ethiopia since 1974. While not formally a marxist-leninist party, the TPLF nonetheless was devoted to these ideals and they figured prominently in the structure and functioning of the organisation. While the TPLFs base represented the peasantry of Tigray, its leadership was dominated by young, radical intellectuals. Itself representing an ethnic group of relatively modest size, the TPLF formed a coalition of ethnically based organisations, the EPRDF, in 1989, to give itself Ethiopia-wide political scope and legitimacy. Once it came to power, the Front faced serious problems of adjustment, but managed to overcome them thanks to the coherence of its programme, the commitment of its cadres, and the cohesiveness of its leadership. In the face of dramatically changed international circumstances, the EPRDF moderated its policies, abandoning marxism and embracing the free market. It weathered an insurrection by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1992-93, contained Islamist incursions from Sudan and Somalia, won the war against Eritrea (1998-2000), achieved a measure of economic progress, and took large steps towards state decentralisation and smaller ones towards democratisation.

Sudan: liberation movements, regional armies, ethnic militias & peace

At the time this article was written – autumn 2002 – peace talks were underway between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Machakos, Kenya. For the first time since the outbreak of the conflict nineteen years ago, the July 20th Protocol reached between the belligerents under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) at Machakos raised the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Sudans civil war has been part of the political landscape of Africa for so long, that most people believe it to be intractable. Even more difficult to envisage is an effective government, autonomous or independent, in Southern Sudan. Therefore, it is time to consider the issue of governance in the South, taking into account the administrative and political capacity of the SPLM/A, as well as the challenge posed by a host of rival armed movements loosely grouped under the umbrella of the South Sudan Democratic Front (SSDF), plus a dozen or more tribal militias

The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: a History of Tensions and Pragmatism

The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), and by extension the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the multi-ethnic coalition that it established and still dominates, is frequently considered to be a creation of, and beholden to, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). From this perspective the foreign loyalties of the TPLF made it an unsuitable, if not illegitimate, movement to lead the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991, and since 1995, the newly created Federal Democratic Republic. By way of contrast, this article attempts to demonstrate that the developing relationship between the TPLF and the EPLF during the course of their respective revolutionary struggles has been far more problematic and beset with tensions than critics are either aware of, or acknowledge, and that an understanding of their nature casts light on present and possible future differences between the respective regimes of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Sudan: a flawed peace process leading to a flawed peace

Peace is more than the cessation of military hostilities, more than simple political stability. Peace is the presence of justice and peace building entails addressing factors and forces that stand as impediments to the realisation of all human rights. 1 The hopes and aspirations of the Sudanese people hang on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)2 peace process and there are increasing doubts whether it can deliver lasting peace, much less democracy and justice. It is too early to give up on the process, but not too late to analyse and critique it, in the hope that this will encourage debate and stimulate the Sudanese to take control of the process from self-proclaimed leaders and an ‘international community’ which has not encouraged broad participation. This is all the more important because there is every indication that the flaws discussed below will be repeated in trying to resolve the conflict in Darfur. The following points are articulated in the pages that follow: (1) most Sudanese in both the north and south have been denied access to the IGAD peace process; (2) this process has been dominated by a handful of Western states led by the US which have injected their own interests into the process; (3) democracy and justice do not figure highly among their concerns; (4) the peace protocols that have been signed do not adequately address fundamental issues of power sharing, equity, and human rights; (5) the security agreements reached thus far, and the instruments they establish, lack accountability, transparency and professionalism; and (6) given the weaknesses of the peace process, the belligerents are indicating by their actions, if not their words, that they are not discounting the possibility of returning to war.

John Garang's legacy to the peace process, the SPLM/A & the south

The death of Dr. John Garang, First Vice President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and Chairman of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) in a helicopter crash on 30 July, and the riots that followed, produced doubts about the viability of the 9 January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the prospects of peace processes underway elsewhere in the country. On the surface, this is not surprising because Garang had been the leader of the SPLM/A since its founding in 1983 and for many in Sudan and abroad he virtually personified the struggle of the south. Garang was also the unchallenged focal point during the various peace processes, in particular during the final phase of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) negotiations which were largely reduced to then First Vice President Ali Osman Taha and himself. And more than anyone else on either side of the table, Garang was the biggest beneficiary of the peace process which granted him a virtual hegemonic position in the south and the holding of a strong vice presidency nationally.

Development and Change in Post-Revolutionary Tigray

After a 14-year struggle the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) took control of the entire northern Ethiopian province of Tigray in 1989. But it was not until two years later, when the TPLF-led Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) captured power in Addis Ababa, that plans to rehabilitate and develop the badly weakened provincial economy could proceed in an environment of peace. This meant that the TPLF in Tigray could for the first time begin to utilise the resources of the central state for its programmes. Since 1991 the post-revolutionary regime has been attempting to stabilise the rural economy, repair and strengthen the provinces infrastructure, create a climate in which private investment can flourish, and begin the process of establishing an industrial base to meet the rising demands of off-farm labour. This article largely contrasts conditions observed in Tigray during the first half of 1993 and those existing in December 1995 and 1996, when my primary objectives were to update my doctoral study of the history of the Tigrayan revolution for publication, and to gauge – with the help of subsequent interviews in Ethiopia – some of the changes that had taken place in the province during that three-year interval.