Jon G. Sutinen

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.

Location Choice in New England Trawl Fisheries: Old Habits Die Hard

In his seminal work on common property resources, H. Scott Gordon proposed that in a fishery with multiple grounds, effort would be distributed such that profit rates would be equal among them. Gordons model relies on implicit assumptions that are inaccurate and lead to false conclusions in many cases. In this paper, we present an empirically estimated model of fishery and location choice for large trawlers in New England using a random-utility framework with a nested-logit model specification. We use the model to test the validity of a behavioral model developed from ethnographic interviews with skippers.

Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries

Abstract This article focuses on measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed U.S. fisheries. Novel measurement techniques are used to characterize the extent and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. According to the authors’ estimates, noncompliance increased substantially in 1986 and remained high through 1988 in the groundfish fishery. On Georges Bank during 1987, a quarter to a half of all groundfish vessels were identified as frequent violators, committing closed area violations on about one‐third of their trips and using illegal mesh on nearly all trips. Illegal earnings by a typical frequent violator operating in the groundfish fishery on Georges Bank amounted to

Vessel Entry-Exit Behavior in the Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Fishery

225,000 per year in 1987. A theory of compliance in fisheries is developed and applied to explain the trends and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. Biological and economic forces are shown to be dominant causes of the recent deterioration in compliance. Other contributin...

Bioeconomic models of marine recreational fishing

Given the heterogeneous nature of the fishing fleet and complex vessel behavior, traditional marginalist supply models are not well suited for modeling vessel mobility. A discrete choice model is utilized here to predict the probability that a vessel will enter, exit, or remain in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery based on a myopic profit maximization criterion. The multinomial logit model indicates that fisherman behavior is not influenced by stock variability. The crowding externality as represented by size of fishing fleet exhibits a strong negative impact on the probability of entry, independent of changes in abundance, exvessel prices, or harvest costs. The Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery was not an autonomous system of fishing vessels as initially believed.

Angling management organizations: integrating the recreational sector into fishery management

Abstract The theory of recreational fishing is developed and conditions are derived for optimal management policy, with special attention given to functional relationships that must be empirically verified. Determinants of the optimal allocation between commercial and recreational fishing effort are derived. The theory is extended to include selected peculiar features of recreational fishing: Some anglers sell their catch; a small proportion of the fishing population accounts for a large proportion of the catch; and anglers throw back a fraction of what they catch. Optimal policies are derived under these more realistic conditions.

An Econometric Study of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance in the Commercial Inshore Lobster Fishery of Massachusetts

This paper examines ways to reduce conflicts and improve the sustainability and value of marine recreational fisheries by fully integrating the recreational sector into the management of fisheries. One possibility involves a novel approach, here called angling management organizations (AMOs), which combines three of the more pervasive and promising trends in fishery management worldwide--management devolution, strengthened harvest rights, and co-management. AMOs are community-based organizations that are designed to conform to seven basic principles of integrated fishery management, which are described below. AMOs are loosely related to rights-based producer organizations in commercial fisheries, and are expected to strengthen resource stewardship, reduce enforcement and monitoring costs, alleviate management conflicts, and produce greater long-term net economic benefits in recreational fisheries. The other organizational structures considered here, including the management status quo, do not conform to all seven principles and are not expected to be as effective as AMOs.

3 – A Framework for Monitoring and Assessing Socioeconomics and Governance of Large Marine Ecosystems1

The economics literature is replete with studies of the economic consequences of various property rights and regulatory schemes in fisheries. Practical experience with such schemes has shown that the enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations is a troublesome and expensive enterprise. Yet, studies of the economic aspects of regulatory enforcement in fisheries have only recently appeared in the literature.1

Harbor Porpoise Bycatch: ITQs or Time/Area Closures in the New England Gillnet Fishery

This chapter has described a framework for assessing and monitoring the salient socioeconomic and governance elements of LMEs. The assessment and monitoring framework consists of 12 steps that, if applied, are expected to produce the essential information required for adaptive ecosystem management. The ecosystem paradigm is emerging as the dominant approach to managing natural resources in the U.S., as well as internationally. The shift away from the management of individual resources to the broader perspective of ecosystems has not been confined to academia and think tanks where it first began; it also is beginning to take root in government policy and programs. Many have advocated a new, broader approach to managing the nations natural resources. The approach recognizes that plant and animal communities are interdependent and interact with their physical environment to form distinct ecological units called ecosystems. The approach also recognizes that many human actions and their consequences, including marine pollution, extend across jurisdictional boundaries. This chapter presents a methodology for determining what is known of the socioeconomic and governance aspects—the human dimensions—of LME management. The chapter describes a basic framework for identifying the salient socioeconomic and governance elements and processes of an LME. Methods for monitoring and assessing the various elements and processes are also discussed in the chapter. There is description on the human dimensions of LMES, monitoring and assessment, applications of the monitoring and assessment framework, property rights entitlements and regimes for LME management, the structure of property rights entitlements in an LME, property rights regimes and management of LME resources. Property rights paradigm could be the framework necessary to design LME resource management policies for long-term economic growth and resource sustainability. Property rights establish the incentives and time-horizons for resource use and investment.

The Rational Choice of Share Leasing and Implications for Efficiency

The implications of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for reducing harbor porpoise bycatch in a multi-species fishery are investigated. Our intra-year bioeconomic model incorporates spatial and temporal patterns of abundance and harvest rates of commercial fish species and porpoise. Results indicate that porpoise ITQs, when compared to closures, are more profitable than closures, and distribute effort and profit reductions more evenly across seasons and areas. Price estimates for a unit of porpoise quota ranges from