Jonathan A. Fugelsang
University of Waterloo
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Featured researches published by Jonathan A. Fugelsang.
Brain Research | 2006
Adam E. Green; Jonathan A. Fugelsang; David J. M. Kraemer; Noah A. Shamosh; Kevin Dunbar
Integration of abstractly similar relations during analogical reasoning was investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activation elicited by an analogical reasoning task that required both complex working memory and integration of abstractly similar relations was compared to activation elicited by a non-analogical task that required complex working memory in the absence of abstract relational integration. A left-sided region of the frontal pole of the brain (BA 9/10) was selectively active for the abstract relational integration component of analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning also engaged a left-sided network of parieto-frontal regions. Activity in this network during analogical reasoning is hypothesized to reflect categorical alignment of individual component terms that make up analogies. This parieto-frontal network was also engaged by the complex control task, which involved explicit categorization, but not by a simpler control task, which did not involve categorization. We hypothesize that frontopolar cortex mediates abstract relational integration in complex reasoning while parieto-frontal regions mediate working memory processes, including manipulation of terms for the purpose of categorical alignment, that facilitate this integration.
Cognition | 2012
Gordon Pennycook; James Allan Cheyne; Paul Seli; Derek J. Koehler; Jonathan A. Fugelsang
An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.
Cerebral Cortex | 2010
Adam E. Green; David J. M. Kraemer; Jonathan A. Fugelsang; Jeremy R. Gray; Kevin Dunbar
Solving problems often requires seeing new connections between concepts or events that seemed unrelated at first. Innovative solutions of this kind depend on analogical reasoning, a relational reasoning process that involves mapping similarities between concepts. Brain-based evidence has implicated the frontal pole of the brain as important for analogical mapping. Separately, cognitive research has identified semantic distance as a key characteristic of the kind of analogical mapping that can support innovation (i.e., identifying similarities across greater semantic distance reveals connections that support more innovative solutions and models). However, the neural substrates of semantically distant analogical mapping are not well understood. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity during an analogical reasoning task, in which we parametrically varied the semantic distance between the items in the analogies. Semantic distance was derived quantitatively from latent semantic analysis. Across 23 participants, activity in an a priori region of interest (ROI) in left frontopolar cortex covaried parametrically with increasing semantic distance, even after removing effects of task difficulty. This ROI was centered on a functional peak that we previously associated with analogical mapping. To our knowledge, these data represent a first empirical characterization of how the brain mediates semantically distant analogical mapping.
Cognition | 2010
Erin A. Maloney; Evan F. Risko; Daniel Ansari; Jonathan A. Fugelsang
Individuals with mathematics anxiety have been found to differ from their non-anxious peers on measures of higher-level mathematical processes, but not simple arithmetic. The current paper examines differences between mathematics anxious and non-mathematics anxious individuals in more basic numerical processing using a visual enumeration task. This task allows for the assessment of two systems of basic number processing: subitizing and counting. Mathematics anxious individuals, relative to non-mathematics anxious individuals, showed a deficit in the counting but not in the subitizing range. Furthermore, working memory was found to mediate this group difference. These findings demonstrate that the problems associated with mathematics anxiety exist at a level more basic than would be predicted from the extant literature.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology | 2011
Erin A. Maloney; Daniel Ansari; Jonathan A. Fugelsang
In an effort to understand the origins of mathematics anxiety, we investigated the processing of symbolic magnitude by high mathematics-anxious (HMA) and low mathematics-anxious (LMA) individuals by examining their performance on two variants of the symbolic numerical comparison task. In two experiments, a numerical distance by mathematics anxiety (MA) interaction was obtained, demonstrating that the effect of numerical distance on response times was larger for HMA than for LMA individuals. These data support the claim that HMA individuals have less precise representations of numerical magnitude than their LMA peers, suggesting that MA is associated with low-level numerical deficits that compromise the development of higher level mathematical skills.
Social Neuroscience | 2006
Anne C. Krendl; C. Neil Macrae; William M. Kelley; Jonathan A. Fugelsang; Todd F. Heatherton
Abstract Social interactions require fast and efficient person perception, which is best achieved through the process of categorization. However, this process can produce pernicious outcomes, particularly in the case of stigma. This study used fMRI to investigate the neural correlates involved in forming both explicit (“Do you like or dislike this person?”) and implicit (“Is this a male or female?”) judgments of people possessing well-established stigmatized conditions (obesity, facial piercings, transsexuality, and unattractiveness), as well as normal controls. Participants also made post-scan disgust ratings on all the faces that they viewed during imaging. These ratings were subsequently examined (modeled linearly) in a parametric analysis. Regions of interest that emerged include areas previously demonstrated to respond to aversive and disgust-inducing material (amygdala and insula), as well as regions strongly associated with inhibition and control (anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortex). Further, greater differences in activation were observed in the implicit condition for both the amygdala and prefrontal cortical regions in response to the most negatively perceived faces. Specifically, as subcortical responses (e.g., amygdala) increased, cortical responses (e.g., lateral PFC and anterior cingulate) also increased, indicating the possibility of inhibitory processing. These findings help elucidate the neural underpinnings of stigma.
Neuropsychologia | 2005
Jonathan A. Fugelsang; Kevin Dunbar
We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioral analyses to study the neural roots of biases in causal reasoning. Fourteen participants were given a task requiring them to interpret data relative to plausible and implausible causal theories. Encountering covariation-based data during the evaluation of a plausible theory as opposed to an implausible theory selectively recruited neural tissue in the prefrontal and occipital cortices. In addition, the plausibility of a causal theory modulated the recruitment of distinct neural tissue depending on the extent to which the data were consistent versus inconsistent with the theory provided. Specifically, evaluation of data consistent with a plausible causal theory recruited neural tissue in the parahippocampal gyrus, whereas evaluating data inconsistent with a plausible theory recruited neural tissue in the anterior cingulate, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and precuneus. We suggest that these findings provide a neural instantiation of the mechanisms by which working hypotheses and evidence are integrated in the brain.
Acta Psychologica | 2010
Erin A. Maloney; Evan F. Risko; Frank F. Preston; Daniel Ansari; Jonathan A. Fugelsang
The numerical distance effect (NDE) is one of the most robust effects in the study of numerical cognition. However, the validity and reliability of distance effects across different formats and paradigms has not been assessed. Establishing whether the distance effect is both reliable and valid has important implications for the use of this paradigm to index the processing and representation of numerical magnitude in both behavioral and neuroimaging studies. In light of this, we examine the reliability and validity of frequently employed variants (and one new variant) of the numerical comparison task: two symbolic comparison variants and two nonsymbolic comparison variants. The results of two experiments demonstrate that measures of the NDE that use nonsymbolic stimuli are far more reliable than measures of the NDE that use symbolic stimuli. With respect to correlations between measures, we find evidence that the NDE that arises using symbolic stimuli is uncorrelated with the NDE that is elicited by using nonsymbolic stimuli. Results are discussed with respect to their implications for the use of the NDE as a metric of numerical processing and representation in research with both children and adults.
Neuropsychology (journal) | 2005
Matthew E. Roser; Jonathan A. Fugelsang; Kevin Dunbar; Paul M. Corballis; Michael S. Gazzaniga
An understanding of relations between causes and effects is essential for making sense of the dynamic physical world. It has been argued that this understanding of causality depends on both perceptual and inferential components. To investigate whether causal perception and causal inference rely on common or on distinct processes, the authors tested 2 callosotomy (split-brain) patients and a group of neurologically intact participants. The authors show that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality depend on different hemispheres of the divided brain. This finding implies that understanding causality is not a unitary process and that causal perception and causal inference can proceed independently.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition | 2012
Adam E. Green; David J. M. Kraemer; Jonathan A. Fugelsang; Jeremy R. Gray; Kevin Dunbar
Brain-based evidence has implicated the frontal pole of the brain as important for analogical mapping. Separately, cognitive research has identified semantic distance as a key determinant of the creativity of analogical mapping (i.e., more distant analogies are generally more creative). Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess brain activity during an analogy generation task in which we varied the semantic distance of analogical mapping (as derived quantitatively from a latent semantic analysis). Data indicated that activity within an a priori region of interest in left frontopolar cortex covaried parametrically with increasing semantic distance, even after removing effects of task difficulty. Results implicate increased recruitment of frontopolar cortex as a mechanism for integrating semantically distant information to generate solutions in creative analogical reasoning.