Jonathan B. Wiener

Risk versus risk : tradeoffs in protecting health and the environment

Foreword by Cass R. Sunstein Preface 1. Confronting Risk Tradeoffs John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener 2. Estrogen Therapy for Menopause Evridiki Hatziandreu, Constance Williams, and John D. Graham 3. Clozapine Therapy for Schizophrenia Miriam E. Adams, Howard Chang, and Howard S. Frazier 4. Licensing the Elderly Driver Constance Williams and John D. Graham 5. Saving Gasoline and Lives John D. Graham 6. Eating Fish Paul D. Anderson and Jonathan Baert Wiener 7. Seeking Safe Drinking Water Susan W. Putnam and Jonathan Baert Wiener 8. Recycling Lead Katherine Walker and Jonathan Baert Wiener 9. Regulating Pesticides George M. Gray and John D. Graham 10. Protecting the Global Environment Jonathan Baert Wiener 11. Resolving Risk Tradeoffs Jonathan Baert Wiener and John D. Graham References Contributors Author Index Subject Index

Precaution Against Terrorism

Stunned by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration adopted a new National Security Strategy in September 2002. The UK government took a similar stance. This new strategy calls for anticipatory attacks against potential enemies with uncertain capacities and intentions, even before their threat is imminent. Rather than wait for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, it shifts the burden of proof, obliging “rogue” states to show that they do not harbor weapons of mass destruction or terrorist cells, or else face the possibility of attack. This new strategy amounts to the adoption of the Precautionary Principle against the risk of terrorism. We offer two main conclusions about precaution against terrorism. First, any action taken to reduce a target risk always poses the introduction of countervailing risks. Moreover, a precautionary approach to terrorism is likely to entail larger, more expensive interventions, so the expected opportunity costs are likely to be higher. While considering worst‐case scenarios is important for the development of sound policy, taking action based only on worst‐case thinking can introduce unforeseen dangers and costs. We argue that a better approach to managing risk involves an assessment of the full portfolio of risks—those reduced by the proposed intervention, as well as those increased. We argue that decision makers developing counterterrorism measures need mechanisms to ensure that sensible risk analysis precedes precautionary actions. Such a mechanism currently exists to review and improve or reject proposed precautionary measures against health and environmental risks, but not, so far, for counterterrorism and national security policies. We urge the creation of such a review mechanism.

Using and improving the social cost of carbon

Regular, institutionalized updating and review are essential The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a crucial tool for economic analysis of climate policies. The SCC estimates the dollar value of reduced climate change damages associated with a one-metric-ton reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Although the conceptual basis, challenges, and merits of the SCC are well established, its use in government cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is relatively new. In light of challenges in constructing the SCC, its newness in government regulation, and the importance of updating, we propose an institutional process for regular SCC review and revision when used in government policy-making and suggest how scientists might contribute to improved SCC estimates.

Genetically Modified Salmon and Full Impact Assessment

Health and environmental impacts of GM salmon hinge on aggregate market size, which current regulatory processes ignore. As the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considers approving a genetically modified (GM) Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), it faces fundamental questions of risk analysis and impact assessment. The GM salmon—whose genome contains an inserted growth gene from Pacific chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and a switch-on gene from ocean pout (Zoarces americanus)—would be the first transgenic animal approved for human consumption in the United States (1, 2). But the mechanism for its approval, FDAs new animal drug application (NADA) process (2), narrowly examines only the risks of each GM salmon compared with a non-GM salmon (2, 3). This approach fails to acknowledge that the new products attributes may affect total production and consumption of salmon. This potentially excludes major human health and environmental impacts, both benefits and risks. Regulators need to consider the full scope of such impacts in risk analyses to avoid unintended consequences (4), yet FDA does not consider ancillary benefits and risks from salmon market expansion (2, 3), a result of what may be an overly narrow interpretation of statutes.

Precautionary regulation in Europe and the United States: a quantitative comparison.

Much attention has been addressed to the question of whether Europe or the United States adopts a more precautionary stance to the regulation of potential environmental, health, and safety risks. Some commentators suggest that Europe is more risk-averse and precautionary, whereas the United States is seen as more risk-taking and optimistic about the prospects for new technology. Others suggest that the United States is more precautionary because its regulatory process is more legalistic and adversarial, while Europe is more lax and corporatist in its regulations. The flip-flop hypothesis claims that the United States was more precautionary than Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, and that Europe has become more precautionary since then. We examine the levels and trends in regulation of environmental, health, and safety risks since 1970. Unlike previous research, which has studied only a small set of prominent cases selected nonrandomly, we develop a comprehensive list of almost 3,000 risks and code the relative stringency of regulation in Europe and the United States for each of 100 risks randomly selected from that list for each year from 1970 through 2004. Our results suggest that: (a) averaging over risks, there is no significant difference in relative precaution over the period, (b) weakly consistent with the flip-flop hypothesis, there is some evidence of a modest shift toward greater relative precaution of European regulation since about 1990, although (c) there is a diversity of trends across risks, of which the most common is no change in relative precaution (including cases where Europe and the United States are equally precautionary and where Europe or the United States has been consistently more precautionary). The overall finding is of a mixed and diverse pattern of relative transatlantic precaution over the period.

Theorizing and Generalizing About Risk Assessment and Regulation Through Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases

This article provides a framework and offers strategies for theorizing and generalizing about risk assessment and regulation developed in the context of an on-going comparative study of regulatory behavior. Construction of a universe of nearly 3,000 risks and study of a random sample of 100 of these risks allowed us to estimate relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution over a thirty-five-year period. Comparative nested analysis of cases selected from this universe of ecological, health, safety, and other risks or its eighteen categories or ninety-two subcategories of risk sources or causes will allow theory-testing and -building and many further descriptive and causal comparative generalizations.

Using Decision Analysis to Improve Malaria Control Policy Making

Malaria and other vector-borne diseases represent a significant and growing burden in many tropical countries. Successfully addressing these threats will require policies that expand access to and use of existing control methods, such as insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and artemesinin combination therapies (ACTs) for malaria, while weighing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches over time. This paper argues that decision analysis provides a valuable framework for formulating such policies and combating the emergence and re-emergence of malaria and other diseases. We outline five challenges that policy makers and practitioners face in the struggle against malaria, and demonstrate how decision analysis can help to address and overcome these challenges. A prototype decision analysis framework for malaria control in Tanzania is presented, highlighting the key components that a decision support tool should include. Developing and applying such a framework can promote stronger and more effective linkages between research and policy, ultimately helping to reduce the burden of malaria and other vector-borne diseases.

The precautionary principle and risk–risk tradeoffs: a comment

We are pleased that Hansen, von Krauss and Tickner (2008) (hereafter ‘HKT’) found our risk–risk framework helpful in their analysis of 33 case studies of alleged instances where efforts to reduce a target risk contributed to a countervailing risk. If the concepts of risk–risk tradeoffs and risk-superior solutions (Graham and Wiener 1995; Wiener 1998) have brought this general problem to the attention of advocates of precautionary regulation, we count that as a success, even if there will always be debate over particular cases. In this reply, we distinguish HKT’s prescriptive/normative views from their descriptive/empirical observations. We agree with much of their normative recommendations for policy, but disagree with many of their empirical claims.

Hormesis, Hotspots and Emissions Trading

Instrument choice - the comparison of technology standards, performance standards, taxes and tradable permits - has been a major topic in environmental law and environmental economics. Most analyses assume that emissions and health effects are positively and linearly related. If they are not, this complicates the instrument choice analysis. This article analyses the effects of a nonlinear dose-response function on instrument choice. In particular, it examines the effects of hormesis (highdose harm but low-dose benefit) on the choice between fixed performance standards and tradable emissions permits. First, the article distinguishes the effects of hormesis from the effects of local emissions. Hormesis is an attribute of the dose-response or exposure-response relationship. Hotspots are an attribute of the emissions-exposure relationship. Some pollutants may be hormetic and cause local emissions-exposure effects; others may be hormetic without causing local emissionsexposure effects. It is only the local exposure effects of emissions that pose a problem for emissions trading. Secondly, the article shows that the conditions under which emissions trading would perform less well or even perversely under hormesis, depend on how stringent a level of protection is set. Only when the regulatory standard is set at the nadir of the hormetic curve would emissions trading be seriously perverse (assuming other restrictive conditions as well), and such a standard is unlikely. Moreover, the benefits of the overall programme may justify the risk of small perverse effects around this nadir. Thirdly, the article argues that hotspots can be of concern for two distinct reasons, harmfulness and fairness. Lastly, the paper argues that the solution to these problems may not be to abandon market-based incentive instruments and their cost-effectiveness gains, but to improve them further by moving from emissions trading and emissions taxes to risk trading and risk taxes. In short, the article argues that hormesis does not pose a general obstacle to emissions trading or emissions taxes, but that in those cases where hormesis does pose such a problem, a shift toward risk trading or risk taxes would be the superior route.

Empirical evidence for risk‐risk tradeoffs: a rejoinder to Hansen and Tickner

Hansen, Krauss, and Tickner (2008) (hereafter ‘HKT’) identified 33 cases where a ‘risk-risk tradeoff’ was proclaimed in the literature. They concluded from this review that ‘only a small number of these cases can actually be considered risk-risk tradeoffs’ (HKT, abstract, 423). In particular, they rejected 13 cases on the grounds that a risk-superior alternative was available, and 11 cases on the grounds that the countervailing risk was only ‘hypothesized’, leaving nine cases of what they deemed true risk-risk tradeoffs. In our initial reply (Graham and Wiener 2008), we raised a number of concerns about how the 33 cases were selected and how they were analyzed. We argued that HKT’s sample was selected by convenience and thus not generalizable, that HKT omitted many examples in the literature of serious risk-risk tradeoffs, and that even within their sample a proper analysis of the 33 cases actually demonstrates the ubiquity of risk-risk tradeoffs. In their rejoinder to our critique, Hansen and Tickner (2008) (hereafter HT) devote only modest effort to defending their empirical analysis of the 33 cases. Instead they emphasize a broader normative defense of the precautionary principle and alternatives analysis.