Jonathan Baron

Outcome bias in decision evaluation.

In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.

Status-Quo and Omission Biases

Bias toward the status quo, found in choice and in emotional reactions to adverse outcomes, has been confounded with bias toward omission. We unconfounded these effects with scenarios in which change occurs unless action is taken. Subjects reacted more strongly to adverse outcomes caused by action, whether the status quo was maintained or not, and subjects preferred inaction over action even when inaction was associated with change. No status-quo bias was found in a matching task, which did not require action. The observed status-quo bias is at least partly caused by a bias toward omissions.

An analysis of the word-superiority effect ☆

It is easier to decide which of two letters was presented tachistoscopically if the critical letter was in a word rather than in a scrambled word. We showed that this word-superiority effect holds just as strongly for pronounceable nonwords as for words, even when the critical letters are constant over all trials. This finding rules out word meaning and familiarity as variables accounting for the effect. In addition, it was found that the superiority of pronounceable stimuli holds for two-letter stimuli as well as four, and it is therefore concluded that the effect is not due to a memory limitation. An explanation of the effect in terms of the use of additional acoustic information is ruled out by showing that the effect was not diminished when the two possible words sounded exactly alike. An experiment using correctly and incorrectly spelled chemical formulas suggested that spelling regularities, regardless of pronounceability per se, account for the superiority effect. Finally, when decisions about two critical letters must be made on each trial, the correlation between being correct on one and on the other is higher for pronounceable stimuli under some conditions.

Phonemic stage not necessary for reading

Subjects can classify, as not making sense, phrases which sound as though they make sense, e.g. “tie the not”, as quickly as other phrases which do not even sound right, although they make more errors on the former. When asked whether or not phrases sound sensible regardless of how the phrases look, they are faster and make fewer errors on the phrases that look sensible as well as sound sensible. It is concluded that meaning can be efficiently derived from a visual analysis of text without the use of an intermediate phonemic code, or “inner speech”, although such a code may be used some of the time.

Cognitive Processes and the Decisions of Some Parents to Forego Pertussis Vaccination for Their Children

Public health analyses suggest that, in spite of the possibility that pertussis vaccine may cause rare cases of neurological injury, catastrophic risks to individual children are lower if they are vaccinated. A number of parents, however, choose not to vaccinate their children. The purpose of this study was to investigate the decision processes of some parents who choose to vaccinate and some parents who choose not to do so. Surveys were mailed to 500 randomly selected subscribers of Mothering magazine. Two hundred and ninety-four completed questionnaires were returned (59%). In addition to well-recognized factors in vaccination decisions, perceived dangers of the vaccine, and of the disease and susceptibility to the disease, several cognitive processes not previously considered in vaccination decision studies were found to be important predictors in this population of parents: perceived ability to control childrens susceptibility to the disease and the outcome of the disease; ambiguity or doubts about the reliability of vaccine information; a preference for errors of omission over errors of commission; and recognition that if many other children are vaccinated, the risk to unvaccinated children may be lowered. Although perhaps most cases of undervaccination for pertussis reflect more general problems of health care access, some parents choose to forego vaccination for their children for other reasons. Traditional risk-benefit arguments alone will be unlikely to persuade these parents to reassess their decisions. Efforts to increase childhood vaccination must incorporate an understanding of the cognitive processes that help drive these decisions.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in a Setting of Budget Constraints — Is It Equitable?

BACKGROUND: One of the promises of cost-effective analysis is that it can demonstrate how to maximize health benefits attainable within a specific limited budget. Many people argue, however, that when there are budget limitations, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis leads to health care policies that are inequitable. METHODS: We asked prospective jurors, medical ethicists, and experts in medical decision making to choose between two screening tests for a population at low risk for colon cancer. One test was more cost effective than the other but because of budget constraints was too expensive to be given to everyone in the population. With the use of the more effective test for only half the population, 1100 lives could be saved at the same cost as that of saving 1000 lives with the use of the less effective test for the entire population. RESULTS: Fifty-six percent of the prospective jurors, 53 percent of the medical ethicists, and 41 percent of the experts in medical decision making recommended offering the less effective screening test to everyone, even though 100 more lives would have been saved by offering the more expensive test to only a portion of the population. Most of the study participants justified this recommendation on the basis of equity. A smaller number stated either that it was not politically feasible to offer a test to only half the population or that the additional benefit of the more expensive test (100 more lives saved) was too small to justify offering it to only a portion of the public. CONCLUSIONS: People place greater importance on equity than is reflected by cost-effectiveness analysis. Even many experts in medical decision making -- those often responsible for conducting cost-effectiveness analyses -- expressed discomfort with some of its implications. Basing health care priorities on cost effectiveness may not be possible without incorporating explicit considerations of equity into cost-effectiveness analyses or the process used to develop health care policies on the basis of such analyses.

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.

Phonemic-analysis training helps children benefit from spelling-sound rules

It has been frequently suggested that the ability to analyze spoken words into phonemes facilitates children’s learning of spelling-sound rules. This research attempts to demonstrate that link by showing that phonemic-analysis training helps children take advantage of spelling sound rules in learning to read. In two experiments, preschool and kindergarten prereaders participated in an analysis condition and a control condition on each of 4 test days. In the analysis condition, children learned to segment (and in Experiment 2, also to blend) selected spoken syllables. In the control condition, they merely repeated syllables. Children were then introduced to printed items that corresponded to the spoken syllables with which they had worked. The pronunciation of the “related” item could be deduced from those of other printed items in the set; the pronunciation of the “unrelated” item could not be so deduced. Both experiments revealed a significant interaction between condition (analysis vs. control) and item type (related vs. unrelated). In the control condition, children tended to make more errors on the related item than on the unrelated item; in the analysis condition, they tended to make fewer errors on the related item than on the unrelated item. These results suggest a causal link between the ability to analyze spoken syllables and the ability to benefit from spelling-sound relations in reading.

Myside bias in thinking about abortion

Abstract College-student subjects made notes about the morality of early abortion, as if they were preparing for a class discussion. Analysis of the quality of their arguments suggests that a distinction can be made between arguments based on well-supported warrants and those based on warrants that are easily criticised. The subjects also evaluated notes made by other, hypothetical, students preparing for the same discussion. Most subjects evaluated the set of arguments as better when the arguments were all on one side than when both sides were presented, even when the hypothetical student was on the opposite side of the issue from the evaluator. Subjects who favoured one-sidedness also tended to make one-sided arguments themselves. The results suggest that “myside bias” is partly caused by beliefs about what makes thinking good.

I Know, You Know: Epistemic Egocentrism in Children and Adults

This article reviews the evidence and theory pertaining to a form of perspective-taking failure—a difficulty in setting aside the privileged information that one knows to be unavailable to another party. The authors argue that this bias (epistemic egocentrism, or EE) is a general feature of human cognition and has been tapped by 2 independent and largely uncommunicating research traditions: the theory-of-mind tradition in developmental psychology and, with more sensitive probes, the “heuristics and biases” tradition in the psychology of human judgment. This article sets the stage for facilitating communication between these traditions as well as for the recognition of EEs breadth and potential interdisciplinary significance: The authors propose a life-span account and a tentative taxonomy of EE; and they highlight the interdisciplinary significance of EE by discussing its implications for normative ethics.