Jonathan Boston

Linking strategy and performance: Developments in the New Zealand public sector

In recent decades, many governments have sought to improve their systems of strategic management and priority setting. Few of these attempts have met with unequivocal success. In particular, the systems for “whole-of-government strategizing” have not been well integrated into the ongoing budgetary processes and departmental performance management systems. In 1993-1994, as part of its comprehensive reforms of the public sector, the New Zealand government instituted a new system of strategic management. The new approach-which in part grew out of the National governments attempt to outline its long-term vision in a document titled Path to 2010-involves the ministers specifying a series of medium-term policy goals, referred to as “strategic result areas” (SRAs), and then translating these into more detailed departmental objectives, known as “key result areas” (KRAs). More specific “milestones” are subsequently identified to serve as benchmarks against which the achievement of departmental KRAs can be assessed. This article describes and evaluates this new approach and considers its possible application in other countries.

The challenge of evaluating systemic change: the case of public management reform

At what stage of reform in the public sector does it become possible to conduct a thorough appraisal of results and how does one know when this stage has been reached? How should such an assessment be undertaken? By what methods can comprehensive and far-reaching systemic reforms be evaluated in the arena of public management during recent decades, particularly in countries like Australia, Britain and New Zealand? Most assessments have focused upon specific changes in management practice including the introduction of performance pay, the move to accrual accounting, the growth of contracting-out, the separation of policy and operations or the devolution of human resource management responsibilities. Alternatively, they have dealt with management changes in particular policy domains ‐such as health care, education, community services or criminal justice ‐ or within a particular organization (department, agency or private provider). By contrast, there have been relatively few macro evaluations ‐ comprehensive assessments of the impact of root-and-branch changes to the system. The problems of evaluation in the arena of public management are inherently complex and the way ahead is by no means clear. This article offers some broad reflections on the limitations to policy evaluation in the field of public management, and more particularly explores the obstacles confronted when assessing the consequences of systemic management reforms. It focuses on recent changes in the New Zealand public sector to illustrate the general themes because these reforms constitute one of best examples of systemic change anywhere in the world.

Climate change: Explaining and solving the mismatch between scientific urgency and political inertia

Purpose - This paper has two main purposes. First, it considers the detrimental effects of four politically-salient asymmetries on the policy choices of liberal democracies when dealing with the problem of human-induced climate change. Second, it outlines and evaluates possible solutions for reducing or countering these asymmetries. Design/methodology/approach - The approach involves an analysis and evaluation of policy options based on a survey of the relevant literature. Findings - The paper highlights the serious mismatch between the magnitude and urgency of the climate change problem and the current political will to overcome or mitigate the problem. Although four categories of potential solutions, and the various mechanisms through which they might operate, are discussed, it is recognized that all the available options have significant drawbacks, not least limited political feasibility and doubtful effectiveness. In short, action within liberal democracies to mitigate climate change is likely to remain seriously constrained by the four asymmetries discussed, thus increasing the risk of dangerous climate change. Originality/value - The paper highlights the complexities, both international and national, of confronting human-induced climate change. In particular, it identifies four systemic reasons, in the form of politically-salient asymmetries, why liberal democracies have struggled to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provides a systematic assessment of possible solutions to these asymmetries. These include changes to accounting frameworks to ensure that the impact of humanity on the environment and future generations is more transparent.

Policy challenges for livestock emissions abatement: lessons from New Zealand

Under the current framework embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and envisaged for future multilateral agreements, Annex I parties are obliged to limit their economy-wide GHG emissions and accept responsibility for exceeding their targets through various flexible mechanisms. The predominant sources of agricultural GHGs, which represent about 8% of total Annex I emissions, are methane and nitrous oxide from livestock. Efforts to reduce livestock emissions have so far been limited due to disagreements over the abatement potential, technical feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of the policy instruments available, including market-based measures. Two key challenges facing the application of market-based measures to livestock emissions are evaluated: first, to design a policy framework that appropriately aligns the measurement of emissions, the abatement options, and the incentives facing livestock producers; second, to address the risk of leakage and economic regrets that arise from unilateral domestic policy action. Particular attention is given to the policy developments in New Zealand and the lessons learnt from its experience. The challenges of applying market-based measures to livestock emissions are surmountable, but require innovative policy responses.

Child Poverty in New Zealand: Why it matters and how it can be reduced

Abstract A combination of policy changes and wider socio-economic trends led to a dramatic increase in child poverty in New Zealand during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Higher rates of child poverty have now become embedded in the system and show little sign of resolving themselves. For a country which once took pride in being comparatively egalitarian and, more particularly, a great place to bring up children, the tolerance of much greater child poverty is surprising. It is also concerning. Child poverty imposes many costs. This is especially the case, according to the available evidence, when poverty occurs during early childhood and when it is severe and/or persistent. These costs afflict not only the children directly exposed to poverty (e.g. in the form of lower educational achievement, reduced lifetime earnings and poorer health outcomes), but also the whole society. This article briefly explores the available evidence concerning the nature, magnitude, causes and consequences of child poverty in New Zealand and considers why substantial rates of child poverty have been tolerated for an extended period. Drawing on the lessons of anti-poverty approaches in other OECD countries, it then outlines a strategy for securing substantial and durable reductions in child poverty rates in New Zealand. Finally, it considers the prospects of such a strategy being implemented and suggests ways of enhancing the focus of the political system on child-related social issues.

Multi-party governance: Managing the unity-distinctiveness dilemma in executive coalitions

In democracies where no party enjoys a parliamentary majority, various multi-party governance arrangements have evolved to accommodate the respective interests of the parties involved. Such arrangements reflect, among other things, the political imperatives facing the parties in question, in particular the quest for an effective and durable government (which typically requires significant inter-party discipline) and the competing desire for parties to retain their distinctiveness in order to protect their electoral support (which implies less discipline). In New Zealand, efforts to balance governmental unity and party distinctiveness have generated several innovative solutions, including agree-to-disagree provisions in coalition agreements and hybrid arrangements enabling minor parties to participate within the executive while being free of the usual conventions of collective cabinet responsibility. This article explores the origins, nature, merits and impact of the recent developments in New Zealand, and their implications for the study of coalition government.

Climate change, equity and the relevance of European ‘effort-sharing’ for global mitigation efforts

The question of equity in international agreements has a wide variety of interpretations and embraces a number of competing principles. The European Union (EU) effort-sharing arrangement for 2013–2020 collaborative greenhouse gas emissions reductions and renewable energy growth is explored for two underlying principles: solidarity and capability. The concepts and mechanisms of the EU effort-sharing arrangement are examined, with particular attention to how well issues of equity are addressed. The EU approach is then considered for its potential application to other country groupings to ascertain whether, and under what specific conditions, it could be adapted. Based on some features of the EU effort-sharing arrangements, a policy process for determining effort-sharing for mitigation is proposed, which allows for specific national circumstances and varying emphases of solidarity and capability.

The Budget Process in New Zealand: Has Proportional Representation Made a Difference?

In New Zealand, as in most countries, the budget is at the heart of the political process. This paper examines the impact of the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system in the mid-1990s on budget decision-making by focusing on two dimensions. First, it seeks to compare the budget process across five distinct periods of government. Second, it examines changes to two distinct stages of the budget process: the executive phase and the legislative phase. The evidence suggests that the move from single-party majority government to other governmental forms has made the formulation of the budget a more open process, and has increased the number of actors involved. However, Treasury ministers remain dominant, while the primary cabinet cleavage continues to be between them and spending ministers, rather than between coalition partners or between those partners and parties providing support on confidence and supply. To date, there has been no significant change to the legislative phase of the budget, little recourse to the financial veto provisions, and no serious threats to the capacity of governments to secure parliamentary endorsement for their budgetary intentions.

Why did New Zealand adopt German‐style proportional representation?

Public cynicism with politics and politicians led ultimately to New Zealands referendums on electoral systems.

Explaining the demise of the national–New Zealand first coalition

This article considers the fall of New Zealands first coalition government under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, through the prism of a ‘unified’ model of Cabinet durability. This model incorporates both the ‘structural attributes’ of the government at the time of its formation, as well as the stochastic ‘critical events’ that occur over its lifetime. However, the conventional attributes of the National–New Zealand First coalition were considered favourable, and the critical event that precipitated its demise did not by itself appear to be a sufficient condition for termination. It is argued that the hitherto unspecified structural attribute of intra‐party stability was a significant factor for this particular coalition, and that this case also demonstrates the cumulative impact of non‐terminal events in undermining the incentives for continued cooperation between coalition partners.