Jonathan Di John

Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment

Abstract This paper addresses one of the empirical claims of the ‘resource curse’ argument, namely that oil abundance raises the probability of political violence. I argue that the two main theoretical premises of the oil-civil-war link, rent-seeking and the rentier state model, fail to provide a convincing argument as to why oil economies are more vulnerable to the onset of civil war. I find that three often-mentioned mechanisms as to why oil economies succumb to political violence not convincing; that oil economies are poor economic performers; that oil economies generate high corruption; and that oil economies tend to produce authoritarian regimes. I also examine the empirical evidence on the oil-civil-war link and conclude that the results are not robust. I conclude with some policy implications.

The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa

This article provides a critical review of recent literature that has attempted to define what a ‘failed state’ is and explains why such states emerge. It is argued that aggregate indices of ‘failure’ are misleading due to the wide variations of capacity across state functions within a polity. The focus on ranking states also distracts attention away from analyses concerning the dynamics of state capacity. Moreover, many of the definitions either compare reality to a Weberian ideal, or assume that violence is ‘development in reverse’, both of which are ahistorical and unhelpful as a guide to policy. The second part of the article assesses the contributions of functionalist, ‘new war’ and neo-Tillean approaches to explain state failure. The article finds that while these theories take concrete historical situations seriously, they have important theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Finally, the conclusion outlines an agenda for further research.Cet article offre un examen critique de la littérature récente cherchant à définir ce qu’est un État défaillant, ainsi que les raisons donnant lieu à leur émergence. Il considère que les indicateurs agrégés permettant d’établir qu’un État est défaillant sont tous trompeurs en raison de la grande variation qui peut exister au sein d’un même État quant à sa capacité à assurer ses différentes fonctions. Il est souligné que les classements détournent l’attention des analyses portant sur la dynamique variable de la capacité des États. Plusieurs approchent comparent, de plus, la réalité avec un idéal weberien, ou bien supposent que la violence est une forme de développement « à l’envers », ce qui constitue une présupposition anhistorique et inutile du point de vue de l’aide à la décision. La deuxième partie de l’article se penche en particulier sur les contributions fonctionnalistes, du paradigme des « nouvelles guerres », ainsi que des approches basées sur les théories de Charles Tilly. Bien que prenant en compte les réalités historiques, ces différentes approches ont toutes des points faibles, tant théoriques qu’empiriques, et la conclusion de l’article se base sur ces derniers afin d’élaborer un agenda de recherche futur à propos des États défaillants.

Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in Venezuela

This article examines the mechanisms through which economic liberalization policies contributed to increasing political instability and declines in state capacity in Venezuela. Particular attention is paid to the role that increasing income inequality played in polarizing politics and the role that policy switches and party-neglecting strategies among reformers played in increasing political instability. The Venezuelan experience challenges the mainstream view of state capacity, which posits that reductions in the state’s discretionary control over resources will reduce corruption, and thereby increase the capacity of the state to govern more effectively. It also examines why Venezuela suffered greater destabilization than other Latin American economies undergoing neoliberal reform.This article examines the mechanisms through which economic liberalization policies contributed to increasing political instability and declines in state capacity in Venezuela. Particular attention is paid to the role that increasing income inequality played in polarizing politics and the role that policy switches and party-neglecting strategies among reformers played in increasing political instability. The Venezuelan experience challenges the mainstream view of state capacity, which posits that reductions in the state’s discretionary control over resources will reduce corruption, and thereby increase the capacity of the state to govern more effectively. It also examines why Venezuela suffered greater destabilization than other Latin American economies undergoing neoliberal reform.

Albert Hirschman's Exit-voice Framework and its Relevance to Problems of Public Education Performance in Latin America

This paper applies Albert Hirschmans exit-voice framework to the problems of education coverage and quality in Latin America. It argues that the combination of low direct taxation and high levels of private primary enrolment provides exit options for the wealthy and reduces their incentive to exercise their “voice”, or protest mechanisms, in the face of poor education performance. It also argues that fragmented and clientelist political party structures limit the provision and monitoring of public education, and also reduce the political capacity of the poor to exercise their voice regarding public education coverage and quality. The main policy implication of the paper is that good governance in education cannot realistically be addressed without analysing how the structure of power and voice, and of conflicts of interest within civil society, affect the actual political pressures that state institutions face.