Jonathan Harrison

Utilitarianism, Universalization, Heteronomy and Necessity or Unkantian Ethics

My main object in this paper will be to try to show that there is a large area of agreement between a Kantian ethical theory and the teleological ethical theories which, primarily in the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, he so strongly opposed. The manner in which I shall do this is by showing that Kant’s criticism of teleological theories in general does not apply to utilitarianism, the most influential teleological ethical theory. The reason for proceeding in this way is that Kant himself seldom if ever says anything about utilitarianism. It may be that he was not familiar with a sufficiently evolved form of utilitarianism for him clearly to have considered it.

More Deviant Logic

Professor Korners Experience and Conduct , like many other notable entities, is divided into three parts. Part I contains accounts of what Korner calls factual and constructive logic, some remarks on the logic of maxims and their consistency and adequacy, a chapter on probabilistic thinking, and another on preference theory. Part II contains chapters on the logic of action, on attitudes, upon the distinction between regulative and evaluative standards of conduct, on morality, justice, welfare, prudence, legality, and what Korner calls ‘idealizations’. Part III, on the epistemology and metaphysics of practical thinking, contains chapters on rationality, evidence, moral pluralism and a final chapter on moral guidance. The amount of guidance one gets from this last chapter is, as one might expect, small.

Some Reflections on the Ethics of Knowledge and Belief

Knowledge is desirable both for its own sake (because it is something most of us, from curiosity, want) and because without it we will not be able to take the right means to whatever ends we happen to have. Much knowledge is interesting to oneself and others as well as useful, and a man without it will be an impoverished bore, as well as being unsuccessful in his enterprises. There are a large number of moral restraints upon the pursuit of knowl? edge. Probably the most important are imposed by limited time and money. Time and money spent on the pursuit of knowledge mean less time and money to be spent on seeking other worthwhile things. Men must be allowed some time and money to spend even on things that are not worth? while. Life would be dreary else. It is not reasonable to expect men to be engaged on worthwhile pursuits all their lives, or even most of them. Even time and money that could be devoted to preserving human life is often quite properly spent on acquiring knowledge instead, and this for reasons other than that more knowledge will make man more able to preserve human life later on, though sometimes it will do this. One cannot inhibit all dangerous forms of production or activity (e.g., dangerous sport) with the object of securing for everyone an entirely risk-free existence. The safer way of pro? ducing things may sometimes be too expensive, and a life of complete safety is not something that it is either useful or enjoyable to have. Since time and money spent on the pursuit of knowledge is a long-term investment men, who are ineradicably inclined to prefer small near goods to larger distant ones, will tend to spend less of these things upon acquiring knowledge than is wise.

Be Ye Therefore Perfect or The Ineradicability of Sin

The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die in extreme agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, shall be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should will one venial untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse (John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua )