Jonathan Lear

The introduction of Eros : Reflections on the work of Hans Loewald

reud’s essay “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914a) F would have been more aptly called “On the Introduction of Narcissism,” not merely because it is a more accurate translation of the German, but because the aim of the essay is not to introduce the reader to narcissism, so much as to introduce narcissism into psychoanalytic theory. In hindsight, it seems that Freud should also have written an essay entitled, “On the Introduction of Eros.” For from 1920 on, he seems increasingly aware that he had, incredibly enough, left eros out of psychoanalytic thinking. IVhen we talk of a legacy our speech is often tinged with an ambiguity which suggests ambivalence. There is, of course, the straightfonvard sense of a bequest-as with Freud’s passing on to us the idea of the repressed unconscious. But there is also a sense of legacy as that which a person did not hand down (but should have). Here the legacy is a task: it is the unfinished business which the child needs to complete in order to manifest love, atone for ambivalence and succeed the parent (Loeivald, 1960, p. 249). This is Freud’s legacy-as-task: to develop a psychoanalytic account of the erotic. Although he placed eros at the center of psychoanalytic theory, he says remarkably little about it. Of course, he speculates grandly: “Eros” is capitalized, and introduced as one of hvo cosmic principles which, together, make

Working through the end of civilization.

This is an account of how a civilization works through the problems it faces when it is threatened with destruction. It focuses on the example of the Crow Nation, an Indian tribe of the northwest plains of North America, and their last great chief Plenty Coups. Psychoanalytic ideas play a crucial role in explaining how a creative response was possible. In particular, their collective use of dream‐visions and dream‐interpretation made possible the creation of a new ego ideal for the tribe. This allowed for the transformation of traditional allocations of shame and humiliation. It also allowed for the possibility of transformation of psychological structure. And it opened up new possibilities for what might count as flourishing as a Crow. Conversely, the threat of civilizational collapse allows us to see new possibilities for the conceptual development of psychoanalysis. In particular, psychoanalysis needs to recognize that destruction can occur at the level of the culture while the individuals are not physically harmed. The psychological states of these individuals can be various and complex and cannot be neatly summed up under the category of trauma. A culture can be devastated, while there is no one‐to‐one relation to the psychological states of the individuals who participate in that culture. It is also true that a collapse of a way of life makes a variety of psychological states impossible. Coming to understand these phenomena is essential to understanding how a culture works through threats to its very existence.

Technique and Final Cause in Psychoanalysis: Four Ways of Looking at One Moment

This paper argues that if one considers just a single clinical moment there may be no principled way to choose among different approaches to psychoanalytic technique. One must in addition take into account what Aristotle called the final cause of psychoanalysis, which this paper argues is freedom. However, freedom is itself an open‐ended concept with many aspects that need to be explored and developed from a psychoanalytic perspective. This paper considers one analytic moment from the perspectives of the techniques of Paul Gray, Hans Loewald, the contemporary Kleinians and Jacques Lacan. It argues that, if we are to evaluate these techniques, we must take into account the different conceptions of freedom they are trying to facilitate.

JUMPING FROM THE COUCH

This paper addr-linees two questions: first, how do phantasies work? Second, how do these mental activities affect a persons overall emotional life? The first question tends to be overlooked since those who accept, for example, projective identification as a basic mental activity tend also to treat it as an explanatory primitive. On this view, there is no further question to ask about how projective identification itself works; rather, other psychological and emotional phenomena are explained in terms of it. By contrast, this paper asks, how does projective identification itself work? The aim is not to provide a reductive explanation but to ask how it is that phantasies have the efficacy they have. To that end, one moment in the analysis of the Rat Man is re‐examined. There is then an attempt to show the difficulties involved in weaving an account of phantasy into the broader‐scale interpretation of emotional life.

Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being

From its inception psychoanalysis claimed not merely to be an effective therapy for psychological suffering, but to shed light on the human condition. But what kind of insight does psychoanalysis offer? This paper locates psychoanalysis in the western philosophical tradition, arguing that psychoanalysis provides not only theoretical wisdom about the human, but practical wisdom of a peculiar kind. The human mind, through its self‐conscious understanding can be immediately and directly efficacious in shaping its own structure.

The thought of Hans W. Loewald.

1. If Hans Loewald will be remembered, it will not be because of a new theory he contributed, nor because of a scientific discovery, but because of the wisdom that pervades his writing. For that reason, I do not think he will ever be fashionable; but I suspect that through the generations he will continue to attract certain readers. To appreciate Loewald requires patience and playfulness (traits that come in handy as a psychoanalyst): a willingness to live with the unfamiliar thought of another, to allow it take root in one’s own psyche, to return to it after some time and see how it now looks, from the changed perspective that has become one’s own. Consider this passage from Psychoanalytic theory and the psychoanalytic process:

Psychoanalysis and the idea of a moral psychology: Memorial to bernard Williams' philosophy

I met Bernard Williams when I went to Cambridge over three decades ago: he was my teacher – indeed, he remains my teacher – but we then became colleagues and friends. It is a friendship that spanned – and transformed – my adult life. There is no one I know who more enjoyed gossiping about others, trading anecdotes, offering shrewd insights about what makes people tick; but even more than that Bernard loved philosophical conversation. He delighted in talking philosophy – any time, with anyone – and philosophy came alive in those conversations. It is thus a fitting tribute to the man to have a session of the APA devoted to his philosophy. I shall thus pass over reminiscences, important as they are to the mourning process. Instead, I should like to talk about how Williams’ distinctive approach to ethics leads inevitably and essentially to an engagement with psychoanalytic ideas. This is an unfamiliar claim – both in terms of the general understanding of Williams’ work and in terms of the approach to ethics in the analytic tradition of philosophy. And yet, as I hope to show, Williams’ approach to ethical life requires that we turn to human psychology; and the form of psychology required will have to be of a broadly psychoanalytic bent. We can see Williams working towards this conclusion. In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) he raises the possibility that a psychological theory, ‘particularly of a psychoanalytical kind… will support some ethical conceptions as necessary to human happiness’. 1 But because in that book Williams was primarily concerned to argue against the possibility or aspiration of providing a foundation for morality or ethical life, he confined himself to arguing that psychoanalysis could not provide the sought-after foundation. But what if we abandon the aspiration to provide a foundation? What would a non-foundationalist approach to ethical life look like? This was a question which preoccupied Williams over the last two decades of his life.

The idea of a moral psychology: The impact of psychoanalysis on philosophy in Britain

In this paper the author addresses the question of the significance of psychoanalysis for moral psychology via a more specific question: the impact of psychoanalysis on British philosophy in the twentieth century. He argues that there has been no influence of any real significance, and offers intellectual reasons why not. However, he also argues that there has recently emerged the possibility for a future engagement between psychoanalysis and philosophy, and he offers a history of the emergence of this possibility. In particular, the author discusses how the emerging interest within philosophy to work out a satisfying approach to naturalist moral psychology leads it to a concern with internal mental structure and, most importantly, to transformations of intrapsychic structures. He believes that this will lead philosophy to take a greater interest in psychoanalysis.

Den Untergang einer Kultur durcharbeiten

Ubersicht: In diesem Beitrag wird beschrieben, wie eine Kultur die Probleme durcharbeitet, mit denen sie aufgrund ihrer drohenden Vernichtung konfrontiert ist. Der Autor konzentriert sich auf das Beispiel der Crow-Indianer, eines Stammes, der in der Prarie im Nordwesten Nordamerikas lebte, und auf ihren letzten bedeutenden Hauptling, Plenty Coups. Psychoanalytische Konzepte spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei dem Versuch, die Moglichkeit einer kreativen Reaktion zu erklaren. Vor allem die kollektive Benutzung von Traumen und Traumdeutung ermoglichte es dem Stamm, ein neues Ich-Ideal zu entwickeln und herkommliche Scham- und Demutigungszuweisungen auf diese Weise zu transformieren. Dies schuf zudem die Voraussetzung fur eine Transformation der psychischen Struktur und eroffnete den Crow-Indianern neue Moglichkeiten, als Crow ein gutes Leben zu fuhren. Umgekehrt kann uns die Gefahr eines Zivilisationszusammenbruchs neue Moglichkeiten fur die konzeptuelle Entwicklung der Psychoanalyse aufzeigen. Die Psychoanalyse mus insbesondere anerkennen, das eine Destruktion auf der Ebene der Kultur erfolgen kann, ohne das die Individuen korperlichen Schaden nehmen. Die psychischen Zustande der betroffenen Individuen sind unterschiedlich und komplex und konnen nicht unter die Kategorie Trauma subsumiert werden. Eine Kultur kann vernichtet werden, ohne das es eine Eins-zu-eins-Beziehung zu den psychischen Zustanden der Individuen gibt, die ihr angehoren. Gleichzeitig werden zahlreiche psychische Zustande durch den Zusammenbruch einer Lebensweise unmoglich gemacht. Diese Phanomene verstehen zu lernen ist eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung, wenn man begreifen mochte, wie eine Kultur die Gefahrdung ihrer eigenen Existenz durcharbeitet.