Jonathan Reuter

When Should Firms Share Credit with Employees? Evidence from Anonymously Managed Mutual Funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.

How Much Does Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach

The level of diseconomies of scale in asset management has important implications for tests of manager skill and the expected level of performance persistence. To identify the causal impact of fund size on future returns, we exploit the fact that small differences in returns can cause discrete changes in Morningstar ratings that, in turn, generate discrete differences in size. Despite robust evidence that Morningstar ratings increase fund size, our regression discontinuity estimates yield little evidence that fund size erodes returns. Consequently, any downward bias in standard estimates of performance persistence due to diseconomies of scale is likely to be small.

What is the Impact of Financial Advisors on Retirement Portfolio Choices and Outcomes

Within the Oregon University System’s defined contribution retirement plan, one investment provider offers access to face-to-face financial advice through its network of brokers. We find that younger, less highly educated, and less highly paid employees are more likely to choose this provider. To benchmark the portfolios of broker clients, we use the actual portfolios of self-directed investors and counterfactual portfolios constructed using target-date funds, a popular default investment. Broker clients allocate contributions across a larger number of investments than self-directed investors, and they are less likely to remain fully invested in the default option. However, broker clients’ portfolios are significantly riskier than self-directed investors’ portfolios, and they underperform both benchmarks. Exploiting across-fund variation in broker compensation, we find that broker clients’ allocations are higher when broker fees are higher. Survey responses from current plan participants support our identifying assumption that the portfolio choices of broker clients reflect the recommendations of their brokers.

Is Conflicted Investment Advice Better than No Advice

The answer depends on how broker clients would have invested in the absence of broker recommendations. To identify counterfactual retirement portfolios, we exploit time-series variation in access to brokers by new plan participants. When brokers are available, they are chosen by new participants who value recommendations on asset allocation and fund selection because they are less financially experienced. When brokers are no longer available, demand for target-date funds (TDFs) increases differentially among participants with the highest predicted demand for brokers. Broker client portfolios earn significantly lower risk-adjusted returns and Sharpe ratios than matched portfolios based on TDFs—due in part to broker fees that average 0.90% per year—but offer similar levels of risk. More generally, the portfolios of participants with high predicted demand for brokers who lack access to brokers comparable favorably to the portfolios of similar participants who had access to brokers when they joined. Exploiting across-fund variation in the level of broker fees, we find that broker clients allocate more dollars to higher fee funds. This finding increases our confidence that actual broker client portfolios reflect broker recommendations, and it highlights an agency conflict that can be eliminated when TDFs replace brokers.

Heterogeneity in Target-Date Funds: Optimal Risk-Taking or Risk Matching?

In this paper, we study the evolution of the market for target-date funds (TDFs) between 1994 and 2009. We document pronounced heterogeneity in the TDF universe: TDFs with the same target retirement date have delivered very different returns within the same year. We show that some of the heterogeneity in realized returns can be attributed to heterogeneity in allocations to stocks versus bonds. However, we also show that heterogeneity in idiosyncratic returns has increased over time, especially following the passage of the Pension Protection Plan of 2006, which encouraged the use of TDFs as default investments in defined contribution retirement plans. Indeed, we can attribute some of the increased heterogeneity in idiosyncratic returns to the entry of new fund families into the TDF market in 2007-2009. Because these families have few assets to lose if they underperform, and because we show that flows into TDFs chase idiosyncratic returns rather than total returns, we argue that the increased heterogeneity in idiosyncratic returns is consistent with entrants in the market internalizing their risk-taking incentives. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that the widespread adoption of TDFs will not result in returns that are similar across investors enrolled in different 401(k) plans.Following the Pension Protection Act of 2006, there was a sharp increase in the use of TDFs as default investment options in defined contribution retirement plans. We document large differences in realized TDF returns and risk profiles, even for funds with the same target retirement date. Using fund-level data, we find evidence that this heterogeneity reflects optimal risk-taking by fund families with low market share, especially those entering the market after 2006. Using plan-level data, we find little evidence that 401(k) plan sponsors match the risk profile of the TDFs in their plans to the risks of their companies.

Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?

We examine whether credit rating agencies reward accurate or biased analysts. Using data collected from Moody’s corporate debt credit reports, we find that Moody’s is more likely to promote analysts who are accurate, but less likely to promote analysts who downgrade frequently. Combined, analysts who are accurate but not overly negative are approximately twice as likely to get promoted. Further, analysts whose rating changes are more informative to the market are more likely to get promoted, unless their ratings changes cause large negative market reactions. Moody’s balances a desire for accuracy with a desire to cater to its corporate clients.