Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Jonathan Schaffer.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy | 2015
Jonathan Schaffer
The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.
Synthese | 2016
Jenann Ismael; Jonathan Schaffer
Quantum mechanics seems to portray nature as nonseparable, in the sense that it allows spatiotemporally separated entities to have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each other. This is often said to implicate some form of “holism.” We aim to clarify what this means, and why this seems plausible. Our core idea is that the best explanation for nonseparability is a “common ground” explanation (modeled after common cause explanations), which casts nonseparable entities in a holistic light, as scattered reflections of a more unified underlying reality.
Archive | 2016
Jonathan Schaffer
Wilson’s “No Work for a Theory of Grounding” (2014) offers an insightful critique of grounding-based approaches to metaphysical inquiry. She argues that the notion of grounding is uninformative, disunified, and in the end unhelpful. I think that Wilson is right to criticize many extant grounding-based approaches for not being sufficiently informative, but reply that the grounding theorist can learn her lesson by using structural equation models, in ways that reveal the unity and informativeness of grounding. (I also argue that Wilson’s own alternative approach is open to serious criticisms, including every one of the criticisms she levels at the grounding theorist.)
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | 2015
Michael Townsen Hicks; Jonathan Schaffer
Orthodoxy has it that only metaphysically elite properties can be invoked in scientifically elite laws. We argue that this claim does not fit scientific practice. An examination of candidate scientifically elite laws like Newton’s F = ma reveals properties invoked that are irreversibly defined and thus metaphysically non-elite by the lights of the surrounding theory: Newtonian acceleration is irreversibly defined as the second derivative of position, and Newtonian resultant force is irreversibly defined as the sum of the component forces. We think that scientists are happy to invoke metaphysically non-elite properties in scientifically elite laws for reasons of convenience, such as to simplify the equations and to make them more modular. On this basis, we draw a deflationary moral about laws themselves, as being merely convenient summaries. 1. Introduction2. Orthodoxy 2.1. Orthodoxy stated2.2. Orthodoxy explained2.3. A worrisome commitment: Term objectivism3. The Loose View 3.1. The argument from practice3.2. Finding the scientifically elite equations3.3. Diagnosing the metaphysically non-elite properties3.4. Situating our challenge4. Newtonian Mechanics 4.1. Newtonian acceleration4.2. Newtonian resultant force4.3. A metaphysical discovery?5. Objections 5.1. Metaphysically elite after all?5.2. Scientifically non-elite after all?5.3. But our world is not Newtonian!6. Consequences 6.1. Consequences for the motivations for link6.2. Consequences for metaphysically elite properties6.3. Consequences for lawhood Introduction Orthodoxy 2.1. Orthodoxy stated2.2. Orthodoxy explained2.3. A worrisome commitment: Term objectivism Orthodoxy stated Orthodoxy explained A worrisome commitment: Term objectivism The Loose View 3.1. The argument from practice3.2. Finding the scientifically elite equations3.3. Diagnosing the metaphysically non-elite properties3.4. Situating our challenge The argument from practice Finding the scientifically elite equations Diagnosing the metaphysically non-elite properties Situating our challenge Newtonian Mechanics 4.1. Newtonian acceleration4.2. Newtonian resultant force4.3. A metaphysical discovery? Newtonian acceleration Newtonian resultant force A metaphysical discovery? Objections 5.1. Metaphysically elite after all?5.2. Scientifically non-elite after all?5.3. But our world is not Newtonian! Metaphysically elite after all? Scientifically non-elite after all? But our world is not Newtonian! Consequences 6.1. Consequences for the motivations for link6.2. Consequences for metaphysically elite properties6.3. Consequences for lawhood Consequences for the motivations for link Consequences for metaphysically elite properties Consequences for lawhood
Dialectica | 2016
Jonathan Schaffer
Non-Humean accounts of lawhood are said to founder on the Inference Problem, which is the problem of saying how laws that go beyond the regularities can entail the regularities. I argue that the Inference Problem has a simple solution – the Axiomatic Solution – on which the non-Humean only needs to outfit her laws with a law-to-regularity axiom. There is a remaining Epistemic Bulge, as to why one should believe that the posit-so-axiomatized is to be found in nature, but the non-Humean can flatten the bulge. Lawhood serves as a case study of how fundamental posits can do their business.
Synthese | 2018
David Rose; Jonathan Schaffer; Kevin Tobia
Two separate research programs have revealed two different factors that feature in our judgments of whether some entity persists. One program—inspired by Knobe—has found that normative considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when the changes it undergoes lead to improvements. The other program—inspired by Kelemen—has found that teleological considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when it preserves its purpose. Our goal in this paper is to determine what causes persistence judgments. Across four studies, we pit normative considerations against teleological considerations. And using causal modeling procedures, we find a consistent, robust pattern with teleological and not normative considerations directly causing persistence judgments. Our findings put teleology in the driver’s seat, while at the same time shedding further light on our folk notion of an object.
Philosophical Studies | 2016
Jonathan Schaffer
Noûs | 2015
Wesley Buckwalter; Jonathan Schaffer
Philosophical Studies | 2013
David Rose; Jonathan Schaffer
Philosophical Studies | 2014
Jonathan Schaffer; Zoltán Gendler Szabó