Jonathan Tallant

What is it to “B” a relation?

The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, I look to show Oaklander’s (The ontology of time. New York: Prometheus Books, 2004) theory of time to be false. Second, I show that the only way to salvage the B-theory is via the adopting of the causal theory of time, and allying this to Oaklander’s claim that tense is to be eliminated. I then raise some concerns with the causal theory of time. My conclusion is that, if one adopts eternalism, the unreality of time looks a better option than the B-theory.

Against mereological nihilism

I argue that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer (what I describe as) the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs (the mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? I suggest that the answers given in the literature fail and that the obvious responses that could be made look to undermine the motivations for adopting nihilism in the first place.

Optimus prime: paraphrasing prime number talk

Baker (Mind 114:223–238, 2005; Brit J Philos Sci 60:611–633, 2009) has recently defended what he calls the “enhanced” version of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. In this paper I demonstrate that the nominalist can respond to Baker’s argument. First, I outline Baker’s argument in more detail before providing a nominalistically acceptable paraphrase of prime-number talk. Second, I argue that, for the nominalist, mathematical language is used to express physical facts about the world. In endorsing this line I follow moves made by Saatsi (Brit J Philos Sci 62(1):143–154, 2011). But, unlike Saatsi, I go on to argue that the nominalist requires a paraphrase of prime-number talk, for otherwise we lack an account of what that ‘physical fact’ is in the case of mathematics that seemingly makes reference to prime numbers.

Intuitions in physics

This paper is an exploration of the role of intuition in physics. The ways in which intuition is appealed to in physics are not well understood. To the best of my knowledge, there is no analysis of the different contexts in which we might appeal to intuition in physics, nor is there any analysis of the different potential uses to which intuition might be put. In this paper I look to provide data that goes some way to giving a sense of the different contexts in which intuition is appealed to in physics. As I note in the conclusion, there is still much work to be done but I hope that the work here provides us with a first step in the journey to properly understand the use to which intuitions are put in physics and science more generally.

Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. 1 Introduction 2 Three Desiderata 2.1 Limiting 2.2 Robustness 2.3 Breadth 2.3.1 A limited success for Baker 2.3.2 Rejecting Baker’s analysis 2.4 The proposal 3 Probabilistically Additive Hypotheses and a (Sort of) Bayesian Account: The Limpid Rationale Relativized and Reconsidered 3.1 Neutrinos and beta decay 3.2 Avogadro’s hypothesis 3.3 Postulation of Neptune 4 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Three Desiderata 2.1 Limiting 2.2 Robustness 2.3 Breadth 2.3.1 A limited success for Baker 2.3.2 Rejecting Baker’s analysis 2.4 The proposal 2.1 Limiting 2.2 Robustness 2.3 Breadth 2.3.1 A limited success for Baker 2.3.2 Rejecting Baker’s analysis 2.4 The proposal 3 Probabilistically Additive Hypotheses and a (Sort of) Bayesian Account: The Limpid Rationale Relativized and Reconsidered 3.1 Neutrinos and beta decay 3.2 Avogadro’s hypothesis 3.3 Postulation of Neptune 3.1 Neutrinos and beta decay 3.2 Avogadro’s hypothesis 3.3 Postulation of Neptune 4 Conclusion

Dubious by nature

There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelows (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism.

The New A-theory of Time

Abstract The New A-theory of Time (TNAT) is the view, to be elaborated and defended in this article, that many times exist, and that time is real in virtue of every moment in time bearing each of the so-called A-properties: past, present and future. I argue that TNAT is at least as theoretically virtuous as mainstream views in the philosophy of time and may have some claim to being our best theory of time. I show that the properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ can be understood as compatible intrinsic properties. Having demonstrated that this account of the A-properties is coherent, I go on to demonstrate how TNAT can give us an account of passage, change and the truth-conditions for temporal sentences. In the final section of the article, I develop a tentative argument in favour of TNAT, though concede that we have to settle for the result that TNAT is on a par with our other theories of time. In the remainder of this opening section, my aim is to situate the current proposal as a direct response to McTaggart’s infamous argument against the reality of time.

Pretense, Mathematics, and Cognitive Neuroscience

A pretense theory of a given discourse is a theory that claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we token (speak, write, and so on) when taking part in that discourse. Instead, according to pretense theory, we are speaking from within a pretense. According to pretense theories of mathematics, we engage with mathematics as we do a pretense. We do not use mathematical language to make claims that express propositions and, thus, we do not use mathematical discourse to make claims that are either true or false. In this paper I make use of recent findings from cognitive neuroscience and developmental science to suggest that pretense theories of mathematics fail. 1 Introduction 2 The Autism Objection     2.1 Autism and pretense     2.2 Autistic engagement with mathematics         2.2.1 Cortical folding         2.2.2 The language of mathematics 3 The Onset of the Number Sense and the Recognition of Pretense     3.1 A difference in neurology     3.2 Young and no numbers         3.2.1 When and where is the difference?         3.2.2 Damaged HIPS without impairment to engagement with fiction 4 Concluding Remarks 1 Introduction 2 The Autism Objection     2.1 Autism and pretense     2.2 Autistic engagement with mathematics         2.2.1 Cortical folding         2.2.2 The language of mathematics     2.1 Autism and pretense     2.2 Autistic engagement with mathematics         2.2.1 Cortical folding         2.2.2 The language of mathematics         2.2.1 Cortical folding         2.2.2 The language of mathematics 3 The Onset of the Number Sense and the Recognition of Pretense     3.1 A difference in neurology     3.2 Young and no numbers         3.2.1 When and where is the difference?         3.2.2 Damaged HIPS without impairment to engagement with fiction     3.1 A difference in neurology     3.2 Young and no numbers         3.2.1 When and where is the difference?         3.2.2 Damaged HIPS without impairment to engagement with fiction         3.2.1 When and where is the difference?         3.2.2 Damaged HIPS without impairment to engagement with fiction 4 Concluding Remarks

Causation in a timeless world

Abstract This paper is an attempt to answer the question, ‘could there be causation in a timeless world?’ My conclusion: tentatively, yes. The paper and argument have three parts. Part one introduces salient issues and spells out the importance of this (initially somewhat baroque seeming) line of investigation. Section two of the paper reviews recent arguments due to Baron and Miller, who argue in favour of the possibility of causation in a timeless world, and looks to reject their arguments developed there. Section three is a response to a response. In their, Baron and Miller also argue that an argument in favour of the possibility of causation at timeless worlds, that I put forward, is an argument that fails. In section three, my response to Baron and Miller is that their argument against me succeeds, but that there is a nearby argument that we can appeal to in order to demonstrate the possibility of causation at timeless worlds.

Can Teaching Philosophy in Schools Count towards the Research Excellence Framework (UK)

Abstract Even though critical thinking is carried out in schools across the country, there is no attempt to take high-level published philosophical research into schools. This paper reports on a pilot where this was attempted. The findings suggest that this can be done successfully and moreover that the results can be contextualised so as to count towards “impact” in the Research Excellence Framework (UK). The paper suggests that this means philosophers have not only a way of developing children’s confidence and reasoning, but also a way of meeting the requirements on Higher Education Institutions within the UK.