Jordan Gans-Morse

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.

Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm

A political scientist investigates the claim that the field of post-communist studies is and has been dominated by a transitology paradigm whose teleological biases lead to faulty analysis. Based on a comprehensive analysis of post-communist regime change studies published in 10 leading area studies and comparative politics journals between 1991 and 2003 as well as a broader review of the post-communist transition literature, this article seeks to clarify the terminological confusion that is a prominent feature of critiques of transitology and to examine the claim that a single mode of analysis dominates the study of post-communism.

Putin’s Crackdown on Mortality: Rethinking Legal Nihilism and State Capacity in Light of Russia’s Surprising Public Health Campaigns

Facing a demographic crisis, the Russian government recently introduced public health measures to reduce alcohol consumption, traffic fatalities, and tobacco use. The relative success of these measures challenges common assumptions about Russia’s culture of “legal nihilism” and lack of state capacity. Drawing on two original surveys of smokers at Russian universities, we provide evidence that low legal compliance results from expectations about low enforcement, not from a unique legal culture. To account for unexpectedly stringent enforcement of public health laws, we offer a theory of selective state capacity. In contemporary Russia, the top leadership’s personal endorsements of policy initiatives make clear to lower-level officials which rules must be enforced.

Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works

ABSTRACT: This article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti-corruption policies, with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants. Drawing on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, we examine seven categories of anti-corruption strategies: (1) rewards and penalties; (2) monitoring; (3) restructuring bureaucracies; (4) screening and recruiting; (5) anti-corruption agencies; (6) educational campaigns; and (7) international agreements. Notably, rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti-corruption strategies. Nevertheless, we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of anti-corruption audits and e-governance. In addition, adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption. An emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature. We conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review, such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem, it cannot be treated in the long-term with individual-level solutions.

Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-Soviet Russia

Studies of property rights overwhelmingly focus on whether states expropriate or protect property, overlooking the crucial issue of whether private sector actors will use state institutions. By contrast, I argue that the “supply” of formal legal institutions often fails to ensure firms will rely on the state for property rights protection. Instead, firms frequently avoid formal legal institutions and turn to illegal strategies based on violence or corruption. Whether firms adopt legal strategies depends on: (1) firm-level practices and beliefs that impede the use of law, (2) the effectiveness of illegal strategies, and (3) coordination problems resulting from firms’ expectations about each other’s strategies. Drawing on interviews with firms, lawyers, and private security agencies, as well as an original survey of Russian enterprises, I illustrate how “demand-side” factors led to a surprising increase in Russian firms’ reliance on formal legal institutions over the past two decades. The findings suggest that comprehensive understanding of property rights and the rule of law requires not only attention to state institutions’ effectiveness, but also to private actors’ strategies.