José Luis Guasch

The Impact of Privatization on the Performance of the Infrastructure Sector: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Latin American Countries

The authors analyze the impact of privatization on the performance of 116 electric utilities in 10 Latin American countries. The analysis makes a number of contributions to the literature on changes in infrastructure ownership. First, this is the first systemic analysis of the impact of privatization on the distribution of the electricity sector. Second, it constructs an unbalanced panel data set of key indicators for each country. Third, it includes a broader-than in past studies-range of indicators, such as output, employment, productivity, efficiency, quality, coverage, and prices, offering a fuller picture of the effects of privatization on consumers. Fourth, this research covers a longer period of time, and evaluates three stages-before, transition, and after-allowing for the identification of the short- and long-run effects of privatization, as opposed to previous analysesshort time series data that do not identify long-run outcomes. Finally, the counterfactual is considered through the analysis in trends. The authors apply two different methodologies. The first methodology uses means and medians from each period and tests the significance of the changes between periods. The second methodology consists of an econometric model that captures firm fixed effects, firm-specific time trends, and heteroscedasticity corrections. When needed, the authorsused firm-specific time trends to better understand the outcomes. The results suggest that changes in ownership generate significant improvements in labor productivity, efficiency, and product and service quality, and that most of those changes occur in the transition period. Improvements in the post transition period-beyond two years after the change in ownership-are much more modest.

Assessing the governance of electricity regulatory agencies in the Latin American and the Caribbean region : a benchmarking analysis

This paper focuses on an evaluation and benchmarking of the governance of regulatory agencies in the electricity sector in Latin American Countries (LAC). Using a unique database, we develop an index of regulatory governance and rank all the agencies in the LAC countries. The index is an aggregate number of the evaluation of four key governance characteristics: autonomy, transparency, accountability, and regulatory tools, including not only formal aspects of regulation but also indicators related to actual implementation. Based on 18 different indexes, we analyze the positions of agencies with regard to different aspects of their regulatory governance, considering not only performance in each variable but also scores in the different components of each category. This evaluation allows for the identification of particular country shortcomings regarding governance, and indicates needed improvements. Although the region shows an overall good governance design of their regulatory agencies, the implementation of the independent regulator model still faces several challenges. This is particularly evident in political autonomy and in the informal aspects of governance, where the region shows the largest number of countries with the lowest scores. Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil show the best results and Ecuador, Honduras, and Chile the poorest performances. The rest of the countries vary according to the different indexes. We give each governance variable equal weights and positively test the robustness of our approach using Principal Component Analysis.

Do Regulation and Institutional Design Matter for Infrastructure Sector Performance

This paper evaluates the impact of economic regulation on infrastructure sector outcomes. It tests the impact of regulation from three different angles: aligning costs with tariffs and firm profitability; reducing opportunistic renegotiation; and measuring the effects on productivity, quality of service, coverage, and prices. The analysis uses an extensive data set of about 1,000 infrastructure concessions granted in Latin America from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. The analysis finds that as the theory indicates, regulation matters. The empirical work here reported shows that in three relevant economic aspects-aligning costs and tariffs; dissuading renegotiations; and improving productivity, quality of service, coverage, and tariffs-the structure, institutions, and procedures of regulation matter. Thus, significant efforts should continue to be made to improve the structure, quality, and institutionality of regulation. Regulation matters for protecting both consumers and investors, for aligning closely financial returns and the costs of capital, and for capturing higher levels of benefits from the provision of infrastructure services by the private sector.

Improving Logistics Costs for Transportation and Trade Facilitation

Access to basic infrastructure services - roads, electricity, water, sanitation - and the efficient provision of the services, is a key challenge in the fight against poverty. Many of the poor (and particularly the extreme poor) in rural communities in Latin America live on average 5 kilometers or more from the nearest paved road, which is almost twice as far as non-poor rural households. There have been major improvements in access to water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, ports, and airports, but road coverage has not changed much, although some effort and resources have been invested to improve the quality of road networks. This paper focuses on the main determinants of logistics costs and physical access to services and, whenever possible, provides evidence of the effects of these determinants on competitiveness, growth, and poverty in Latin American economies. The analysis shows the impact of improving infrastructure and logistics costs on three fronts - macro (growth), micro (productivity at the firm level), and poverty (the earnings of poor/rural people). In addition, the paper provides recommendations and solutions that encompass a series of policies to reduce the prevalent high logistics costs and limited access to services in Latin America. The recommendations rely on applied economic analysis on logistics and trade facilitation.

Dispositifs de propriété, de financement et de gestion des risques afférents aux concessions de grandes infrastructures portuaires : Le cas du Chili

Le succes de la participation du secteur prive a un projet d’infrastructure est etroitement lie a la capacite des pouvoirs publics a concevoir et a controler judicieusement la relation contractuelle liant les secteurs public et prive. Aussi importe-t-il de bien definir le mecanisme destine a encadrer la participation du prive, tant en amont (contrats adequats et bonne repartition des risques ; procedures d’appel d’offres efficaces, dotees de criteres d’attribution solides et transparents ; et mise en oeuvre d’une procedure de surveillance et d’une reglementation efficaces) qu’a posteriori (gestion posterieure a l’attribution du contrat et examen attentif des demandes de renegociation). Une autre question importante concerne la gestion des risques dans le cadre des concessions privees, en particulier pour les tres grandes infrastructures, les risques inherents a ces projets pouvant etre un obstacle au financement prive.