José María Da Rocha

Economic effects of global warming under stock growth uncertainty: the European sardine fishery

Global warming of the oceans is expected to alter the environmental conditions that determine the growth of a fishery resource. Most climate change studies are based on models and scenarios that focus on economic growth, or they concentrate on simulating the potential losses or cost to fisheries due to climate change. However, analysis that addresses model optimisation problems to better understand the complex dynamics of climate change and marine ecosystems is still lacking. In this paper, a simple algorithm to compute transitional dynamics in order to quantify the effect of climate change on the European sardine fishery is presented. The model results indicate that global warming will not necessarily lead to a monotonic decrease in the expected biomass levels. Our results show that if the resource is exploited optimally, then in the short run, increases in the surface temperature of the fishery ground are compatible with higher expected biomass and economic profit.

Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity: The Role of Idiosyncratic Shocks

We consider policy distortions in a model where plants face idiosyncratic productivity shocks that evolve following a Brownian motion. Introducing idiosyncratic shocks into the model implies that plants have non-constant operating profits and as a result there is an endogenous exit margin and incumbent plants must decide in each period whether or not to remain in the industry. By using the forward Kolmogorov equation, we analytically characterize the Stationary Equilibrium. Our main contribution is to show that if a model is being calibrated/estimated without idiosyncratic shocks, where plants face constant productivity over time and the exit rate is exogenous to fit data generated from a model with shocks and endogenous entry, TFP distortions will be overestimated.

Credible enforcement policies under illegal fishing: does individual transferable quotas induce to reduce the gap between approved and proposed allowable catches?

In general, approved Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are higher than proposed TACs by the scientific assessment and reported landings approved are higher than approved TAC. We build a simple enforcement agency’s behavior model that generates—as a rational behavior—those two facts. The model has two ingredients. First, there exists illegal fishing generated by an imperfect enforcement technology; second, the enforcement agency cannot commit on announced penalties. We show that lack of commitment increases the potential benefits for national enforcement agency of deviating from proposal (scientific optimal) quotas. Although the enforcement agency wants to announce a low quota target to induce a low level of illegal harvest, it will find optimal to revise the quota announced in order to reduce penalties and improve fishermen welfare. Therefore, agencies find it optimal to approve higher quotas than that proposed by the scientific advice. Our main result is to show that when full compliance is not possible, and national agencies cannot commit, the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas increases the potential benefits for agencies of deviating from the optimal proposed TAC by the scientific advised.