Joseph A. Akinyele
Johns Hopkins University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Joseph A. Akinyele.
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering | 2013
Joseph A. Akinyele; Christina Garman; Ian Miers; Matthew W. Pagano; Michael Rushanan; Matthew Green; Aviel D. Rubin
We describe Charm, an extensible framework for rapidly prototyping cryptographic systems. Charm provides a number of features that explicitly support the development of new protocols, including support for modular composition of cryptographic building blocks, infrastructure for developing interactive protocols, and an extensive library of re-usable code. Our framework also provides a series of specialized tools that enable different cryptosystems to interoperate. We implemented over 40 cryptographic schemes using Charm, including some new ones that, to our knowledge, have never been built in practice. This paper describes our modular architecture, which includes a built-in benchmarking module to compare the performance of Charm primitives to existing C implementations. We show that in many cases our techniques result in an order of magnitude decrease in code size, while inducing an acceptable performance impact. Lastly, the Charm framework is freely available to the research community and to date, we have developed a large, active user base.
security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices | 2011
Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew W. Pagano; Matthew Green; Christoph U. Lehmann; Zachary N. J. Peterson; Aviel D. Rubin
We provide a design and implementation of self-protecting electronic medical records (EMRs) using attribute-based encryption on mobile devices. Our system allows healthcare organizations to export EMRs to locations outside of their trust boundary. In contrast to previous approaches, our solution is designed to maintain EMR availability even when providers are offline, i.e., where network connectivity is not available. To balance the needs of emergency care and patient privacy, our system is designed to provide fine-grained encryption and is able to protect individual items within an EMR, where each encrypted item may have its own access control policy. We implemented a prototype system using a new key- and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption library that we developed. Our implementation, which includes an iPhone app for storing and managing EMRs offline, allows for flexible and automated policy generation. An evaluation of our design shows that our ABE library performs well, has acceptable storage requirements, and is practical and usable on modern smartphones.
ieee computer security foundations symposium | 2014
Joseph A. Akinyele; Gilles Barthe; Benjamin Grégoire; Benedikt Schmidt; Pierre-Yves Strub
Many algorithms admit very efficient batch versions that compute simultaneously the output of the algorithms on a set of inputs. Batch algorithms are widely used in cryptography, especially in the setting of pairing-based computations, where they deliver significant speed-ups. AutoBatch is an automated tool that computes highly optimized batch verification algorithms for pairing-based signature schemes. Thanks to finely tuned heuristics, AutoBatch is able to rediscover efficient batch verifiers for several signature schemes of interest, and in some cases to output batch verifiers that outperform the best known verifiers from the literature. However, AutoBatch only provides weak guarantees (in the form of a LaTeX proof) of the correctness of the batch algorithms it outputs. In this paper, we verify the correctness and security of these algorithms using the EasyCrypt framework. To achieve this goal, we define a domain-specific language to describe verification algorithms based on pairings and provide an efficient algorithm for checking (approximate) observational equivalence between expressions of this language. By translating the output of AutoBatch to this language and applying our verification procedure, we obtain machine-checked correctness proofs of the batch verifiers. Moreover, we formalize notions of security for batch verifiers and we provide a generic proof in EasyCrypt that batch verifiers satisfy a security property called screening, provided they are correct and the original signature is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. We apply our techniques to several well-known pairing-based signature schemes from the literature, and to Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge proofs.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | 2010
Matthew W. Pagano; Aviel D. Rubin; Zachary N. J. Peterson; Christoph U. Lehmann; Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew Green
Archive | 2008
Cal Waits; Joseph A. Akinyele; Richard A. Nolan; Larry Rogers
computer and communications security | 2013
Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew Green; Susan Hohenberger
Journal of Computer Security | 2014
Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew Green; Susan Hohenberger; Matthew W. Pagano
computer and communications security | 2015
Joseph A. Akinyele; Christina Garman; Susan Hohenberger
Archive | 2015
Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew Green
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | 2013
Joseph A. Akinyele; Matthew Green; Susan Hohenberger; Matthew W. Pagano