Joseph Boyle

Methotrexate toxicity precipitated by azapropazone

We report an episode of bone marrow hypoplasia following the administration of azapropazone to a patient stabilized on regular methotrexate for psoriasis. A pharmacokinetic interaction is postulated.

Sanctity of Life and Suicide: Tensions and Developments within Common Morality

Among the positions taken on the various disputed questions related to the ethics of killing, one has come to be called the “sanctity-of-life” view. What is designated by this expression is not a carefully articulated philosophical position, but a family of connected views and attitudes, not all of which would be accepted by most who would consider themselves committed to the sanctity of human life.

Symposium: Responding to Terror

IN this article, I will articulate a traditional version of just war theory and apply it to the case of a polity’s response to terrorist actions by groups that are not themselves polities. I will argue that, according to just war theory, defending against this sort of terrorism is a just cause; that within significant constraints sovereign political authorities can have authority to undertake military actions for the sake of this just cause, notwithstanding the nature of organization of the terrorists; and that a political community can pursue such a cause with right intention, even though in the world as it is military efforts to defend against terrorism may well not meet this condition. In this introduction I will define key terms; in the second section I will provide a formulation of just war theory, and in the last section I will apply its conditions for the permissibility of waging war to the case of responding to terrorism by groups that are not states. Traditional just war theory has some potential to illumine issues raised by the response to terrorism because, on the one hand, it is related historically and conceptually to the forms of just war thinking embedded in international law, and on the other, it is rooted in a normatively richer and distinctive conception of practical life than is current just war doctrine. The difference pointed to by my distinguishing current from traditional just war doctrine is in the rationale for the judgments made within each. There will certainly be disagreements about theory and particular judgments in both; but in current just war theory, the project of seeking agreement within the common moral world by careful casuistry from broadly acceptable paradigms, often embodied in international law and agreements, is central. By contrast, in traditional just war doctrine, the consensus is not so central, and the project of determining a war’s justice by application of a conception of morally good social living to the bellicose The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 11, Number 2, 2003, pp. 153–170

Duties to Others in Roman Catholic Thought

This article is not an attempt to offer a full summary of Roman Catholic perspectives on issues involving a person’s duties to others. Such a summary would require a monograph, and such a monograph could hardly begin to address the analytical issues that must be considered if any position on duties to others is to be clarified sufficiently to be part of current discussions. Rather, this article is an essay on the existence and character of duties to others, on their normative foundation, and on their limits and practical implications.

An Appreciative Response

I should like to begin this response by expressing my gratitude to Christopher Tollefsen and to the authors of the contributions for the attention and respect they show my work by preparing these papers and including them in this collection. They honor me and I thank them. I was surprised by the undertaking when told about it, and I have been regretfully slow to respond.

A Catholic Approach to Withholding Medically Provided Food and Water

The refusal or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration to patients unable to provide it for themselves must not be tantamount to intentional killing, nor to bringing about death as a side-effect unless the decision not to help is fully justified morally so as to take proper account of that bad side effect. Moreover, the decision must not be tantamount to intentionally causing suffering or allowing it as a side effect unless the decision not to assist is fully justified morally so as to take proper account of this bad side-effect. Likewise the human solidarity offended by refusing to help to feed another, or to provide nutrition and hydration by way of medical actions must also be respected. The person denied must not be intentionally abandoned; the human good that binds those called to assist with those needing help must not be simply ignored. I will argue that applying these considerations to the variety of possible situations where there is some reason to refuse assistance shows that cases can arise in which refusing this assistance is permissible, but that there are also cases, thought by many to be permissible, that in fact are impermissible.

The Relevance of Double Effect to Decisions About Sedation at the End of Life

Let me begin with (a) some clarifications about how I will understand and use the key terms in clinical and moral discussions of sedation at the end of life, and (b) a brief account of what the ethical doctrine of the double effect is.

WAGING DEFENSIVE WAR: THE IDEA AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPORTANCE

Abstract During the 20th century some versions of just war doctrine came to restrict the condition of just cause to defense, that is, these just war doctrines now hold it to be a necessary condition for the moral justifiability of any war that it be undertaken for defensive purposes. These purposes need not be self – defensive but may be defensive of the welfare and legitimate rights of other polities and groups. Some reasons for war are obviously not defensive, for example, the acquisition of territory or the assertion of imperialist control. But the boundaries of defensive warfare are unclear. I will consider two important cases in which this lack of clarity is proving to be morally significant: namely, preventive and punitive warfare undertaken for the sake of the goal of defense. I will argue that the normative rationale for limiting just cause to defense does not allow these as legitimate forms of defense. That rationale moves towards the view that one should not intend the deaths of enemies but only the restraint of their wrongdoing, and preventive and punitive warfare appear to involve intending the deaths of enemies.