Joseph D. Reid

Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era*

In part A. The patronage era we explain of the changing organization of public employees from patrons to spoilsmen. (Part B. Civil service and militancy, explains the evolution from spoilsmen to civil servants to militant unionists). Commonly, each transformation has been related only to some failing of its preceding form: patronage ended because of its corruption, civil service began because of its promise to stop corruption, and militancy spread because of the inadequacies of civil service. In contrast to these different explanations of each transformation of government employment, we offer the same explanation for each change: a public choice theory assumption that the new organizational form more efficiently maximized the mixture of votes, power, and income that politicians seek. Thus, when poor immigrants promised votes for insurance from urban hazards and businessmen promised graft in return for accommodations, spoilsmen effected the exchanges.

The contribution of exclusive representation to union strength

In this paper we show that exclusive representation and other union security agreements contribute substantially to union strength. A regression analysis of the growth of unionism among teachers during the 1970s measures just how potent exclusive representation and dues checkoff agreements are in stimulating union growth in the public sector. Further discussion prompts the conclusion that these powerful measures are especially inappropriate in the public sector, for they excessively coerce employees’ representation and benefit employers, not employees.

Right-to-work and union compensation structure

There are many reasons to expect that right-to-work legislation should affect unionism, independently of whether or not such legislation reflects the sentiments of the electorate. The strongest reason is that employees protected by right-to-work legislation can quit a union without quitting their job. This should make collective job actions more difficult and prompt local union leaders to strive more for consensus among members. If so, unions in right-to-work states should negotiate less pay for seniority than do unions in non-right-to-work states. PSID wage data generally confirm this prediction.

Union militancy among public employees: A public choice hypothesis

Public employee union membership has grown from under 6 percent to over 20 percent of all union members since 1963. This growth has been ascribed to lagging wages, inelastic demands for public products, political clout, changed laws, and reduced professionalism and public spiritedness. These explanations agree that public employees now confront their employers in a newly militant and adversarial mode. We disagree. We model this growth in membership as a continuation of old public employment relations and forecast the soon diminution of militancy.