Joseph Keim Campbell

Hume's refutation of the cosmological argument

ConclusionLet me summarize the results of this paper in a way that seems fitting to Humes discussion of the cosmological argument. There are some philosophers who adopt the most stringent empiricist principles. Such men and women would reject any notion of necessity that is not analytic, and for this reason they would never admit a proof of the necessary existence of anything. Other philosophers, though empiricists, are not so dogmatic. They question the need for, not the coherence of, necessary existence. They believe that the material universe is nothing over and above the sum of its material parts and, thus, see no reason to conclude that a necessary being exists based on PSR. Still others are driven by a rationalist persuasion. They would gladly recognize the existence of almost anything provided it be proven by reason and argument. When they confront the cosmological argument they do indeed find it compelling but still see no reason to conclude that God, or any transcendent being, necessarily exists. The entity established need be nothing more than the universe itself. Therefore, as Hume has demonstrated, no philosopher need accept the conclusion of the cosmological argument.

Critical Notice: Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Humes Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Humes series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’” (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle” of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Humes (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’” (2008, 3)? Or does Humes skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature” (290)? Russells controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Humes fundamental intentions in the Treatise” is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Humes irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.