Joseph Scanlon

Emergent Groups in Established Frameworks: Ottawa Carleton's Response to the 1998 Ice Disaster

In his book, Organized Behavior in Disaster, Russell Dynes classifies organizations that respond to emergencies four ways – regular, expanding, extending and emergency. He bases this on an analysis of research done mainly in the United States. This article examines whether these typologies fit a 1998 ice storm that left about one-fifth of Canadians without power. The conclusion is that the typologies do fit. However, in the case of the ice storm the ‘emergent’ groups were formed from within rather than outside the established response structure. As a result, there was none of the expected conflict between existing and emergent organizations. The lesson for planners is that if they adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and are ready to sponsor or include emergent groups in their existing structure they can reduce or eliminate conflict.

Unwelcome Irritant or Useful Ally? The Mass Media in Emergencies

When the crew of a derailed Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) freight train at Minot, North Dakota spotted anhydrous ammonia leaking from damaged tank cars, they immediately dialed 9-1-1. As a result of that call, the Minot fire department:

Handling Mass Death by Integrating the Management of Disasters and Pandemics: Lessons from the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Spanish Flu and Other Incidents

At first glance, there appear to be significant differences between mass death from disasters and catastrophes and mass death from pandemics. In a disaster or catastrophe the major problem is identifying the dead and, sometimes, determining cause of death. This can be very frustrating for next of kin. In a pandemic, the identity of the dead is usually known as is the cause of their death. There is an immediate certainty in pandemic death. Despite these major differences there are many similarities. Because it takes time to identify the dead after a disaster or catastrophe, there is a steady release of bodies for cremation or burial, just as in a pandemic. In both types of incidents, there tends to be a shortage of supplies and personnel and, therefore, a need for use of volunteers. There are also massive amounts of paper work. This would suggest a need in both cases for stockpiling and for training of volunteers. And, although this does not always happen, both types of incidents tend to strike harder among the poorer elements in cities yet both create serious economic problems. Despite these many similarities, planning for the first tends to be done by emergency agencies, especially the police; planning for the second by health agencies. Given the many similarities this separation makes no sense. Since both types of mass death incidents lead to similar problems, it would make sense to take an all-hazards approach to planning for dealing with mass death.

Transportation in emergencies: an often neglected story

Looks at the way in which public transport is used for evacuation of personnel in the event of emergencies or disasters. Although the work of the emergency services is well documented, it seems that the important task of evacuation, and particularly the planning, operation and documentation is often overlooked. This article looks at how public transport copes with this task, and suggests that this is due to the sometimes unpredictable nature of the transport system due to roadworks, road closures, accidents, etc. Special events, such as football matches, are a regular occurrence, which include the need to move large crowds to and from the venue. This strategy and planning can be used in the evacuation of people in the event of a disaster.

Dealing with mass death after a community catastrophe: handling bodies after the 1917 Halifax explosion

The literature available on how communities deal with mass death, in particular body handling procedures, is sparse. Describes the actions of the various people involved in the immediate aftermath of the Halifax (Nova Scotia) 1917 explosion. Also, but in less detail, examples the Rapid City flood, the Gander air crash, the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, the Tangsham earthquake, the Texas City explosion and the Kobe earthquake. Highlights the problems of handling bodies after a mass fatality incident: respect accorded to the dead individual; whether skilled individuals are there to take on the tasks, the tagging and identification procedures required and the setting up of temporary morgue facilities.

Convergence unlimited: overloaded call centres and the Indian Ocean tsunami

In the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, hundreds of thousands of persons all over the world called their foreign ministries to report that they were concerned their loved ones were among the victims. There were so many calls that most Foreign Ministry call centres were overwhelmed in short, there was worldwide information convergence. Though all call centres had problems some fared better than others, sometimes because they had more experience or better planning, sometimes because they had a good back-up system or because they had a recording informing callers what information would be needed so callers were prepared when they did get through not because they did get through. In one case the problems were fewer because the incident occurred the day after Christmas day, which is a holiday in Christian countries but was a normal working day in Israel. Two countries Canada and the Netherlands used a computer-based system designed by a Canadian company, World Reach Software, intended for precisely this type of crisis. It functioned well. There is no way to prevent calls in the wake of such destructive events but a review of what happened in nine countries Israel, the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Australia and New Zealand suggests that some lessons were learned and that planning could be improved.

Steadily Increasing Control: The Professionalization of Mass Death

Recent mass death incidents in Japan and Haiti have again focused attention on the challenge of dealing with large numbers of dead. Focusing on mass death incidents involving large numbers of Canadian victims, including the Titanic, Halifax explosion, Air India bombing and the 2004 Tsunami, the paper researches incidents dating back to the beginning of the 20th Century. By examining each stage of the process including initial response, identification, funerals, communication, religious services and inquests, the paper identifies key changes in the way that mass death incidents are handled. For example, the research identifies greater professionalization and state control of mass death incidents, increased reliance on experts and technology and increased emphasis on accurate identification, through forensics, and causes, through inquests and inquiries.

Increasingly intolerable boundaries: future control of environmental pollution.

In recent years, there have been a number of toxic accidents on the sea and on land which have caused pollution down current, down wind and down stream. Four were dramatic and these four have led to substantial changes in the way we deal with risk to the environment. There have also been increasing concerns about a less spectacular but equally concerning problem, acid rain, though attempts to deal with this problem have been less successful. Perhaps the drama was lacking. In all these cases, unfortunately, the less developed countries can ill afford the costs of prevention and this means they are often the home of environmentally unfriendly development. While the current approaches to such problems will continue, it is likely that the countries on the receiving end of such pollution, especially if they have economic and military power, will seek more forceful solutions. One outcome may be a UN-sponsored environmental police force.

OLD THEORIES DON'T APPLY: IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES*

Essential to any system of mass communication in normal or crisis situations would seem to be a functioning system of mass media. Certainly, the existence of such a system is implicit in both general theories of how people acquire and disseminate information and in the literature about crisis or disaster communication. There is evidence, however, that the assumptions made about media under normal conditions may, in fact, not apply to crises, especially if these crises occur without warning. Instead of being essential or at least useful in disasters, the media may be either absent or dysfunctional. This suggests the need both for new theories and for plans to deal with communication in crises in ways not dependent on present theories. Before expanding on this point, a note of caution: the material in this article is put forward for discussion. The conclusions are tentative depending to some extent on data that may be atypical. Theories about how people acquire, disseminate and are influenced by information abound. The most rudimentary is the hypodermic needle model [Reference (27) p. 791. It postulates that information flows directly from media to receiver eliciting a specific response. Like other stimulus-response models, it fails to explain differing responses to similar stimuli or similar responses to different stimuli. A more elaborate concept is the notion of the two-step flow of communication, the notion that “ideas often flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of population” [Reference (12) p. 1511. This idea has gained considerable credence and has been used in election studies and personal influence research. weakness appears to be that information flows both ways not just out from the media and that factors other than just opinion leaders influence attitude formation. J Concerned about these various limitations, Klapper has argued for a phenomenistic approach. He perceives informaIts

The Politics of Hostage Rescue: Is Violence a Route to Political Success?

Over the years, law enforcement agencies have acquired extensive experience with hostage incidents, and most Western countries have officers trained in all aspects of hostage resolution. There are also articles and manuals outlining how to deal with the media coverage of hostage takings (Scanlon, 1989). However, because hostage rescue efforts can provide dramatic visuals that attract enormous audiences, the media have steadily intensified their coverage of such incidents. Today, a group of previously obscure persons can suddenly dominate the media agenda by successfully resisting an armed assault or by seizing hostages and calling themselves terrorists. After defining a hostage incident and looking at the strategy for dealing with such incidents, this article examines the implications of two fatal incidents: the stand-off involving religious fanatics at Waco, Texas; and the Air France hijacking that started in Algiers and ended in Marseille, France. Both became number one on the Western media agenda, and both became political crises involving the head of state; one threatening a president’s credibility, the other enhancing a president’s status. Together they suggest that the escalating media coverage of such incidents raises questions not only about the effectiveness of current response strategies, but also about political leadership. This article discusses a number of strategies that have been tried or suggested. It also debates whether involvement has a positive or negative effect on political leaders. It concludes that, from the evidence available, a successful hostage rescue can yield political rewards.