Joshua Cockayne

Empathy and divine union in Kierkegaard: solving the faith/history problem in Philosophical Fragments

Soren Kierkegaards account of faith in Philosophical Fragments claims that the historical Incarnation is necessary for faith, but that historical evidence for the Incarnation is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. It has been argued that the defence of these two claims gives rise to a faith/history problem for Kierkegaard and that it is incoherent to defend an account of faith which affirms both the necessity of the historical Incarnation and rejects the necessity and sufficiency of the historical evidence for the Incarnation. I argue that this problem can be solved by applying Eleonore Stumps (2013) account of divine–human union. I argue that the Incarnation is necessary because it allows us to enjoy a kind of mutual empathy with Christ which is the basis of divine–human union and that the historical evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient since faith is grounded in a second-person experience of Christ. I claim that this solves the faith/history problem and offers a way of defending Kierkegaards account of faith as coherent.

The Imitation Game: Becoming imitators of Christ

What is it to lead a Christian life? At least part of the answer, from St Paul to Thomas a Kempis, to makers of WWJD bracelets, is to imitate Christ. But while there is a lot of practical advice in the spiritual literature for imitating Christ, there is little by way of philosophical analysis of what it is to imitate Christ. In this article, I aim to fill this lacuna. I argue that the imitation of Christ, as conceived of by St Paul, Thomas a Kempis, and others, requires a radical transformation of character, which, in turn, I argue, based on considerations from developmental psychology, requires direct engagement with Christ. This conclusion may be surprising, since Christ does not seem to be directly present to contemporary believers in the same way as, say, a mother is directly present to her infant child. I deal with this objection, and conclude with some applications of this approach to the philosophy of Christian spirituality.

Prayer as God-knowledge (via Self)

Abstract What is the purpose of prayer? According to Kierkegaard, “prayer does not change God, but it changes the one who prays.” Whilst much contemporary philosophy of religion focuses on the so-called puzzle of petitionary prayer, less is written about how prayer can change the person who prays. In this paper, I discuss Kierkegaard’s account of prayer in The Sickness unto Death and “An Occasional Discourse on the Occasion of Confession.” Prayer, as it is presented here, allows a person to gain a certain kind of self-knowledge and thereby draw near to God. After outlining Kierkegaard’s account, I draw some comparisons with Harry Frankfurt’s account of the will to demonstrate how prayer might allow for both self-knowledge as well as God-knowledge

The naked self: Kierkegaard and personal identity

© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1176901

Søren Kierkegaard: subjectivity, irony, and the crisis of modernity

Since the celebration of the 200th anniversary of Soren Kierkegaard’s birth, there has been a steady stream of excellent secondary literature on Kierkegaard released. Jon Stewart’s Subjectivity, Ir...

Contemporaneity and communion: Kierkegaard on the personal presence of Christ

ABSTRACT Søren Kierkegaard’s claim that having faith requires being contemporary with Christ is one of the most important, yet difficult to interpret claims across his entire authorship. How can one be contemporary with a figure who existed more than two millennia ago? A prominent answer to this question is that contemporaneity with Christ is achieved through a kind of imaginative co-presence made possible by reading Scripture. However, I argue, this ignores what Kierkegaard thinks about Christ as a living agent, and not a merely historical agent. By drawing on Kierkegaard’s discussion of Christ’s true presence in the sacrament of Communion, I argue that contemporaneity with Christ should be understood in the same way as any other intersubjective relation. That is, I argue, that just as relating to any living person as contemporary requires a kind of two-way attention-sharing, relating to Christ as contemporary, on Kierkegaard’s account, requires a kind of two-way attention-sharing with Christ.

The Dark Knight of the Soul : weaning and the problem of divine withdrawal

If God loves us and so desires union with us, why is it that so many, who once felt close to God and who have subsequently done nothing to precipitate separation from him, now experience only his absence? A metaphor which has been used repeatedly to answer this question is that separation from God is a kind of spiritual weaning process in which God uses the experience of his absence in order to bring about maturation and greater union with him. After discussing the use of this metaphor in Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling and John of Crosss poem The Dark Night of the Soul, I discuss the question of how someones absence could be good for their maturation. I argue that separation has an important role to play in deepening relationships of love – drawing on research in de-adaptation in the psychological and sociological literature, I argue that in order for there to be a union of love, there must be an experience of both dependence and independence. This position can explain why God allows people who engage in the spiritual life to suffer the pain of separation from him.