Joshua D. Kertzer

Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes

Although classical international relations theorists largely agreed that public opinion about foreign policy is shaped by moral sentiments, public opinion scholars have yet to explore the content of these moral values, and American IR theorists have tended to exclusively associate morality with liberal idealism. Integrating the study of American foreign policy attitudes with Moral Foundations Theory from social psychology, we present original survey data showing that the five established moral values in psychology—harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity—are strongly and systematically associated with foreign policy attitudes. The “individualizing” foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are particularly important drivers of cooperative internationalism and the “binding” foundations of authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity of militant internationalism. Hawks and hardliners have morals too, just a different set of moral values than the Enlightenment ones emphasized by liberal idealists.

Making Sense of Isolationism: Foreign Policy Mood as a Multilevel Phenomenon

Political scientists have long been interested in the American public’s foreign policy mood, but they have typically separated the microlevel question (who’s more likely to support isolationism?) from the macrolevel one (when does isolationism’s popularity increase?), even though public opinion is inherently a multilevel phenomenon, as the answers to these two questions interact. Showing how multilevel models can deal with the effects of time rather than just space, I find that both guns and butter drive foreign policy mood, but in different ways. When economic assessments sour, the public’s appetite for isolationism increases, but the impact of these individual-level perceptions is constrained by aggregate economic conditions, which are sufficiently salient that they are accessible irrespective of knowledge. The nature of the international security environment, however, predominantly affects foreign policy mood amongst high-knowledge individuals, thereby suggesting that low- and high-knowledge individual...

Resolve in International Politics

Why do some leaders and publics display remarkable persistence in war, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? Why did the French remain in the First World War despite having suffered nearly a third of a million soldiers killed, missing, or wounded in the Battle of Verdun alone, while the United States immediately halted its military operations in Somalia after 18 of its soldiers were killed during the Battle of Mogadishu? Although resolve is one of the most frequently used independent variables in International Relations, used to explain everything from developments on the battlefield to deliberations at the bargaining table to decisions at the ballot box, we have very little sense of why some actors are more resolved than others. I argue that resolve is an interaction between situational stakes and dispositional traits; by pointing to a series of dispositional characteristics frequently studied in a growing body of research on willpower in behavioral economics and social psychology (time and risk preferences, honor orientations, and trait self-control), I disaggregate the costs of war and explain why certain types of actors are more sensitive to the costs of fighting, while others are more sensitive to the costs of backing down. I test this argument at the micro-level with laboratory and survey experiments, and at the macro-level with Boolean statistical analyses of great power military interventions from 1946-2003. The macro-level analyses suggest that resolve indeed boosts the probability of victory, finding evidence in favor of country-level situational and leader-level dispositional sources of resolve.

Resolve, Time, and Risk

Why do some actors in international politics display remarkable persistence in wartime, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? I offer a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I test the theory experimentally in the context of public opinion about military interventions. The results not only help explain why certain types of costs of war loom larger for certain types of actors but also shed light on some of the behavioral revolutions contributions more broadly.

Homo Diplomaticus : Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality

Psychology is traditionally used in political science to explain deviations from rationality. Lost in the debate between rationalists and their critics, however, is a sense of whether the kinds of strategic self-interested behavior predicted by these models has psychological microfoundations: what would homo economicus look like in the real world? We argue that strategic rationality varies across individuals and is characterized by a pro-self social-value orientation and a high level of epistemic motivation. Testing our argument in the context of international relations, we employ a laboratory bargaining game and integrate it with archival research on German foreign policy-making in the 1920s. We find in both contexts that even among those interested in maximizing only their own egoistic gains, those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to adapt to the strategic situation, particularly the distribution of power. Our results build a bridge between two approaches often considered to be antithetical to one another.

Fair is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics

Behavioral economics has shown that people often diverge from classical assumptions about self-interested behavior: they have social preferences and are concerned about issues of fairness and reciprocity. Social psychologists show that these preferences vary across actors, with some displaying more prosocial value orientations than others. Integrating a laboratory bargaining experiment with original archival research on Anglo-French and Franco-German diplomacy during the interwar period, the authors show how fairness and reciprocity matter in social interactions. That prosocials do not exploit their bargaining leverage to the degree that proselfs do helps explain why some pairs of actors are better able to avoid bargaining failure than others. In the face of consistent egoism on the part of negotiating partners, however, prosocials engage in negative reciprocity and adopt the same behaviors as proselfs.

National socioeconomic indicators are associated with outcomes after aneurysmal subarachnoid hemorrhage: a hierarchical mixed-effects analysis

OBJECT Although heterogeneity exists in patient outcomes following subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) across different centers and countries, it is unclear which factors contribute to such disparities. In this study, the authors performed a post hoc analysis of a large international database to evaluate the association between a countrys socioeconomic indicators and patient outcome following aneurysmal SAH. METHODS An analysis was performed on a database of 3552 patients enrolled in studies of tirilazad mesylate for aneurysmal SAH from 1991 to 1997, which included 162 neurosurgical centers in North and Central America, Australia, Europe, and Africa. Two primary outcomes were assessed at 3 months after SAH: mortality and Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS) score. The association between these outcomes, nation-level socioeconomic indicators (percapita gross domestic product [GDP], population-to-neurosurgeon ratio, and health care funding model), and patientlevel covariates were assessed using a hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regression analysis. RESULTS Multiple previously identified patient-level covariates were significantly associated with increased mortality and worse neurological outcome, including age, intraventricular hemorrhage, and initial neurological grade. Among national-level covariates, higher per-capita GDP (p < 0.05) was associated with both reduced mortality and improved neurological outcome. A higher population-to-neurosurgeon ratio (p < 0.01), as well as fewer neurosurgical centers per population (p < 0.001), was also associated with better neurological outcome (p < 0.01). Health care funding model was not a significant predictor of either primary outcome. CONCLUSIONS Higher per-capita gross GDP and population-to-neurosurgeon ratio were associated with improved outcome after aneurysmal SAH. The former result may speak to the availability of resources, while the latter may be a reflection of better outcomes with centralized care. Although patient clinical and radiographic phenotypes remain the primary predictors of outcome, this study shows that national socioeconomic disparities also explain heterogeneity in outcomes following SAH.

Microfoundations in international relations

Many of our theories of international politics rely on microfoundations. In this short note, I suggest that although there has been increasing interest in microfoundations in international relations (IR) over the past 20 years, the frequency with which the concept is invoked belies a surprising lack of specificity about what microfoundations are, or explicit arguments about why we should study them. I then offer an argument about the value of micro-level approaches to the study of conflict. My claim is not that all theories of IR need to be developed or tested at the micro-level in order to be satisfying, but rather, that many of our theories in IR already rest on lower-level mechanisms—they either leave these assumptions unarticulated or fail to test them directly. In these circumstances, theorizing and testing micro-level dynamics will be especially helpful. I illustrate my argument using the case of resolve, one of the central explanatory variables in the study of international security. I argue that the absence of microfoundations for resolve is one reason why IR scholars have had difficulties testing whether resolve has the effects we often claim, and sketch out a two-stage research design political scientists can use to study unobservable phenomena.

From Geo to Neo: A Speculative Inquiry into the Unusual “Geo-Ethnic” Roots of Neoconservatism in US Foreign Policy

There has been much controversy over the role that ethnic diasporas (sometimes called “lobbies”) do or should play in shaping American foreign policy. This article looks at one particular ethnic group, American Jews, with a view to assessing the claim made by some authors, to the effect that “neoconservatism” has been influenced considerably by Judaism. The article mostly debunks that claim, at least if the suggestion is that something about Judaism as a religion can help account for the policy agendas espoused by neoconservatives in recent years. However, the authors do argue that a “geo-ethnic” link can be established between a Jewish diaspora in America and the evolution of neoconservatism. Their claim is that a “borderlands” tradition emanating originally on the Russian frontier in the latter part of the nineteenth century was exported to America, through the migration of peoples they refer to as “new borderers.” This folk community, the authors argue, coalesced with another, well-established, folk community of “borderers” (the Scotch-Irish), resulting in the formation of the coalition known in recent years as neoconservatism – a coalition representing a fusion of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism.

Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes

Do costly signals work? Despite their widespread popularity, both hands-tying and sunk-cost signaling have come under criticism, and there’s little direct evidence that leaders understand costly signals the way our models tell us they should. We present evidence from a survey experiment fielded on a unique sample of elite decision makers from the Israeli Knesset. We find that both types of costly signaling are effective in shaping assessments of resolve for both leaders and the public. However, although theories of signaling tend to assume homogenous audiences, we show that leaders vary significantly in how credible they perceive signals to be, depending on their foreign policy dispositions, rather than their levels of military or political experience. Our results thus encourage international relations scholars to more fully bring heterogeneous recipients into our theories of signaling and point to the important role of dispositional orientations for the study of leaders.